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Preface
Germany has a fertility rate far below replacement level, meaning that its population is pro-
jected to shrink. Thus, fertility behavior is of highest interest for both policymakers and
researchers. Figure 1 shows the development of the total fertility rate (TFR) for West and East
Germany. The TFR is a hypothetical measure of howmany children a woman would have over
her lifetime if she were to experience the current age-specific fertility pattern. Since the baby
boom in the middle of the 1960s, the West German TFR has been falling. The replacement
rate of 2.1 children per woman was reached for the last time in 1970. Now, the TFR is stag-
nating at a very low level of around 1.4 children per woman, making it one of the lowest in
the developed world. The long-run trend for East Germany looks similar – negative and far
below the replacement level. However, East Germany’s short-run fertility trend is dierent
than that of West Germany. It has been argued that the tremendous fall in the eastern part
of the country’s TFR to 0.8 children per woman in the period 1991 to 1994 is partly due to
the uncertainty surrounding German Reunification and the transition from a socialist to a
market-based economy. Indeed, the German Reunification is an example, among others, of
economic uncertainty.
Figure 1 : Total fertility rate from 1950 to 2013 in West and East Germany
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Apart from demographers and also sociologists who have been interested in fertility behavior
for decades, even economists have started to focus on this topic. The economic literature
identifies several determinants of the fertility level, includingpreferences andvalues (Easterlin,
1973; Easterlin, Pollak, and Wachter, 1980), socioeconomic factors (Becker, 1991; Schultz,
1974), and institutional settings (Lundberg and Pollak, 2007). As pointed out by Becker (1960)
early on, economic circumstances and, especially, labor market conditions are of major
importance in fertility decisions since they determine the opportunity costs of childbearing. In
a very simple framework, couples of reproductive age devote their disposable time either to
working in the labormarket or to childrearing at home. Therefore, labormarket conditions can
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influence the time allocation within households and, consequently, fertility. The contribution
of this dissertation is that it explicitly investigates the socioeconomic consequences arising
from economic uncertainty on the labor market.
Measuring economic uncertainty, however, is non-trivial. Situations that some individuals
assess as uncertain in the sense of unpredictable future developments might be interpreted
by other individuals in a more positive way as either challenging or even beneficial. At the
individual level, uncertainty can bemeasured subjectively or objectively. For instance, indi-
viduals can subjectively assess the economic situation in general as well as the security of
their own particular employment. However, it is not clear whether self-assessed uncertainty is
comparable across individuals. Thus, an oenpreferredwayofmeasuring uncertainty is to use
observable and objective characteristics. More precisely, spells of unemployment and atypical
employment, like marginal or fixed-term employment, are considered. Unemployment – and,
to some extent, marginal employment – leads to career interruptions and uncertainty about
future job and income prospects, whereas the economic uncertainty aspect of fixed-term
employment involves the unemployment risk once the contract ends. At the aggregate level,
economic uncertainty is basically measured by national or local economic conditions. One
way of measuring economic uncertainty at the aggregate level is the unemployment rate
in a certain area. For employed individuals in that area, it represents the risk of becoming
unemployed. Thus, not the realized shock, but the inherent risk of becoming unemployment
causes the uncertainty.
This dissertation is comprised of four stand-alone research papers in which I analyze the
socioeconomic consequences of economic uncertainty. At the aggregate level, I focus on
local labor market conditions and how they aect period fertility measures in the short run
(Chapter 1) and cohort fertility in the long run (Chapter 2). At the individual level, I empirically
investigate theeectsof startinga careerwitha fixed-termcontract on thequantumand timing
of fertility (Chapter 3) and on health conditions and well-being (Chapter 4). The remainder of
this preface contains nontechnical summaries of the four chapters.
Chapter 1: Fertility and Local Labor Market
Opportunities
In Chapter 1, I investigate, at the aggregate level, how local labor market conditions aect
birth rates in German travel-to-work areas.
Graphical evidence suggests a correlation between current labormarket dynamics and fertility
trends. However, very little is known about the true relationship between unemployment
and fertility rates at an aggregate level. I use German administrative birth and unemployment
data from 1997 to 2011 to clarify the role played by local labor markets in fertility levels. My
approach is based on fixed eects regressions as well as instrumental variable estimations
making use of a shi-share index that models changes in the local labor demand. The key
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findings are as follows. There is a significant negative impact of local unemployment on
fertility. I find strong indications that the negative eects on fertility are permanent and not
driven by the postponement of births. Consistent with economic theory, increases in the gap
betweenmale and female unemployment are associated with lower fertility rates. Moreover,
heterogeneity analyses show that the findings hold particularly in the West German travel-
to-work areas and for the subset of native Germans. Themain estimate suggests that in the
period from 2001 to 2004, when unemployment rose on average by 1.9 percentage points,
Germany lost approximately 50,000 children due to unfavorable developments on the labor
market.
This chapter makes several contributions to the field. First, I use monthly data on a very
precise regional level that allows me to link labor market conditions and fertility behavior
more closely thanhas beendone in previouswork. Second, the use of an instrumental variable
approach in the German context is unique. Finally, extant research ignores the fact that the
short-run labor market eects could be entirely due to changes in the timing of fertility. I
present extensive evidence that a mere tempo eect on childbearing is very unlikely in the
German context.
Chapter 2: The Long-Run Consequences of Unemployment
Experience on Fertility
In Chapter 2, I empirically assess how state-level unemployment is related to completed
fertility and childlessness for the female birth cohorts from 1954 to 1967.
Extant fertility research mainly focuses on the short-run relationship between local labor
market conditions and birth rates; not much, if any, work has been done on the long-run
eects of unemployment on fertility. Chapter 2 goes somedistance in addressing this oversight
by examining the consequences of experiencing high levels of local unemployment over the
fertile age on the number of children and the incidence of childlessness at age 40. Applying
standard estimation techniques to a sample of women from the birth cohorts 1954 to 1967
(data from the Microcensus 2008 and 2012) shows that unemployment experience averaged
over five-year age intervals does indeed matter for women’s fertility behavior: increasing
female unemployment rates during early career years significantly increase fertility, whereas
rising male unemployment rates have the opposite eect. This relationship is mainly driven
by changes in the probability of remaining childless. For instance, if the average female
unemployment rate for the age rangeof 20 to 24 increases by 1percentagepoint, the likelihood
that a woman remains childless decreases by 1.6 percentage points. However, if the male
unemployment rate rises by the same amount in the same period, childlessness increases by
1.2 percentage points. Sincemost couples do notmake decisions about having children before
age 25, we argue that our results represent a "scaring" eect of unemployment that influences
future fertility behavior. Twomechanismsmay explain the findings: first, unemployment rates
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have a substantial impact onmarriage market outcomes, that is, the likelihood of marrying,
and, second, the level of unemployment has an impact on household income.
The combined results of Chapters 1 and 2 have an important message for policymakers.
We show in detail that labor market conditions interfere with fertility behavior. Adverse
labor market conditions influence the level of fertility in the short as well as the long run.
However, men and women react dierently to changes in unemployment rates. If the job
market prospects for women worsen, they increase fertility, whereas poorer conditions for
men reduce fertility. Therefore, in the event of rising unemployment rates, a well-designed
family-oriented labor market policy should attempt to minimize the negative consequences
of reduced income and reduce the opportunity costs of childbearing.
Chapter 3: Fixed-Term Employment and Fertility: Evidence from
GermanMicro Data
In the third chapter, my co-author, Natalia Danzer, and I study the short- tomedium-run eects
on subsequent fertility of starting a career with a fixed-term contract.
Fixed-term employment has become tremendously popular in the German labor market.
By 2012, almost every second new employment contract was of limited duration. Previous
research oen discusses the employment and income eects of fixed-term employment but
ignores possible spill-over eects to other domains of life. Therefore, we close this gap by
analyzing the eects of starting a career with a fixed-term contract on timing of first birth and
number of children. We focus on career start since we expect that fixed-term contracts and
their inherent economic uncertainty imply a path dependence, setting individuals on career
paths that are characterized by repeated spells of temporary employment, lower income
progression, and higher risk of unemployment.
Descriptiveevidence suggests that fixed-termemployment is indeedassociatedwitheconomic
uncertainty and that having children requires secure economic conditions. In ourmultivariate
analysis we comparewomenwith either a permanent or a temporary first contract in regard to
their fertility behavior during the first 10 years aer they entered the labor market. Based on
rich data from the German Socio-Economic Panel, which provides comprehensive information
about individuals’ labor market history as well as their fertility, our main results are the
following. Women tend to postpone first birth when they enter the labor market with a fixed-
term contract and reduce the number of children in the first 10 years aer graduation. These
associations are strongest in the subsample of native women with at least vocational training
but no university degree. In contrast, we find no significant correlations for men. Results are
robust to the inclusion of a large set of control variables and a number of sensitivity checks. In
addition, based on observable characteristics, we find no evidence that certain women tend
to select into fixed-term employment.
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Themain contribution of this chapter is its explicit focus on the type of first contract and the in-
herent path dependence caused by starting the careerwith a fixed-term contract. We conclude
that fixed-term employment disproportionately aects the young generation (i.e., women of
reproductive age). Therefore, policymakers should strive for a more equal distribution of the
costs associated with flexible labor markets across population subgroups.
Chapter 4: Health Consequences of Starting a
Career with a Fixed-Term Contract
Chapter 4 is a follow-up to Chapter 3 in which I study the short- to medium-run eects on
subsequent health outcomes of starting a career with a fixed-term contract.
Oicial health insurance statistics provide evidence that mental health issues are a major
concern in Germany. The 2014 report of the company health insurance fund (BKK) contains
statistics suggesting that absenteeism due to mental illness has increased rapidly – since the
1970s, absence days per insured person have quintupled. Therefore, I investigate in this last
chapter how the type of first employment contract aects health and well-being during the
first five years of an individual’s career.
Again, Imake use of theGermanSocio-Economic Panel, which has provided information about
mental andphysical health conditions since 2002. Themain analysis shows thatwomenwhose
first employment contract is of the fixed-term type tend to report worse mental health in
the short run compared to women who start their career with a permanent contract. This
relationship is driven by the subjective perception of stress and pressure in these jobs, fades
out over time, and is strongest in the sample of women with secondary education. However,
economic uncertainty due to fixed-term employment has the opposite eect onmen’s mental
health. At the beginning of the careers, men do not appear to be aected by economic
uncertainty, but starting in their third year in the labor market, men report significantly better
health outcomes when their first contract was of limited duration and not a permanent one.
The path dependence consequent to starting a career with a fixed-term contract is the main
mechanism explaining our findings. Men’s and women’s physical health is not aected at
all. The results are robust to the inclusion of a large set of control variables and a number of
sensitivity checks. In addition, we find no evidence that certain women or men tend to select
into fixed-term employment based on observable characteristics.
If economic uncertainty due to fixed-term employment at the beginning of the career is as-
sociated with poor mental health conditions for women, it means that such contracts are
accompanied by unintended costs. Since mental health problems are a major reason for
absenteeism from work, these costs are also incurred by health insurance companies and
employers. Similar to the policy implications of Chapter 3, it appears that making the labor
market more flexible implies unintended costs for young women that should be taken into
consideration when evaluating the benefits of fixed-term employment.
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1 Fertility and Local Labor Market Opportunities
1.1 Introduction
Nearly every developed country is now suering from the problems that accompany fertility
rates far below the replacement level, perhaps one of the most troublesome of which is that
in an ageing society, shrinking population threatens stable growth and a sustainable social
security system. Economic factors play an important role in fertility decisions and economic
uncertainty is seen as an obstacle to young couples having children. During the recent global
financial crisis, the relationship between business cycles and fertility became of renewed
interest to both the public and the scientific community. Based on the latest cross-country
fertility trends, The Economist concluded that the current recession is having a dampening
eect on birth rates, as witnessed by its article entitled "Europe’s Other Crisis: Recession is
Bringing Europe’s Brief Fertility Rally to a Shuddering Halt" (The Economist, June 30, 2012).
Given the already very low levels of fertility inmany European countries, this is not good news.
However, will the assertion that economic downturns have a negative impact on fertility pass
a thorough empirical examination? That is what this chapter intends to analyze.1
Standard microeconomic theory of fertility, which dates back to Becker (see, e.g., Becker,
1960, 1965, 1991) does not predict an unambiguous negative eect of increased economic
uncertainty on fertility. In Becker’s work, children are modeled as normal consumption goods
and fertility decisions are based on the relative costs and benefits of having children. The
overall eect on fertility of a recession characterized by increasing unemployment rates is
the result of two opposing eects and can be positive or negative. On the one hand, demand
for children will fall if unemployment leads to a permanent reduction of wages and family
income (income eect). On the other hand, lower wages reduce the opportunity costs of time
required for childrearing, which should thus increase the demand for children during spells of
unemployment (substitution eect). The overall eect of income on fertility depends on the
relative size of these opposing income and costs of time eects. In many countries women
traditionally devote more time to childrearing than domen, and hence the opportunity costs
argument applies mainly to women. As a result, worsening economic conditions for men
due to increased unemployment risk and lower wages are expected to lower fertility rates,
whereas worse labor market conditions for women are expected to aect fertility through a
negative income and a positive substitution eect. However, the extent to which birth rates
respond to changing labor market conditions is ultimately an empirical question that we will
address in this chapter.
1 This chapter is based on a research proposal by Wolfgang Auer, Natalia Danzer, and Helmut Rainer that was
submitted to the Fritz-Thyssen-Stiung in 2013.
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The question ofwhether and, if so, how labormarket opportunities aect fertility has attracted
scientific interest for many decades. In general, the findings of most – but not all – existing
empirical studies suggest that economicboomsare associatedwithhigher birth rates, whereas
economic downturns are associated with lower birth rates (Sobotka, Skirbekk, and Philipov,
2011).
The extant research on this topic can be divided in two types of studies. The first examines
the eect of national unemployment rates on fertility outcomes in a cross-country or a cross-
region framework. The results for Europe (e.g., Adsera, 2005, 2011 for 13 European countries
without Germany) as well as for Latin America (e.g., Adsera and Menendez, 2011 for 18 Latin
American countries) show that higher levels of unemployment are associated with decreases
in fertility and a delay in childbearing. For the United States, Schaller (2016) explicitly links
birth rates to aggregate unemployment rates in a causal way. Using gender-specific shi-
share instruments, she shows that birth rates rise when labor market conditions for men
improve, and fall when such conditions become better for women. Currie and Schwandt
(2014) look at the short- and long-run consequences of state-level unemployment rates for
fertility outcomes. They conclude that higher unemployment implies lower fertility in both
the short and long term that is mainly driven by increased levels of childlessness. In contrast,
Dehejia and Lleras-Muney (2004) do not find any significant eect of state unemployment
rates on regional birth rates in the United States.
The second type of study investigates individual-level fertility eects of economic uncertainty.
Kreyenfeld (2010) examines whether German women postpone childbearing in response to
economic uncertainty. While she does not find any significant eects for the pooled sam-
ple, a subgroup analysis by educational level reveals that low-educated women who are
unemployed have higher birth rates than do employed women. A more reliable identifica-
tion strategy is applied to Austrian data for the years 1990 to 1998 by Del Bono, Weber, and
Winter-Ebmer (2012). They find a significant and robust reduction in fertility due to career
interruptions. In a follow-up paper, Del Bono, Weber, and Winter-Ebmer (2015) confirm that
displacement from a career-oriented job is detrimental for fertility but find that unemploy-
ment spells per se do not cause a drop in fertility. In a broader context, Schmitt (2012) analyzes
the impact of unemployment and precarious employment (fixed-term contracts, part-time
work) on individuals’ fertility choices using German and U.K. data. His results suggest negative
eects of atypical employment on fertility in Germany but not in the United Kingdom, and
positive eects of female unemployment on fertility in both countries. However, most of
the papers discussed above do not account for either the fact that fertility and labor sup-
ply decisions are interrelated, that changes in the unemployment rate might be caused by
fertility-induced changes in labor supply, or that changes in the timing of births might explain
the estimated eects.
Hence, we intend to answer the following questions. First, is there a causal eect of local labor
market conditions on fertility rates? Second, is the impact of local labor market conditions
on fertility temporary or persistent? Third, are fertility rates dierentially aected by male
2
1 Fertility and Local Labor Market Opportunities
and female labor market opportunities? In particular, we advance the field by using detailed
administrative vital statistics data from Germany to investigate the causal link between local
labor market conditions and fertility rates and by analyzing whether there are dierences in
fertility responses with respect to changing male versus female labor market opportunities as
economic theorywould suggest. Finally, this is the first paper that explicitly examineswhether
the estimated eect is temporary or persistent.
Since unemployment might be endogenous, the empirical identification of a causal eect on
fertility requires exogenous shis in labor demand. Our identification is closely related to that
employed by Schaller (2016), but expands her approach. Using birth and employment data
aggregated on the level of 244 travel-to-work areas (TTWAs) from 1997 to 2011, we instrument
for the local unemployment rate by using an industry shi-share indicator of labor demand –
the Bartik IV, named aer Timothy J. Bartik who proposed the use of labor demand indices
(Bartik, 1991). Since, potentially, births are postponed in recessions and then pursued in the
subsequent recovery, we explicitly discuss whether we are estimating an eect on the timing
of births or an actual quantum eect. In addition, we test existing theory on gender-specific
eects.
Our results suggest that local labor market conditions have a negative impact that reduces,
on average, monthly births per 1,000 women by 0.5 percent (FE) to 0.9 percent (IV). Accord-
ing to this finding, the burst of the dot-com bubble aer 2000 prevented the birth of more
than 50,000 babies in a four-year period. We also find that the extensive margin as well as
the intensive margin is aected: first, second, and higher-order births become less likely if
economic circumstances worsen. To check potential changes in birth timing we investigate
the eects on age-group-specific birth rates as well as age at birth and find no evidence that
births are completely postponed. In support of the above-discussed theory, we find that a
rise in the gap betweenmale and female unemployment rates reduces local fertility rates, a
strong indicator for dierent eects of male and female unemployment rates. For women,
the substitution eect seems to bemore pronounced than the income eect. Heterogeneity
analyses show that the results are driven by native women in West Germany.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 1.2 describes the data and the
empirical approach. Section 1.3 shows results for quantumaswell as tempo eects of changes
in local labor market opportunities. Gender-specific eects are presented in Section 1.4 and
further heterogeneity in Section 1.5. Section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 Data and Method
1.2.1 Data
To conduct the empirical analysis we construct a regional panel dataset for the period 1997 to
2011 in which wematchmonthly regional birth register data with indicators of local labormar-
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ket conditions and other relevant region-specific characteristics. All data (except for the vital
statistics) canbe foundon the regional databaseof theGermanStatisticalOice (regionalstatis-
tik.de) or the statistic website of the Federal Employment Agency (statistik.arbeitsagentur.de).
The unit of analysis is local labor markets as classified by the Federal Institute for Research
on Building, Urban Aairs and Spatial Development (BBSR), hereaer called travel-to-work
areas (TTWAs). A complete list (Table A.1) andmap (Figure A.1) of all 258 German TTWAs can
be found in the Appendix.
Fertility data are from the German Birth Register, which contains information on all birth
certificates in one calendar year, covering more than 650,000 annual births. We collapse the
individual birth data on TTWA-year-month cells andmerge the sociodemographic information.
The birth certificates contain information about county of residence, age of mother, and birth
order within a given marriage. Using this information, we calculate regional fertility rates by
age of mother and by birth order. Our main dependent variable is the birth rate per 1,000
women, that is, the sum of births in a TTWA during a month per 1,000 women of reproductive
age (15 to 44 years). Similarly, the age-specific birth rates are defined as the sum of births per
1,000 women of a specific age relative to all women in the specific age group. Within a given
marriage, the data contains a count variable that identifies the birth order. Dividing the sum
of first, second, and third and higher-order births by the number of women of reproductive
age (× 1,000) allows investigating the eects of local unemployment risk on fertility at the
extensive as well as the intensive margin.
The explanatory variable of main interest is the (local) unemployment rate. The unemploy-
ment rate is a good proxy for general economic activity since unemployment directly aects
individuals and is less likely to be endogenous, unlike, for example, GDP growth or individual
wages. We use administrative unemployment data from the labor statistics of the Federal
Employment Agency. To obtain a measure of local labor market conditions we divide the
number of unemployed individuals in the TTWA by the local working-age population (i.e., men
and women between 15 and 64 years of age). Given the availability of the data (regional level
and long time horizon), this is the best approach for constructing the unemployment rate
even if it is not completely in linewith the definition used by the Federal Employment Agency.2
Since both the birth rates and the unemployment rates are available on a monthly basis, we
can lag the unemployment rate by nine months to control for the fact that the decision to
have a child is made at conception rather than at birth.
As a first step, Figure 1.1 shows the development of unemployment rates (by gender) as well
as the birth rate over time – each series aggregated by year and Germany as a whole. The
figure reveals that the birth rate was relatively high in 1997, with almost 50 births per 1,000
women of reproductive age, but dropped drastically by 2006. Since then, there has been an
2 The German Federal Employment Agency sets the number of unemployed relative to the total work force
defined as the sum of unemployed and the employed individuals. Inactive individuals are not counted. Thus,
our definition underestimates the true level of unemployment. This could be problematic if the share of inactive
individuals varies systematically across regions.
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Figure 1.1 : Development of gender unemployment rates and birth rate
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Notes: Germany, 1996-2011. Unemployment rates are defined as number of
unemployed women ormen divided by the respective working-age population
(15-64) multiplied by 100. Birth rate is defined as number of births per 1,000
women of reproductive age (15-44). All rates are yearly averages for Germany.
upward trend interrupted by a kink in the most recent year. From 1995 to 2000, the birth
rate follows the development of the unemployment rates. However, since 2000, the graph
shows that unemployment and fertility rates go in the opposite direction. In the year aer
unemployment rates peak at 9 percent, fertility hits the bottom. In the subsequent period of
economic recovery, unemployment rates decrease and the level of fertility goes up again.
In the main analysis, we focus on birth and unemployment rates at the regional level, which
gives us several advantages. Compared to cross-country studies employing aggregate national
unemployment rates that might be confounded by general country-specific time trends, our
analysis exploits regional variation in economic uncertainty across space and over timewithin
Germany. This not only allows assessing the importance of local labor market conditions on
regional fertility levels, but also providesmore variation and statistical power for the empirical
analysis. In contrast to micro-level studies that focus on individual unemployment or job
loss incidence, regional unemployment rates are theoretically better proxies for more general
economic uncertainty (Dehejia and Lleras-Muney, 2004).
A TTWA combines one or more counties into a regional unit based on certain prerequisites,
including that one-way commuting time is less than 45 minutes as well as that there have
to be jobs for at least 65 percent of the labor force in a TTWA. Thus, a TTWA is a restricted,
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albeit not exclusive, area where economic activity is concentrated. Even though an analysis
at the county level would give more regional variation and hence more statistical power, the
main advantage of our approach is that the unemployment rate is expected to be far more
representative on the regional than on the county level. For instance, a significant share
of workers live in the countryside and commute to urban centers where jobs are located.
Assigning the unemployment rate of their county of residence rather than their county of
work would bias the relevant measure of labor market conditions. There are 258 TTWAs in
Germany but due to several local government reorganizations (mainly in Eastern Germany),
we have to aggregate some of them to ensure a consistent definition of the regional units of
observation.3 The full sample is comprised of 244 TTWAs, that we observe monthly for 15
years, summing to 43,920 observations. Due to the nine-month lag between measurement of
unemployment and fertility, the final sample size is 41,710 TTWA-month observations.4
Obviously, there is some variation in the sociodemographic characteristics within and across
the TTWA. These factors are likely to aect the level of fertility in an area as well as the level of
unemployment and therefore confound our estimates. Thus, it is essential to include them in
our regression to eliminate this source of endogeneity. Control variables are age structure
of population, population density, and share of migrants of reproductive age (15-44 years).
All controls are available only as yearly averages. To avoid jumps in the covariates only from
December to January each year, we interpolate the variables over all 12 months assuming a
linear development in the demographic controls.5 Table 1.1 shows descriptive statistics for
the outcome as well as the control variables.
On average, there are 3.7 monthly births per 1,000 women of reproductive age, which adds up
to 44.4 births per year and 1,000women. Age-specific birth rates are low for very youngwomen
and women at the end of their childbearing years. The highest rate of 7.9 monthly births per
1,000 women occurs in the age group of 25 to 29 years. Mean age at birth is a little above 29
years. The average monthly unemployment rate is 6.8 percent, with a slightly higher level for
men and a slightly lower level for women. SomeWest German regions exhibit unemployment
rates far below 5 percent (with a minimum of 1.7 percent), but some regions, particularly in
East Germany, face unemployment rates higher than 20 percent.
3 Figure A.1 in the Appendix is a map of all TTWAs with markers for those TTWAs that are aected by local
government reorganizations.
4 The actual number is 41,724 but 14 observations have missing unemployment rates. Düsseldorf and
Mönchengladbach did not report unemployment numbers for February 2010, and nor did Eisenach for the
year 1997.
5 Both linear interpolation as well as constant values over the year might create some structure in the error
term that in turnmight be correlated with the unemployment rate and therefore might cause biased coeicients.
However, we are convinced that not controlling for demographic factors (measured annually) increases the
threat of confounded estimates evenmore drastically.
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Table 1.1 : Descriptive statistics of outcome and control variables
N Mean SD Min Max
A. Dependent variables
Birth rate per 1,000 women 15-44 41,710 3.693 0.599 1.527 7.191
Birth rate per 1,000 women 15-19 41,710 0.927 0.514 0.000 5.204
Birth rate per 1,000 women 20-24 41,710 4.347 1.364 0.282 12.450
Birth rate per 1,000 women 25-29 41,710 7.937 1.759 1.385 18.024
Birth rate per 1,000 women 30-34 41,710 7.010 1.655 1.044 15.816
Birth rate per 1,000 women 35-39 41,710 2.793 1.000 0.000 8.381
Birth rate per 1,000 women 40-44 41,710 0.472 0.302 0.000 2.802
Age at birth women 15-44 41,710 29.183 0.964 24.696 33.150
B. Control variables
Unemployment rate 41,710 0.068 0.032 0.017 0.213
Male unemployment rate 41,710 0.070 0.032 0.013 0.224
Female unemployment rate 41,710 0.066 0.035 0.016 0.218
Labor demand index 41,710 0.031 0.027 -0.047 0.158
Population density 41,710 299.1 432.8 38.22 3919.9
Share of migrants 15-44 41,710 0.094 0.047 0.009 0.250
Share of women 15-19 41,710 0.146 0.019 0.083 0.194
Share of women 20-24 41,710 0.143 0.016 0.107 0.232
Share of women 25-29 41,710 0.145 0.016 0.095 0.208
Share of women 30-34 41,710 0.166 0.025 0.108 0.225
Share of women 34-39 41,710 0.194 0.017 0.136 0.235
Share of women 40-44 41,710 0.206 0.021 0.144 0.264
Population fraction 45-49 41,710 0.076 0.008 0.057 0.104
Population fraction 50-54 41,710 0.066 0.009 0.040 0.098
Population fraction 55-59 41,710 0.061 0.009 0.038 0.089
Population fraction 60-64 41,710 0.060 0.009 0.036 0.083
Population fraction 65-74 41,710 0.106 0.014 0.072 0.153
Population fraction 75+ 41,710 0.081 0.013 0.047 0.132
Notes: Full sample of 244 TTWAs, 15 years, and 12months; unemployment data are missing for Düsseldorf
and Mönchengladbach for February 2010 and for Eisenach for all of 1997.
The demographic control variables dier largely across regions. First, we include the year-
of-age shares of women over all women between 15 and 44 years,6 which ensures that our
estimations are not confounded by changes in the size of the relevant female cohort. The
younger cohorts are smaller than the older ones in themajority of areas. The declining fertility
rates over the last decades explain why cohorts are shrinking over time. Second, the age
structure of population changes steadily, resulting in higher shares of people close to or at
retirement age. We define the age structure as the number of people of every single age
from 45 to 74, and above 75, divided by the total population in the respective TTWA. These
variables control for the fact that regions with a higher fraction of older residents might have
dierent preferences and therefore dierent fertility behavior. Third, TTWAs vary widely in
6 For a more readable presentation of summary statistics we only show population controls in five-year age
intervals. In the empirical analyses we use these controls as year-of-age shares.
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population density, which is defined as number of residents per square kilometer. On average,
299 people live on a square kilometer in a German TTWA, but the values range from 38 to over
3,900. Population density is a goodmeasure for the degree of urbanization in a region. Fourth,
the share of foreign population possibly influences the level of fertility (Fernández and Fogli,
2006). Hence, we control for the share of migrants of reproductive age, 15 to 44 years. On
average, 9.4 percent of our sample has a foreign background. The values range from less than
1 percent to 25 percent of non-native population in a TTWA.
1.2.2 Method
In a first step, we examine the relationship between (local) labormarket conditions and fertility
by exploiting the variation in the unemployment rate over timewithin regions. The underlying
empirical model is a simple linear regression of the following form:
(1.1) log(FRTrt) = βURrt + γ′Xrt + µt + φr + rt.
log(FRTrt) denotes the natural logarithm of the fertility measures, that is, number of births
per 1,000 women, in region r at time t. On the right-hand side of the equation, URrt is
the unemployment rate at time of conception. Consequently, β captures the eect of local
labor market conditions on the dierent fertility measures. Time-varying, region-specific
characteristics are combined in the vector of controls, Xrt, to account for changes in the
demographic composition of a TTWA. Time fixed eects,µt, control for dynamics in the fertility
rates that are common toall regions. These time controls comprise a full set of dummies for the
interaction of years andmonths to precisely capture the general dynamics as well as seasonal
patterns in fertility and unemployment. TTWA fixed eects, φr, capture all time-invariant
dierences in birth rates that are unique to any region, r. Finally, rt is an idiosyncratic error
term. Under the assumption that based on the observable characteristics as well as the year
and region fixed eects, unemployment rates are exogenous to fertility, we can estimate a
consistent β. In other words, there must not be any unobservable time-varying and region-
specific characteristics that are correlated with both the birth rate and the unemployment
rate.
In a second step, we augment our linear model by implementing a region-specific linear time
trend, ωr × T :
(1.2) log(FRTrt) = βURrt + γ′Xrt + µt + φr + ωrT + rt.
This approach nets out correlation between unobservable characteristics and birth rates that
follow a linear trend over time within region. The identifying assumption changes slightly: we
estimate consistent eects of local labor market conditions when time-varying confounders
follow a linear time trend aer controlling for all regional characteristics and fixed eects.
However, there are still sources of endogeneity that might cause biased estimates, even
aer controlling for all observable characteristics and including a variety of fixed eects. For
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example, there could be reverse causation if, for example, a higher propensity to give birth
results in lower unemployment sincewomen are no longer registered as unemployed. Second,
unobserved heterogeneity across TTWAsmight cause an omitted variable bias. Assuming that
an unobserved change in preferences induces fertility to fall and labor market attachment
to rise, then, mechanically, the fertility rate as well as the unemployment rate (due to larger
denominator) decline, resulting in an underestimation of the true (negative) relationship.
For these reasons, we look for a source of exogenous variation in regional unemployment
rates. Such an instrumental variable must not be correlated with the outcome variable in
any way, except through the channel "unemployment rate." This condition excludes the
instrument from causal model of interest (exclusion restriction) and requires the instrument
to be suiciently correlated with the endogenous variable (relevance condition). While the
earlier condition cannot be tested, we show that the instrument is relevant in the first-stage
results (see Table 1.2).
Following Schaller (2016), we propose a shi-share index of labor demand (LDI), which takes
advantage of dierences in the regional industry structure and dierences in employment
trends across industries. Traditionally, these shi-share indices are used to instrument for
local labormarket opportunities if supply as well as demand shismay influence, for example,
employment andunemployment rates (Bartik, 1991; Blanchard andKatz, 1992). Bertrand, Pan,
and Kamenica (2013) analyze the consequences of relative income within households, Aizer
(2010) studies the influence of the gender wage gap on domestic violence, Gould, Weinberg,
and Mustard (2002) investigate the local unemployment eect on crime rates, and, in a com-
parable setup, Bound and Holzer (2000) look at how labor demand shis aect employment
rates and earnings.
Themain idea is that these dierences in employment trends aremainly due to changes on the
labor demand side (e.g., changes in production technology or product demand) and therefore
do not influence the fertility decisions except through changes in the level of unemployment.
However, not all industries experience the same employment trajectory. Some industries,
such as financial services, are growing faster than others, whereas manufacturing exhibits a
negative employment trend, at least before the year 2000.
To construct our instrumental variable, we exploit the variation that arises due to substan-
tial dierences in industry mix across German TTWAs and hence the fact that the region of
residence might influence the local labor market conditions.7 Figure 1.2 illustrates regional
variation in initial industry composition. For instance, the shares of the construction sector
range from below 5 percent to almost 25 percent of the local economy. This is probably due
7 We use six broad industry categories defined by the German Statistical Oice (WZ03): (1) agriculture, (2)
manufacturing, (3) construction, (4) trade, transportation, and communication, (5) financial services, and (6)
public and other services. In 2008 there was a change in classification (WZ08) with the consequence that
industries are not defined consistently over time. For the years 2000 to 2009 we have information about WZ03 as
well as WZ08 employment. Thus, we are able to compute weights such that the WZ08 classification aer 2009
and WZ03 data are comparable over time.
9
1 Fertility and Local Labor Market Opportunities
Figure 1.2 : Histogram of regional employment shares by industry in 1996
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to the construction boom in East Germany aer Reunification. Trade and transportation,
which encompasses also the hospitality industry, is particularly important in regions that
have a strong tourism industry, while financial services determinemore than 20 percent of
employment in Frankfurt and Munich.
Furthermore, we exploit variation over time that is due to dierences in national employment
trends across industries. Figure 1.3 illustrates the development of overall employment be-
tween 1996, our base year, and 2011. The service sector, which includes "Trade andTransporta-
tion," "Financial Services," and "Public and Other Services," exhibits increasing employment
throughout the whole period of observation, whereas the share of employment in agricultural
and the construction sector steadily shrinks. Employment in manufacturing remains quite
stable. Changes in labor demand, induced by technological change or changes in product
demand, have amore substantial impact on those TTWAs in which the aected industry has a
high share of total employment. Therefore, changes in national employment are likely to also
influence the level of local unemployment.
Following Bartik (1991) and Schaller (2016), we construct a variable representing the predicted
employment growth to the base period as follows:8
(1.3) LDIrt =
∑
i
Git ∗ Eir0
Er0
8 A very clear derivation of the measure of (changes in) labor demand is provided by Maestas, Mullen, and
Powell (2013). The authors also show why the Bartik IV can be regarded as an exogenous measure of labor
market conditions and labor market dynamics.
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Figure 1.3 : Development of national employment by industry (in 1,000s)
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where i is a subscript for industry, r for the regional level, and t denotes the respective time
period. Git is the national growth rate to the base period 1996 of employment in industry i in
period t. This change is weighted by the relative importance of the industry in the region in the
base year 1996, Eir0
Er0
, and summed over all industries. Summing over all industries minimizes
the threat of dierent people sorting into dierent industries (Aizer, 2010). Since national
trends for these six industries are available only on a quarterly basis, we again interpolate the
values for all months within a quarter.9 The variation wemake use of comes from dierences
in the initial industry structure across regions and dierences in the national employment
trends over time.10
Table 1.2 reports the first stage estimates predicting the local unemployment rate by labor
demand shocks. Columns 1 and 2 focus on the overall unemployment rate; Column 3 on the
gender gap in unemployment rates, that is the dierence betweenmale and female unemploy-
ment rates. We return to the gender-specific LDI in Section 1.4. Without TTWA-specific trends,
the shi-share indicator does not predict the unemployment verywell. Apparently, the change
9 Total employment includes dependent employment and self-employment. The data come from the national
accounts statistics forGermanyandareavailable through thewebsite of theFederal StatisticalOice (destatis.de).
10 The literature uses several variations of the initial labor demand index proposed by Bartik (1991). For instance,
we interacted the change in labor demand with the initial employment rate. The coeicients are very similar to
what we show in the following section but in some cases not as precisely estimated. Moreover, an interaction
of oil price shocks and regional employment in the manufacturing industry is not a good instrument for local
unemployment rates (Raphael and Winter-Ebmer, 2001).
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Table 1.2 : First stage results for dierent unemployment measures
Dependent variable Unemployment rate Gender gap in
unemployment
(1) (2) (3)
Labor demand index -1.7855*** -2.0945***
(0.1949) (0.1934)
Gender gap in labor demand index -3.9511***
(0.9163)
1st stage F-stat 83.92 117.5 18.59
prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000
Controls No Yes Yes
TTWA time trends Yes Yes Yes
Observations 41,710 41,710 41,710
Notes: All regressions contain TTWA and year×month fixed eects as well as the year-of-age shares of 15-
to 44-year-old women over all women aged 15 to 44. Control variables include population density, share of
migrants of reproductive age, and the year-of-age shares of 45- to 74-year-old and 75+ years old people over
the population in each TTWA. TTWA time trends are region-specific linear trend variables. Robust standard
errors clustered on TTWA level in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
to the base year in employment and the unemployment rate follow a common trend, resulting
in a spurious correlation. If we account for this trend and include region-specific time eects,
as in Columns 1 and 2, the labor demand index seems to be a strong and relevant instrument
for unemployment rates. As expected, the sign of the correlation is negative, meaning that a
positive labor demand shock reduces unemployment and vice versa. On the one hand, our
instrument is valid only conditional on the regional trend variables. On the other hand, the
change to the base year is less vulnerable to sorting of individuals into industries. For ease
of interpretation we standardize the instrumental variable. Thus, a one standard deviation
shock in labor demand reduces the local unemployment rate by 1.8 to 2.1 percentage points,
depending on the specification.
To estimate the relationship between local birth rates and local labormarket opportunities, we
apply standard fixed-eects estimation (FE) techniques with robust standard errors clustered
at the level of TTWA to account for correlation within TTWAs. The correct specification of the
variance-covariancematrix is amajor challenge in this setup since there is potential correlation
in the error term in a panel with a large time dimension. First and foremost, the large set of
time controls should capture national dynamics. Second, including TTWA-specific eects
models the time-constant part in the error terms, and third, the TTWA-specific trend accounts
for regional dynamics that would otherwise have been a systematic part of the error term.
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Finally, following Cameron and Miller (2015), we run regressions with clustered as well as HAC
standard errors to avoid misleading inferences due to autocorrelated error terms.11
1.3 Main Results
1.3.1 Quantum Eects: Birth Rate
Results from regressions of the log birth rate on the local unemployment rate12 are reported in
Table 1.3. Panel A shows estimates from FEmodels; Panel B the IV estimates. The first column
shows the coeicient from a specification without demographic controls but year×month
and TTWA fixed eects. Moving right across the table, we first add control variables, then
the TTWA-specific linear time trend, and finally, in the full specification, both control and
trend variables. To reflect dierences in cohort size that may influence the birth rate, we
control for the year-of-age shares of 15- to 44-year-old women over all women between 15
and 44 years. The set of regional controls consists of population density and the share of
migrants of reproductive age, as well as a set of variables modeling the age structure, that is,
the year-of-age shares of 45- to 74-year-old and 75+ year-old people over the total population
in each TTWA.
Across all specifications the correlation between the birth rate and the local unemployment
rate is negative and significantly dierent from zero. The estimate in the first column of
Table 1.3 is quite large but shrinks when we include convariates in Column 2 or region-specific
trend variables in Column 3. Thus, parts of the initial correlation can be explained by time-
varying characteristics of the TTWAs, such as changing size of female cohorts. The preferred
specification – that with trend and control variables – in the last column allows for unobserved
characteristics that follow a linear trend. Compared to the specification in Columns 2 and 3
the coeicient is larger in magnitude, meaning that leaving these controls in the error term
causes a bias toward zero. The coeicient suggests that a 1 percentage point increase in the
local unemployment rate leads to an approximately 0.5 percent decrease in the birth rate. To
net out a possible endogeneity bias, we run IV regressions and present the estimates as well
as the first-stage F-statistic for the labor demand index in Panel B of Table 1.3. We refrain from
showing results for Columns 1 and 2 since the instrument is not valid without TTWA trends.
The eects are somewhat larger in magnitude than in the FE setup, as expected given the
predicted direction of bias toward zero from reverse causation and unobserved heterogeneity.
The relationship weakens whenwe add the control variables. Thus, at least parts of the eects
are due to dierences in regional fertility patterns over time. Our preferred specification in
11 Stata’s xtivreg2by Schaer (2005) allows for clustering aswell as heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-robust
(HAC) standard errors using a kernel estimation for the variance-covariance matrix. Since HAC standard errors
tend to be smaller, we report the more conservative estimates and show clustered standard errors in all tables.
For more information about standard error issues, see also Angrist and Pischke (2008).
12 To simplify interpretation of the estimates we multiply the unemployment rate by 100. Thus, a marginal
change in the unemployment rate implies a 1 percentage point increase instead of an increase from 0 to 100.
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Table 1.3 : Eects on birth rate
Dependent variable (log) births per 1,000 women
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: FE
Unemployment rate -0.0296*** -0.0022* -0.0038*** -0.0051***
(0.0035) (0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0011)
Panel B: IV
Unemployment rate -0.0125** -0.0086**
(0.0049) (0.0042)
1st stage F-stat 83.92 117.5
prob>F 0.000 0.000
Controls No Yes No Yes
TTWA time trends No No Yes Yes
Observations 41,710 41,710 41,710 41,710
Notes: All regressions contain TTWA and year×month fixed eects. Control variables include the year-of-age
shares of 15- to 44-year-old women over all women aged 15 to 44 as well as population density, share of
migrants of reproductive age, and the year-of-age shares of 45- to 74-year-old and 75+ year-old people over
the population in each TTWA. TTWA time trends are region-specific linear trend variables. Robust standard
errors clustered at the TTWA level in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Column 4 shows that a 1 percentage point increase in the local unemployment rate lowers
the birth rate by almost 0.9 percent.
1.3.2 Quantum Eects: Birth Rate by Birth Order
Next, we investigate whether fertility responds to changes in unemployment at the extensive
or the intensive margin. Therefore, we construct birth-order-specific fertility rates, defined
as the number of first, second, and third and higher-order births divided by the number of
women of reproductive age (multiplied by 1,000). Table 1.4, Panel A presents the standard FE
results of the specification with demographic control variables and TTWA time trends; Panel
B shows the corresponding IV estimates.
The eect of local unemployment on fertility is the strongest among formerly childless women
entering parenthood in the FE specification: a 1 percentage point increase in the unem-
ployment rate decreases the number of first births per 1,000 women of reproductive age by
1.2 percent. The estimated association is highly significant and very similar to the causal
estimator in Panel B. The coeicient for second births is somewhat smaller but still signifi-
cant. For third and higher-order births, the sign is reversed and the coeicient imprecisely
estimated in the FE estimations. Looking at the IV results in Panel B changes the findings since
the estimates suggest that both the extensive and the intensive margin are aected. Higher
levels of local unemployment seem to decrease fertility rates at the extensive margin: first
14
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Table 1.4 : Eects on birth-order-specific birth rate
Dependent variable (log) births per 1,000 women
(1) (2) (3)
1st births 2nd births 3rd and higher
order births
Panel A: FE
Unemployment rate -0.0116*** -0.0066*** 0.0013
(0.0024) (0.0025) (0.0028)
Panel B: IV
Unemployment rate -0.0155* -0.0332*** -0.0246**
(0.0087) (0.0083) (0.0122)
Controls Yes Yes Yes
TTWA time trends Yes Yes Yes
Observations 41,710 41,710 41,710
Notes: All regressions contain TTWA and year×month fixed eects. Control variables include the year-of-age
shares of 15- to 44-year-old women over all women aged 15 to 44 as well as population density, share of
migrants of reproductive age, and the year-of-age shares of 45- to 74-year-old and 75+ year-old people over
the population in each TTWA. TTWA time trends are region-specific linear trend variables. Robust standard
errors clustered at the TTWA level in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
births are reduced by 1.6 percent. However, higher-order births respond evenmore strongly
to changes in local unemployment: the coeicient of -3.3 percent on second births is more
than twice as large compared to the eect on first births. Since not only childless women
seem to reduce fertility but alsomothers who already have one or more children, we interpret
these results as first evidence against the postponement hypothesis. Nevertheless, we take a
closer look at the timing of births in the next sections.
1.3.3 Tempo Eects: Age-Group-Specific Birth Rates
So far, we have shown that increases in unemployment cause birth rates to fall. However,
our measure of fertility, the birth rate per 1,000 women of reproductive age, is a period
measure rather than a cohort measure of fertility (Bongaarts and Feeney, 1998). As such,
it is suitable for analyzing the influence of business cycles on fertility but, in contrast to
cohort fertility measures that give the actual number of births per womanmeasured aer the
reproductive-age period, it can be distorted by tempo eects, that is, by changes in the timing
of births (Bauernschuster, Hener, and Rainer, 2015). The substantial impact of changes in the
unemployment rate at both the extensive and intensive margins is only a weak indication that
there is no tempo eect.
Thus, we look for empirical evidence that allows us to distinguish actual quantum eects from
mere tempo eects. To this end, wemake use of both the standard FE specification and the IV
15
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Figure 1.4 : Eects on birth rate by age groups
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Notes: Coeicients and confidence intervals for regressions of (log) birth rate on unemployment rate by age
group of mothers. All regressions contain TTWA and year×month fixed eects. Control variables include the
year-of-age shares of 15- to 44-year-old women over all women aged 15 to 44 as well as population density,
share of migrants of reproductive age, and the year-of-age shares of 45- to 74-year-old and 75+ year-old people
over the population in each TTWA. Region-specific linear trend variables are included. The gray area marks the
90 percent confidence interval calculated using standard errors clustered at the TTWA level.
strategy, and adjust the outcome variable to allow for heterogeneous eects along the age
distribution of mothers. Specifically, we split the dependent variable into separate variables
in such a way that each of themmeasures the birth rate for three-year age groups from 20-22
up to 38-40. More precisely, the age-group-specific birth rates are defined as the number of
births by women in each of the age groups, divided by the total female population in the
respective age group. If our results are not just driven by tempo eects, induced by women
postponing childbearing, we should observe negative eects of adverse local labor market
conditions on fertility across all cohorts. Figure 1.4 presents the coeicients and confidence
intervals from seven separate regressions for the age-group-specific birth rates.
The eects dier across age groups of mothers. In both the FE (Panel A) and IV (Panel B)
regressions, women at the lower and upper ends of the age distribution appear to react more
strongly to changes in the local unemployment rate. As expected, the two panels are similar
but, as was previously noticed in Table 1.3, the magnitude of the IV coeicients is somewhat
larger. For women below 29 years, the FE estimates indicate a significant negative eect,
with the exception of women 20 to 22 years old, for which the coeicients just fail to reach
significance. The strongest eect is found forwomenbetween 26 and 28who reduce fertility by
almost 1 percent (IV in Panel B). Both graphs show that fertility decreases for older women at
the end of their fertile age. That both older and younger women are aected is some evidence
against a postponement of births. However, in the prime fertility age between 29 and 34, point
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IV estimates are positive albeit not significant. This can be explained by a catching-up eect
of births postponed earlier in life. Women older than 35 years have lower completed fertility
because, due to biological reasons, postponing births is not as possible for them as it is for
younger women. However, since birth rates among women above 35 years are very low, the
overall eect on births is not substantial. One reason why women below 30 years respond
more strongly to higher unemployment rates than do women above 30 years might be that
olderwomenare already better integrated in the labormarket and thus react less sensitively to
changes in local labor market conditions since their own employment situation is more stable
relative to younger women. We look at the heterogeneous eect by the employment status of
mothers in Section 1.5. In the end, the age-group-specific analysis does not completely solve
the timing puzzle even if the results do suggest rather a substantial fertility reduction.
1.3.4 Tempo Eects: Birth-Order-Specific Age at Birth
To look more deeply into this problem, we now estimate the eect of changes in local unem-
ployment onmothers’ age at birth. A plausible reason for a decrease in the total number of
children in a cohort is a decline in higher-order births, which makes the average age at birth
decrease as well. However, this kind of age eect would not be considered as a mere tempo
eect. Thus, we want to test whether local labor market conditions aect mothers’ age at first,
second, and third and higher-order births in the same way. If women postpone childbearing
in response to unemployment shocks, we would expect the coeicients in Table 1.5 to be
significantly positive. FE results in Panel A do not show any dierences in age at birth due to
changes in local unemployment rates either for all births or by birth order. In contrast, Panel
B suggests that the overall age at birth marginally decreases on average by 0.06 years. This
eect is small in size and unexpected in sign since a postponement should lead to higher age
at birth. Looking at birth-order eects reveals no significant change in the birth age even if
the sign for the first birth coeicient is positive. Thus, instead of decelerating fertility, rising
unemployment seems to have inspired younger women to have children even though we do
not see any eect at the intensive margin.
Since we are not able to follow all women over their fertile lifecycle, we cannot infer that the
estimated eect eventually leads to reduced completed fertility. Moreover, unemployment
typically follows cyclical patterns, with increasing unemployment in downturn periods and
falling unemployment in upswing periods. With the linear estimator we employ, it is not possi-
ble to distinguish between boom and bust periods; hence, the eect is the same independent
of how the unemployment rate changes. Nevertheless, all evidence shown in this section
points at a quantum eect of local unemployment on birth rates.
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Table 1.5 : Eects on birth-order-specific age at birth
Dependent variable Age at birth
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All births 1st births 2nd Births 3rd and higher
order births
Panel A: FE
Unemployment rate -0.0074 -0.0046 -0.0150 0.0075
(0.0051) (0.0095) (0.0091) (0.0160)
Panel B: IV
Unemployment rate -0.0633*** 0.0610 -0.0108 -0.0022
(0.0220) (0.0373) (0.0346) (0.0584)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
TTWA time trends Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 41,710 41,710 41,710 41,710
Notes: All regressions contain TTWA and year×month fixed eects. Control variables include the year-of-age
shares of 15- to 44-year-old women over all women aged 15 to 44 as well as population density, share of
migrants of reproductive age, and the year-of-age shares of 45- to 74-year-old and 75+ year-old people over
the population in each TTWA. TTWA time trends are region-specific linear trend variables. Robust standard
errors clustered at the TTWA level in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
1.4 Gender-Specic Effects of Labor Market Conditions on
Fertility
In a last step we are interested in discovering whether there are heterogeneous eects by
gender. Based on our theoretical considerations, we expect men and women to respond
dierently to unemployment at the individual level. To this point, we have shown that there
is a robust negative eect of local labor market conditions on fertility rates at the aggregate
level, meaning that the negative income eect outweighs the positive substitution eect or,
in other words, the reduction in opportunity costs that is probably more relevant for women
plays only a minor role in fertility decisions. Now, we want to test the presumption that even
on an aggregate level, male and female unemployment has dierential eects on fertility
rates.
We therefore replace the overall unemployment rate with the gender-specific unemployment
ratesURmrt andUR
f
rt. Sincewe suppose thatmale and female are both endogenous regressors
and, in addition, highly correlated, we follow Anderberg, Rainer, Wadsworth, and Wilson
(2015) and use the gender gap in unemployment, URmrt − URfrt, to analyze gender-specific
unemployment eects. Using the gender gap in unemployment has the advantage that the
male unemployment rate reacts more strongly to business cycle fluctuations, meaning that in
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Figure 1.5 : Share of male and female employees by industry in 1996 (in percent)
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Source: German Microcensus (1996).
recessions the gender gap widens, whereas in economic upswings, it oen closes (Albanesi
and Sahin, 2013). Wemake use of this source of variation in the updated estimation equation:
(1.4) log(FRTrt) = θ(URmrt − URfrt) + γ′Xrt + µt + φr + ωr ∗ T + rt.
If standard micro models are also valid at the aggregate level, we expect that the coeicient
on the gender gap in the unemployment rates, θ, will be significant and negative, implying
a dierential eect of male and female unemployment rates. We expect that increases in
male unemployment widen the gap and reduce fertility due to a negative income eect. If
decreasing female unemployment is the reason for a larger gender gap, theory predicts higher
fertility when the substitution eect outweighs the income eect and lower fertility vice versa.
To analyze the gender-specific eects of local unemployment in the IV framework, we take
advantage of the fact that male and female employment is concentrated in particular indus-
tries (see Figure 1.5). Albanesi and Sahin (2013) find that around half the gender dierences
in unemployment growth can be explained by dierences in industry composition. In our
base year 1996, men are overrepresented in construction andmanufacturing, whereas a large
majority of public-sector employees are female. We exploit this variation by constructing
gender-specific labor demand indices based on employment trends in either the male- or the
female-dominated industries. We expect the male unemployment rate to react strongly to
changes in manufacturing labor demand. Female unemployment is expected to be highly cor-
related with changes in public-sector and private services employment. Thus, men are more
aected in TTWAs where manufacturing represents a larger proportion of total employment.
Vice versa, women suer more from employment shocks in regions with a high workforce
concentration in public services.
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We follow the previous work by Albanesi and Sahin (2013) and Anderberg et al. (2015) in
constructing a gender-specific shi-share index,
(1.5) LDIgrt =
∑
j
Gjt ∗ Ejr0
Er0
,
where g is a superscript for gender and can be eitherm (= male) or f (= female). If we are
interested in the demand shocks for males, j comprises themanufacturing sector, whereas
the public sector is employed for the female index. The additional identifying assumption is
that it is not possible to change frommale- to female-dominated industries, or vice versa, to
avoid negative labor market shocks. To simplify interpretation of the gender gap, we multiply
the gender-specific LDI by the initial employment rate. The intuitive meaning of the LDI is
then: Howwould the initial employment rate have evolved given the national trend in female-
or male-dominated industries and the initial industry composition within the TTWAs? Finally,
the instrumental variable for the gender gap in unemployment is the dierence between the
male and the female labor demand index, LDImrt − LDIfrt. Again, we use the standardized
measure of the gender gap in LDI for the first-stage regression. Column 3 in Table 1.2 confirms
that the gender dierence in our measure of labor demand is a valid predictor of the gender
unemployment gap.
Table 1.6 shows FE as well as IV results for the gender-specific local unemployment rates as
well as the gender gap in unemployment rates. From theory, we expect male unemployment
to reduce fertility due to a negative incomeeect and female unemployment to either enhance
or reduce fertility since women experience both lower opportunity costs of childbearing but
also lower income due to higher probability of unemployment. FE results in Panel A suggest
that male and female unemployment rates almost equally contribute to the overall eect
of -0.5 percent, implying no gender dierences in the eect of unemployment on fertility.
Looking at birth order eects reveals that the negative eect for female unemployment is
purely driven by a strong reduction in third births. Concerning family enlargement the female
income eect seems to play amajor role. At the extensive margin, that is, the decision to have
a first child, male unemployment rates matter muchmore which may be because men are
expected to be the main breadwinner aer the birth of the first baby and thus refrain from
entering parenthood until they can aord tomaintain a family. However, we should be careful
not to rely too heavily on the results in Panel A since theymay suer from an omitted variables
bias.
To this point, we have not found any evidence for dierential eects of male and female
unemployment rates. Therefore, we substitute the gender-specific unemployment rates for
the gender gap in unemployment. The estimates of the coeicients suggest gender dierences
as a 1 percentage point increase in the male-female unemployment gap leads to a reduction
in fertility of 0.2 percent (FE, Panel B, Column 1) and 1.9 percent, respectively (IV, Panel C,
Column 1). However, both coeicients fail to reach significance at the 10 percent level. In
contrast, IV estimates for the intensive margins are negative and significant. Increases in the
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Table 1.6 : Gender-specific eects on birth rate (by birth order)
Dependent variable (log) births per 1,000 women
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All births 1st births 2nd births 3rd and higher
order births
Panel A: FE
Unemployment rate men -0.0026** -0.0089*** -0.0042* 0.0089***
(0.0010) (0.0022) (0.0024) (0.0031)
Unemployment rate women -0.0026* -0.0014 -0.0021 -0.0113***
(0.0014) (0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0043)
Panel B: FE
Gap in unemployment rate -0.0016 -0.0069*** -0.0030 0.0093***
(0.0010) (0.0020) (0.0023) (0.0031)
Panel C: IV
Gap in unemployment rate -0.0192 -0.0177 -0.0981*** -0.0606*
(0.0125) (0.0184) (0.0321) (0.0322)
1st stage F-stat 18.59 18.59 18.59 18.59
prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
TTWA time trends Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 41,710 41,710 41,710 41,710
Notes: All regressions contain TTWA and year×month fixed eects. Control variables include the year-of-age
shares of 15- to 44-year-old women over all women aged 15 to 44 as well as population density, share of
migrants of reproductive age, and the year-of-age shares of 45- to 74-year-old and 75+ year-old people over
the population in each TTWA. TTWA time trends are region-specific linear trend variables. Robust standard
errors clustered at the TTWA level in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
gender gap strongly reduce birth rates for second and higher-order births. For instance, if
the male unemployment rate goes up by 1 percentage point and the female rate remains
unchanged, the rate of second births per 1,000 women falls by 9.8 percent and for third
and higher-order births by 6.1 percent. If female unemployment rises, however, the sign
of the eect is reversed. Finally, a surprising finding that is hard to explain and contrary
to theory is the positive association between male unemployment (Panel A, Column 4) as
well as the gender gap (Panel B, Column 4) and higher-order birth rates. When we apply
the instrumental approach, the positive correlation vanishes and the coeicient becomes
negative and significant. Thus, we conclude that the FE results, which imply a predominance
of the substitution eect also for men, are biased.
For childless couples, neither income nor substitution eects seem to play much of a role in
fertility decisions or cancel out each other. Thus, childlessness is not the channel through
which the gender gap in unemployment reduces birth rates. It is, instead, the decision to
extend a family that is aected. Rises in male unemployment reduce birth rates due to a
negative income eect and increased female unemployment fosters higher-order fertility
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since the positive substitution eect dominates. In couples with ospring, the male partner
usually works full-time while the mother divides her time between childrearing and working.
If the risk of unemployment increases for the male partner, that is, the unemployment gap
widens, the couple decides against having more children because of the imminent loss of
income. For couples without children, the gender dierence is less pronounced since usually
both partners work full-time. Thus, the loss of income is comparable for men and women,
resulting in a predominance of the income eect for women also.
To sum up, higher male unemployment relative to female reduces fertility, whereas higher
female unemployment induces women to have children. Themainmechanism behind this
finding is the eect of the gender gap in unemployment on higher-order fertility. The eects
at the intensive margins are negative and large, suggesting that the substitution eect of
increased labor market uncertainty is predominant for women.
1.5 Heterogeneous Effects
Above, we looked at the eects of local labor markets on fertility by age of mothers. In this
section we runmore heterogeneity tests to discover the extent to which various population
subgroups react to labor market uncertainties. Table 1.7 shows FE and IV results separately
for East and West Germany (Columns 1 and 2), German and non-Germanmothers (Columns 3
and 4), and by mothers’ employment status just before the birth of their child (Columns 5
and6). The regionaldierences in the first twocolumns imply that thereare fewerobservations
aer splitting the sample. There are 204 TTWAs in West Germany and 40 TTWAs in the East
(including Berlin). FE results for West Germany are in magnitude, sign, and significance level
fairly similar to the combined coeicients, but much smaller and insignificant for the East
German TTWAs. Applying the IV strategy changes the sign but not the level of significance for
East Germany. Thus, in the former socialist part of Germany women do not reduce fertility
in response to higher unemployment rates. The eect for West Germany is large and highly
significant. Looking at the citizenship of themothers reveals that uncertainty due to increased
local unemployment is mainly an issue for German women. We divide births by German and
non-Germanmothers by the respective population of all German or non-German women of
reproductive age. The FE coeicient of -0.3 percent for Germanmothers is slightly lower than
in the overall regression but still significant. In the IV case, it increases, implying a -1.3 percent
reduction in fertility in response to a 1 percentage point increase in the local unemployment
rate. Foreignmothers do not respond significantly to changes in local labormarket conditions.
Finally, we focus onmothers’ employment status right before giving birth. The idea is that
for employed mothers, local labor market conditions might matter more since they may
fear losing their jobs when pregnancy and recessions coincide. However, neither FE nor IV
regressions reveal a significant eect on fertility rates in the TTWAs. The FE coeicient of
employed mothers at least shows a negative sign, but is not precisely enough estimated.
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This finding also holds for unemployedmothers. Heterogeneity analyses show that the most
aected group is German women in West German TTWAs.
Table 1.7 : Heterogeneity of eects on birth rate
Dependent variable (log) births per 1,000 women
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
West East German Foreign Employed Unemployed
Germany Germany mothers mothers mothers mothers
Panel A: FE
Unemployment rate -0.005*** -0.0025 -0.0030** -0.0050 -0.0025 -0.0007
(0.0014) (0.0029) (0.0015) (0.0041) (0.0063) (0.0043)
Panel B: IV
Unemployment rate -0.0248** 0.0128 -0.0131** 0.0147 0.0103 0.0169
(0.0107) (0.0285) (0.0057) (0.0165) (0.0355) (0.0251)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
TTWA time trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 34,882 6,828 41,710 41,710 41,710 41,710
Notes: All regressions contain TTWA and year×month fixed eects. Control variables include the year-of-age
shares of 15- to 44-year-old women over all women aged 15 to 44 as well as population density, share of
migrants of reproductive age, and the year-of-age shares of 45- to 74-year-old and 75+ year-old people over
the population in each TTWA. TTWA time trends are region-specific linear trend variables. Robust standard
errors clustered at the TTWA level in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
1.6 Conclusion
Germany has experienced fertility rates far below replacement level ever since the 1970s. If
this trend continues, it will result, in the long run, in an ageing and even shrinking society
with possibly negative consequences for economic growth and the public budget. In this
chapter, we shed light on how adverse local labor market conditions influence birth rates. A
high unemployment rate in the area of residencemay imply a high level of unemployment
risk. Theory suggests that this economic uncertainty can have consequences for couples’
fertility plans. In fact, our main results from FE as well as IV regressions suggest a negative
impact of increased local unemployment on birth rates. The size of the eect is substantial: in
our main specification, a 1 percentage point increase in the local unemployment rate leads to
a 0.9 percent decrease in the birth rate per 1,000 women. For instance, aer the burst of the
dot-com bubble, the average annual unemployment rate went from 6.4 percent in 2001 to
almost 8.5 percent in 2005. This 1.9 percentage point increase in unemployment led to an
average decrease in births of roughly 1.6 percent over this four-year period. Given 767,000
births in the pre-crisis year, this means that there were 50,000 fewer babies born because of
this recessionary period.
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Since changes in unemployment are cyclical – periods of higher unemployment are followed
by periods of lower unemployment – we test whether the chapter’s main finding can be
explained by changes in the timing of births. Specifically, we run regressions for age-group-
specific birth rates as well as for mothers’ age at first, second, and third birth. We find no
evidence either for changes in age at first to third birth or for youngerwomenbeingparticularly
aected. Thus, we argue that we are not measuring a timing eect due to postponement but
an actual decline in birth rates. Based on theoretical considerations and empirical results,
policymakers interested in increasing the birth rate should strive to mitigate the negative
impact of increased local unemployment and its associateduncertainty. Since reduced income
appears to be the main obstacle to fertility, compensating for loss of income or improving
men’s labor market conditions to close the gender unemployment gap would appear to be
appropriate measures for increasing or at least maintaining current birth rates.
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Appendix A.1 Supplementary Figures
Figure A.1 : Map of Travel-to-Work areas in Germany 2012
Source: University of Kassel, Prof. Kosfeld; Laufende Raumbeobachtung des
BBSR. Geometrische Grundlage: BKG, Kreise 31.12.2012. Editing: P. Kuhlmann.
Notes: TTWA in East Germany with dots of the same color have to be combined
for the analysis due to local government reorganisations. Thenumber of TTWAs
is reduced from 258 to 244 due to aggregating.
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Appendix A.2 Supplementary Tables
Table A.1 : Travel-to-Work areas in Germany 2012
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
TTWA Name TTWA Name TTWA Name TTWA Name TTWA Name
1 Husum 53 Schwelm 105 Trier 157 Weilheim 209 Eberswalde
2 Heide 54 Remscheid 106 Bernkastel-Wittlich 158 Landsberg 210 Luckenwalde
3 Itzehoe 55 Kleve 107 Daun 159 München 211 Finsterwalde
4 Flensburg 56 Aachen 108 Bitburg 160 Ingolstadt 212 Oranienburg
5 Lübeck 57 Köln 109 Kaiserslautern 161 Kelheim-Mainburg 213 Neuruppin
6 Kiel 58 Leverkusen 110 Landau 162 Landshut 214 Perleberg
7 Ratzeburg 59 Bonn 111 Mainz 163 Dingolfing 215 Prenzlau
8 Hamburg 60 Düren 112 Alzey-Worms 164 Eggenfelden/
Pfarrkirchen
216 Rostock
9 Braunschweig 61 Euskirchen 113 Pirmasens 165 Passau 217 Schwerin
10 Salzgitter 62 Gummers-
bach
114 Ludwigshafen 166 Freyung 218 Mecklenburgische
Seenplatte
11 Wolfsburg 63 Gelsenkirchen 115 Germersheim 167 Regen-Zwiesel 219 Nordvorpommern
12 Göttingen 64 Münster 116 Merzig 168 Deggendorf 220 Südvorpommern
13 Goslar 65 Borken 117 St. Wendel 169 Straubing 221 Chemnitz
14 Helmstedt 66 Steinfurt 118 Saarbrücken 170 Cham 222 Erzgebirgskreis
15 Einbeck 67 Bielefeld 119 Homburg/Saar 171 Regensburg 223 Mittelsachsen
16 Osterode 68 Gütersloh 120 Stuttgart 172 Schwandorf 224 Vogtlandkreis
17 Hannover 69 Detmold 121 Göppingen 173 Amberg 225 Zwickau
18 Sulingen 70 Minden 122 Heilbronn 174 Neumarkt 226 Dresden
19 Hameln 71 Paderborn 123 Schwäbisch Hall 175 Weiden 227 Bautzen
20 Hildesheim 72 Bochum 124 Tauberbischofsheim 176 Marktredwitz 228 Görlitz
21 Holzminden 73 Dortmund 125 Heidenheim 177 Hof 229 Meißen
22 Nienburg 74 Hagen 126 Aalen 178 Bayreuth 230 Leipzig
23 Stadthagen 75 Lüdenscheid 127 Baden-Baden 179 Bamberg 231 Dessau-Roßlau
24 Celle 76 Meschede 128 Karlsruhe 180 Kulmbach 232 Halle
25 Lüneburg 77 Siegen 129 Heidelberg 181 Kronach 233 Magdeburg
26 Zeven 78 Olpe 130 Mannheim 182 Coburg 234 Salzwedel
27 Soltau 79 Soest 131 Mosbach 183 Lichtenfels 235 Anhalt-Bitterfeld
28 Stade 80 Korbach 132 Pforzheim 184 Erlangen 236 Burgenlandkreis
29 Uelzen 81 Kassel 133 Calw 185 Nürnberg 237 Harz
30 Verden 82 Eschwege 134 Freudenstadt 186 Weißenburg-
Gunzenhausen
238 Mansfeld-Südharz
31 Emden 83 Schwalm-
Eder
135 Freiburg 187 Ansbach 239 Salzlandkreis
32 Westerstede 84 Hersfeld 136 Oenburg 188 Neustadt/Aisch 240 Stendal
33 Oldenburg 85 Marburg 137 Rottweil 189 Kitzingen 241 Wittenberg
34 Osnabrück 86 Lauterbach 138 Villingen-
Schwenningen
190 Würzburg 242 Erfurt
35 Wilhelms-haven 87 Fulda 139 Tuttlingen 191 Schweinfurt 243 Gera
36 Cloppenburg 88 Wetzlar 140 Konstanz 192 Haßfurt 244 Jena
37 Lingen 89 Gießen 141 Lörrach 193 Bad Neustadt/Saale 245 Suhl
38 Nordhorn 90 Limburg 142 Waldshut 194 Bad Kissingen 246 Weimar
39 Leer 91 Wiesbaden 143 Reutlingen/ Tübingen 195 Lohr amMain 247 Eisenach
40 Vechta 92 Frankfurt/
Main
144 Balingen 196 Aschaenburg 248 Eichsfeld
41 Nordenham 93 Hanau 145 Ulm 197 Donauwörth-Nördlingen 249 Nordhausen
42 Bremen 94 Darmstadt 146 Biberach 198 Dillingen 250 Mühlhausen
43 Bremerhaven 95 Erbach 147 Friedrichshafen 199 Günzburg 251 Sondershausen
44 Höxter 96 Altenkirchen 148 Ravensburg 200 Augsburg 252 Meiningen
45 Düsseldorf 97 Montabaur 149 Sigmaringen 201 Memmingen 253 Gotha
46 Duisburg 98 Neuwied 150 Bad Reichenhall 202 Kaufbeuren 254 Arnstadt
47 Essen 99 Ahrweiler 151 Traunstein 203 Kempten 255 Sonneberg
48 Krefeld 100 Koblenz 152 Burghausen 204 Lindau 256 Saalfeld
49 Viersen 101 Bad
Kreuznach
153 Mühldorf 205 Berlin 257 Pößneck
50 Mönchen-
gladbach
102 Idar-
Oberstein
154 Rosenheim 206 Potsdam-Brandenburg 258 Altenburg
51 Heinsberg 103 Cochem 155 Bad Tölz 207 Cottbus
52 Wuppertal 104 Simmern 156 Garmisch-
Partenkirchen
208 Frankfurt/Oder
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2 The Long-Run Consequences of Unemployment
Experience on Fertility
2.1 Introduction
In 1986, the seminal paper by Blanchard and Summers introduced the concept of hysteresis
to characterize labor market dynamics in Europe during the last few decades. Hysteresis is the
phenomenon that increases in unemployment due to negative shocks have a persistent eect
on the natural unemployment rate. For instance, the oil crises in the 1970s permanently raised
the unemployment rate despite the subsequent economic recovery. Researchers have tried
to discover whether increased unemployment is responsible for the steady decline in birth
rates. However, most studies, such as Schaller (2016) and Dehejia and Lleras-Muney (2004),
as well as the preceding chapter, focus on only the short-run eects of adverse labor market
opportunities and ignore possible catching-up eects if births are entirely postponed. Thus,
we analyze the long-run consequences for fertility of unemployment rates experienced during
the reproductive age.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to explicitly investigate the long-run eects
of unemployment rates on completed fertility and childlessness in the German context. We
further contribute to the literature by investigating dierences across gender and educational
groups, and by providing evidence regarding mechanisms that have the potential to explain
our findings.
The last several decades have seen increased interest in fertility behavior by economists,
demographers, and sociologists. The extant research oers a variety of explanations for the
low fertility rates in the developed world. Among demographers and sociologists, preference-
based explanations prevail, whereas economists focus on the price of childbearing. In recent
years, the role played by family policies has received increasing attention from researchers.
According to the theory of the "second demographic transition," recent fertility trends are
due to changes in individual values and preferences (see, e.g., Van de Kaa, 1987; Lesthaeghe,
1995). Specifically, the theory argues that the introduction of the birth control pill and the
women’s rights movement had substantial influence on fertility. Women became able to
live more self-determined lives and control their fertility. As women now hadmore choices,
including those involving self-realization, leisure, and consumption, they began to spend
more time on attaining education and in the labormarket than on household production, that
is, childrearing (Lesthaeghe, 2010). A similar approach employing endogenous preferences
was proposed by Easterlin (1973, 1987). He explains the baby boom and the subsequent
baby bust by changing preferences for children. Willis (1987) posits that it is changes in the
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intergenerational relative income across cohorts that cause these shis in preferences. If
the parents’ generation is relatively poor, individuals believe that they can aord to enter
parenthood early and have large families.
The economic approach to fertility dates back to Gary S. Becker (1960). In his work, prefer-
ences are assumed to be exogenously fixed and demand for children is ultimately altered by
changes in the price of children. Children are modeled as normal consumption goods and
fertility decisions are based on the relative costs of having children, including direct costs
(e.g., clothing, nutrition) and the costs of foregone income (i.e., opportunity costs). Becker
argues that the increased earning power of women and the concomitant higher opportunity
costs enhance female labor supply and, ultimately, lower fertility (Becker, 1991). In addition,
with increasing levels of income and education, parents tend to invest more in the quality,
rather than quantity, of their children.
Inspired by Becker’s theory, a large body of economic literature investigates how increased
female education aects fertility levels. Concerning the timing of births, empirical evidence
suggests that higher educational attainment causes a decrease in teenagemotherhood and
leads to a postponement of first birth (Black, Devereux, and Salvanes, 2008; Cygan-Rehm and
Maeder, 2013; Duflo, Dupas, and Kremer, 2015), whereas the findings regarding completed
fertility are inconclusive. Although women with higher education tend to delay first births,
they catch up later in life. Thus, education influences only the timing of fertility but not its
completion (Breierova and Duflo, 2004; Monstad, Propper, and Salvanes, 2008; Grönqvist
and Hall, 2013). In contrast, Amin and Behrman (2014) show that the higher the level of
education, the fewer the number of children. Lavy and Zablotsky (2015), who also find a
reduction in completed fertility if education rises exogenously, provide several explanations
for this phenomenon, including increased child quality and changes in fertility preferences.
In their recent work, Baudin, de la Croix, and Gobbi (2015) develop a model of extensive-
and intensive-margin fertility. They show that childlessness among very low- and very high-
educated women in the United States is a main reason for low fertility. Women at the lower
tail of the educational distribution suer from "social sterility," i.e., they cannot aord having
children because of their precarious income. In contrast, women at the upper tail of the
distribution refrain from having children due to high opportunity costs.
In their pioneerwork, Becker and Lewis (1973) andWillis (1973) established an inverse relation-
ship between female labor force participation and fertility. Testing the model with U.S. data,
Butz and Ward (1979) show that this inverse relationship also holds empirically. More recent
studies challenge the direction of causality and find that lower fertility encourages women to
participate in the labor market (see, e.g., Angrist and Evans, 1998; Bailey, 2006). Ward and
Butz’s (1980) dynamic model of fertility behavior reveals the role labor market conditions
play in determining the opportunity costs of having children. They find strong evidence for an
intertemporal substitution eect between market work and fertility since higher female wage
expectations lower fertility, whereas for male income the eect goes in the opposite direction.
They conclude that current economic conditions alter opportunity costs and thus determine
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the fertility level. Ward and Butz (1980) and Bongaarts and Feeney (1998), point out that a
reduction in period fertility measures, such as the birth rate or the total fertility rate, need not
cause a reduction in cohort fertility if the periodmeasure is confounded by changes in fertility
timing.
Recently, the role played by institutions and family policies has attracted the attention of
researchers. The basic idea is that improvements in a family’s financial resources or a better
compatibility of work and family life can reduce the opportunity costs of childbearing and
thus induce couples to havemore children. Lalive and Zweimüller (2009) investigate the eect
of a parental leave reform. The authors discover positive eects on fertility in response to an
extension of parental leave. In contrast, a reduction in parental leave lowers fertility in the
years right aer the reform (Cygan-Rehm, 2015). This eect is driven by low-income women
who cannot aord to catch up postponed births. Similarly, expansion of public childcare raises
fertility by enabling women to combine children and a successful career (Rindfuss, Guilkey,
Morgan, and Kravdal, 2010; Bauernschuster et al., 2015). Bailey (2012) tests the eectiveness
of a poverty-reducing policy in the United States and finds that among low-income families
public subsidies reduce fertility. However, despite the positive eects of family policies, the
negative relationship between education and fertility persists (Björklund, 2006).
The literature dealing with the link between labor market conditions and fertility tends to
focus on short-run eects; very little of this work distinguishes between tempo and quantum
eects of changes in local labor market opportunities (see, e.g., Schaller, 2016; Dehejia and
Lleras-Muney, 2004; Karaman Örsal and Goldstein, 2010). However, there are a few studies
evaluating the eects of individual or aggregate unemployment on completed fertility. Due
to the generous welfare system in France, Pailhé and Solaz (2012) find only weak evidence
that fertility decreases in response to spells of unemployment. Only long-term unemployed
men significantly reduce completed fertility; women delay childbearing but do not adjust the
number of births. In the Norwegian setting, Kravdal (2002) discovers a negative relationship
between unemployment and fertility only at the aggregate level. Again, individual unem-
ployment does not seem tomatter in couples’ fertility decisions. The most relevant study for
our research is that by Currie and Schwandt (2014) who estimate the long-run relationship
between fertility and unemployment for the US. Following state-year birth cohorts over time,
they find a significant negative eect of state-level unemployment on completed fertility
rates induced by an increase in the likelihood of staying childless. Observing where women
give birth to their children enables them to control cohort migration patterns. Employing an
instrumental variable approach, corrects for a potential selection bias.
Based on this literature we investigate the eect on women’s completed fertility of the un-
employment rates experienced during reproductive age. Wemake use of data from the 2008
and 2012 German Microcensuses, which provide information about the number of children
born to each woman. We focus on the female birth cohorts from 1954 to 1967 since these
women are at least 40 years old in both waves. Four state-specific unemployment measures
are merged with the individual data. We average the experienced unemployment rates over
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five-year age intervals starting with 20-24 up to 35-39. Standard OLS and probit estimation
results suggest that increases in average female unemployment rates during early career years
significantly increase fertility, whereas rising male unemployment rates have the opposite
eect. This relationship is mainly driven by changes in the probability of remaining childless.
For instance, if the average female unemployment rate during the age 20 to 24 increases by
1 percentage point, the likelihood that awoman remains childless decreases by 1.6 percentage
points. However, if themale unemployment rate rises during the same age span, childlessness
increases by 1.2 percentage points. The heterogeneity analysis reveals that the findings are
mainly driven by women with low education. Twomechanismsmay explain the findings: first,
unemployment rates have a substantial influence on marriage market outcomes and, second,
they impact household income. Since we are not able to explicitly control for the mobility of
a cohort, we argue graphically and in a regression framework that the results are robust to
potential distortions caused by womenmigrating to states with more favorable labor market
conditions.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 2.2 describes the data and
Section 2.3 the empirical approach. Section 2.4 sets out the main results while Sections 2.5
and 2.6 present the heterogeneity analysis as well as the potential mechanisms. Robustness
checks are presented in Section 2.7; Section 2.8 concludes.
2.2 Data and Descriptives
2.2.1 Completed Fertility
To conduct the empirical analysis, we need information on women’s completed fertility. The
completed fertility rate (CFR) is a measure of cohort fertility at the end of the reproductive
age. Unlike period measures, such as the total fertility rate (TFR) or the crude birth rate, it
is not distorted by changes in the timing of births. Thus, delayed childbearing reduces, and
accelerated childbearing raises, the periodmeasures even if completed fertility is not aected
(Bongaarts and Feeney, 1998).
The German Microcensus (GMC) – the largest household survey in Europe – annually collects
information on about 1 percent of the German population. In 2008 and 2012, the GMC asked
whether a woman between the ages 15 and 75 had born children and, if so, howmany. The
corresponding questions were: "Have you born children?" and "Howmany children have you
born?" From the first question we obtain a measure of childlessness and from the second
ameasure of completed fertility, that is, the number of children ever born to a woman. We
restrict the sample to women from the West German federal states born in the birth cohorts
1954 to 1967 since they are at least 40 years old in bothwaves.1 The sample restriction ensures
1 We do not consider East Germany in our research because reliable unemployment data are missing for the
time prior to Reunification. Moreover, dierences in East German fertility behavior compared to that of West
Germans are well documented in the literature (see, e.g., Kreyenfeld, 2004). Since we do not have information
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that all cohorts are equally represented and the number of observations is suicient to obtain
precise estimates. To avoid distortions caused by outliers, we drop women with more than
10 children, which is only in 0.03 percent of all observations. The main sample consists of 14
birth cohorts including 90,756 women from 10 West German states.
Figure 2.1 shows the development of cohort fertility and childlessness for our sample cohorts
1954 to 1967. Completed fertility is stable for women born between 1954 and 1958. They have,
on average, 1.6 children by the end of their reproductive years. Until 1970, the corresponding
TFR is above 2.0; aer 1970, the gap between TFR and CFR begins to narrow. This suggests
substantial changes in the timing of births: during the baby boom years, older women catch
up births and younger women enter parenthood earlier in life. Since the beginning of the
1960s, cohort fertility has continuously decreased and is around 1.46 for the latest cohort.
The development of childlessness shows an opposite trend. In the earlier cohorts, less than
20 percent of women above 40 years remain childless, whereas for women from the birth
cohort 1967, this share increases to almost 25 percent. However, the increasing trend in
childlessness appears to flatten for the younger cohorts. The increase in childlessness among
womenmay explain the drop in completed fertility.
Figure 2.1 : Development of completed fertility and childlessness
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Notes: Female birth cohorts from 1954 to 1967 in West Germany.
Source: Microcensus (2008, 2012).
Fertility and childlessness also vary widely across educational subgroups. Figure 2.2 shows
the average number of children and the share of childless women for six dierent educational
about birthplace, we drop East Germans based on their current state of residence and their level of education.
Educational degrees obtained before Reunification dier between East and West Germany and allow us to
identify individuals who are from the former socialist part of Germany. Moreover, we drop women who lived
abroad during their reproductive years.
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groups. Women with low to medium education (ISCED 1-3) have, on average, between 1.6
and 2.0 children. Compared to other developed countries, this number is fairly high. In
addition, these women comprise almost 70 percent of the female population between 20 and
39 years. Thus, for a significant share of women we do not observe lowest-low fertility rates.
Women with upper secondary or tertiary education (ISCED 4-6) exhibit fertility rates less than
1.4 children per woman. Particularly, the high level of childlessness seems to explain why
completed fertility is so low among highly qualified women (ISCED 5: 32 percent, ISCED 6:
40 percent). However, childlessness is not only noticeable among highly educated women
but also occurs in the lowest educational group. Women without a secondary degree either
have far more children than average or are childless.
Figure 2.2 : Completed fertility and childlessness by education
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2.2.2 State-Level Unemployment Rates
For our analysis, we match the Microcensus data with data from the annual statistics of
the German Federal Employment Agency (BA) that are known as "Amtliche Nachrichten der
Bundesagentur für Arbeit (ANBA)". Since 1974, the BA has published annual unemployment
rates by gender for all West German states. For every single birth cohort, we compute the
average state-specific unemployment rate for the five-year age intervals starting at 20 to 24
years up to 35 to 39 years. Ideally, we would like to know in which federal state a woman gave
birth to her children. However, we have information on state of residence only ex-post, at
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Figure 2.3 : Development of national unemployment rate (by gender)
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Source: ANBA (1974-2007).
the end of the reproductive age. Thus, we are forced to assume that women do not move
between federal states during their reproductive age.2
Figure 2.3 shows the overall, as well as the gender-specific, unemployment rates from 1974
to 2007 – the period during which our sample birth cohorts are between 20 and 40 years of
age. The development is characterized by a steady upward trend interrupted only by short
periods of recovery. This phenomenon is exactly described in Blanchard and Summers (1986),
who explain that increases in unemployment may be persistent since they directly impact the
natural level of unemployment. For instance, the sharp increases in unemployment due to
the recessions in 1975 and 1982 were not followed by equivalent decreases in the subsequent
boom period. Instead, the stock of unemployed individuals is larger aer the recession. The
same applies to the recession aer the Reunification boom and the burst of the dot-com
bubble in the early 2000s. The Hartz reforms implemented in the middle of the last decade
initially increased unemployment rates, reaching a peak of 11 percent in 2005. Since then,
there has been a slight decrease in unemployment.
Figure 2.4 focuses on the average state-level unemployment rates to which the birth cohorts
1954 to 1967 were exposed during their reproductive years. Early cohorts suered most
from high unemployment when they were between 30 and 34 – rather late in their period
of fertility, meaning that decisions whether to have children quite likely have already been
made. Later cohorts were hit by several recessions and at dierent stages of the life course.
For instance, the birth cohort 1965 experienced high levels of unemployment between the
ages of 20 and 24 due to the second oil crisis and the subsequent recession in 1982, and
2 Section 2.7 presents descriptive evidence that for the vast majority of women there is very little year-by-year
mobility across states.
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also aer the Reunification boomwhen they were between the ages of 30 and 34. Note that
there is a fair degree of variation in average unemployment rates not only across cohorts
but also across states. Aer the 1982 recession, the highest unemployment rates occurred in
Bremen at around 15 percent, whereas at the same time, rather low rates prevailed in Bavaria,
Baden-Württemberg, and Hesse, ranging from 5 percent to 7 percent. In addition, the peaks
of the recessions hit dierent cohorts across states. For example, average unemployment in
Bavaria for the age group 20-24 peaks for the birth cohort 1963; Bremen exhibits the highest
average unemployment two cohorts later, that is, for the women born in 1965.
Figure 2.4 : Development of average state-level unemployment rates
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2.2.3 Graphical Evidence
To investigate the relationship between unemployment and completed fertility, we first look
graphically at the correlation on the state-cohort level. Therefore, we merge the ANBA unem-
ployment rateswith the GMCdata,making use of the unique combination of federal states and
birth cohorts, and obtain 140 state-cohort observations. Figure 2.5 illustrates the correlation
between average unemployment rates in dierent age groups and the number of children in
Panel A and the share of childless women in Panel B.
If we focus on the overall unemployment rates, lowunemployment coincideswith high fertility
and high unemployment with low fertility (Panel A of Figure 2.5). Thus, the fitted line shows
first evidence of a negative relationship between experienced unemployment and completed
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Figure 2.5 : Relationship between unemployment, childlessness, and fertility
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Notes: The upper-le graph of both panels is a scatter plot of the fertility measures and unemployment
experienced between the age of 20 and 24 and the upper-right graph shows the same for those between
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between ages 30 and 34 and the lower-right graph shows the same for those between 35 and 39. Each
data point represents a cohort-state cell.
Sources: Microcensus (2008, 2012), ANBA (1974-2007).
fertility. For the age group 30 to 34, the negative association seems very pronounced. In
combination with the low dispersion around the fitted line, we expect a significant correlation
in this age group. Similarly, the share of childless women in a state-cohort cell increases with
the level of unemployment (Panel B). Thus, the negative correlation with fertility corresponds
to a positive correlation between experienced unemployment rates and childlessness. At the
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right end of each graph, where unemployment rates are high, there are very few observations,
mainly Bremen, and variation is very large, which could potentially confound the fit of the
line and estimation results later in the chapter.
Figure 2.6 : Gender-specific unemployment and completed fertility
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Notes: Each data point represents a cohort-state cell.
Source: Microcensus (2008, 2012), ANBA (1974-2007)
To discover gender-related dierences in response to the experience of unemployment rates,
we now replace the overall unemployment rates with the gender-specific rates. Since male
and female average unemployment ratesmight be highly correlated, we look at the correlation
holding constant the other gender’s level of unemployment. Figure 2.6 reveals a negative cor-
relation between averagemale unemployment rates and completed fertility for all age groups.
However, for female unemployment rates, the pattern reverses. Holding male unemployment
constant, women tend to havemore children if the unemployment rate they experience during
their reproductive years increases. A possible explanation is the decline in opportunity costs
of childbearing if labor market conditions worsen. The negative relationship for men seems
to be stronger than the positive relationship for women. Although, graphically, it is hard to
identify dierences across age groups, the slope of the fitted lines seems to increase for higher
age categories.
In Figure 2.7 we plot the same relationship substituting number of children by incidence of
childlessness. The basic pattern remains unchanged but the sign of the relationship reverses:
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Figure 2.7 : Gender-specific unemployment and childlessness
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Notes: Each data point represents a cohort-state cell.
Source: Microcensus (2008, 2012), ANBA (1974-2012)
higher femaleunemployment ratesareaccompaniedby lower sharesof childlessness,whereas
higher male unemployment is associated with increases in childlessness. Particularly, the
correlation with the male unemployment rate shows dierences across age groups. Between
25 and 29, as well as between 30 and 34, an increase in the level of male unemployment
substantially increases the share of childlessness. The negative relationship for experienced
female unemployment rates is weak and quite stable across age groups. Again, we find a high
level of variation in each of the plots that might confound the fit of the line.
To sum up, graphical evidence suggests that fertility outcomes and unemployment rates
experienced throughout the reproductive years are related at the state-cohort level. Using
male and female unemployment rates reveals dierences across gender: male unemployment
lowers, whereas female unemployment increases, fertility. The following section explores the
extent to which these findings hold in a multivariate set-up.
2.3 Method
In our main analysis we apply standard OLS and probit methods to estimate the experience
eects of state-level unemployment rates on fertility outcomes at age 40. The basic regression
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implements a stepwise experience function of unemployment rates since it allows for dierent
coeicients along women’s reproductive age. The estimation equation is:
(2.1) yics = β1U(2024)cs+β2U(2529)cs+β3U(3034)cs+β4U(3539)cs+γ
′Xics+µc+φs+ics
where yics is the fertility outcome of woman i of cohort c in state s. U(2024)cs is the average
unemployment rate that all women in cohort c faced between the ages of 20 and 24 in their
current state of residence. The other unemployment rate variables are defined equivalently.
Since time-varying variablesmight be aected by the state unemployment rates and therefore
cannot be treated as valid controls, we do not include them in ourmodel. Instead, we use time-
constant covariates,Xics, an indicator variable for migratory background, and four dummy
variables to control for level of education. The unemployment rates a woman experiences
during her reproductive years, can have an influence on her educational choices. For instance,
adverse labor market conditions may induce her to invest in higher education. Thus, parts of
the correlation between unemployment rates and fertility are due to changes in educational
outcomes and not to labor market conditions. To reduce the threat of these feedback eects,
we do not include the ISCED-level in our model. Instead, level of schooling proxies for level
of education since schooling mainly takes place before age 20 and is not aected by the
experienced unemployment rates. In addition, µc and φs represent cohort- and federal-state-
fixed eects. Cohort- and state-fixed eects account for systematic dierences in fertility
behavior of women across birth years and state. For instance, a change in fertility preferences
is captured by the cohort-fixed eect if these changes aect some cohorts more than others.
Permanent dierences between unemployment rates and fertility are captured by the state-
fixed eects as long as they are constant over time.
Standard microeconomic theory of fertility does not predict an unambiguous eect of in-
creased unemployment on fertility (see, e.g., Becker, 1991). On the one hand, demand for
children will fall since unemployment leads to a reduction in wages and family income (in-
come eect). On the other hand, lower wages reduce the opportunity costs of childrearing,
which should increase demand for children (substitution eect). However, as in Germany
women traditionally devote more time to childrearing than domen, the opportunity costs
argument applies mainly to women. As a result, unfavorable economic conditions for men
through increased unemployment risk and lower income are expected to reduce fertility rates,
whereas adverse labormarket conditions for women aect fertility through a negative income
and a positive substitution eect. Thus, we look more closely at gender-specific eects by
augmenting the equation with two sets of unemployment rate variables, one containing aver-
age male unemployment rates (e.g.,U(2024)
m
cs) and one average female unemployment rates
(e.g., U(2024)
f
cs). This approach enables us to answer the question of howmale and female
labor market conditions aect completed fertility as well as the incidence of childlessness.
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yics = β
m
1 U(2024)
m
cs + β
m
2 U(2529)
m
cs + β
m
3 U(3034)
m
cs + β
m
4 U(3539)
m
cs
+ βf1U(2024)
f
cs + β
f
2U(2529)
f
cs + β
f
3U(3034)
f
cs + β
f
4U(3539)
f
cs
+ γ′Xics + µc + φs + ics(2.2)
Table 2.1 reports summary statistics for the fertility measure as well as the unemployment
rates and the control variables. On average, women of the birth cohorts 1954 to 1967 have
1.53 children during their reproductive years and 23 percent remain childless. Experienced
unemployment rates increase over the fertile lifecycle, starting with 7 percent between 20 and
24 and peaking at almost 9 percent for the ages 35 to 39. This reflects the overall upward trend
in unemployment rates over the sample period 1974 to 2007. 5 percent of the women in the
sample have a migratory background, meaning that either they or their parents are foreign
born. Sample statistics reveal that over 37 percent of women from the birth cohorts 1954 to
1967 have a lower secondary school degree (Hauptschulabschluss), 35 percent graduate from
Realschule and the remaining 27 percent finish school with a university entrance degree –
either for a university (21 percent) or a university of applied sciences (6 percent).
Table 2.1 : Sample summary statistics: women from birth cohorts 1954 to 1967
Mean SD Min Max
Number of children 1.534 1.149 0 10
Childlessness 0.228 0.419 0 1
Average unemployment rate 20-24 0.069 0.026 0.026 0.152
Average unemployment rate 25-29 0.079 0.022 0.037 0.152
Average unemployment rate 30-34 0.085 0.022 0.043 0.158
Average unemployment rate 35-39 0.089 0.020 0.046 0.158
Migratory background 0.047 0.211 0 1
Schooling
Lower secondary degree 0.377 0.485 0 1
Upper secondary degree 0.354 0.478 0 1
Entrance degree for university of applied sciences 0.063 0.242 0 1
Entrance degree for regular university 0.207 0.405 0 1
Notes: Main sample consisting ofwomen frombirth cohorts 1954 to 1967 in theWest German
states who lived in Germany during their reproductive years.
Source: Microcensus (2008, 2012).
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2.4 Main Results
To estimate the coeicients of the linear equation, we employ standard OLS techniques with
robust standard errors clustered at the state level.3 For the regressions of the incidence of
childlessness at age 40 wemake use of a probit estimator and report averagemarginal eects,
again with clustered standard errors in parentheses. The estimated βs tell us to what extent
an increase in the average unemployment rate experienced during a certain age interval leads
to a change in completed fertility.
Table 2.2 : Long-run eects of average unemployment rate on completed fertility
Dependent variable Number of children above age 40
(1) (2) (3)
Eect of average unemployment rate at
Age 20-24 -0.0007 -0.0013 0.0018
(0.0054) (0.0051) (0.0054)
Age 25-29 -0.0035 -0.0048 -0.0035
(0.0062) (0.0062) (0.0067)
Age 30-34 -0.0140 -0.0140 -0.0111
(0.0143) (0.0142) (0.0139)
Age 35-39 -0.0078 -0.0075 -0.0065
(0.0163) (0.0161) (0.0163)
Migration No Yes Yes
Education No No Yes
Observations 90,756 90,756 90,756
Notes: Marginal eects from OLS regressions of number of children on average unemployment rates in age
groups. Sample consists of women fromWest Germany born between 1954 and 1967. All regressions contain
cohort- and state-fixed eects. Robust standard errors clustered at the state level in parentheses, *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
We start with showing the results from a regression of the number of children on the overall
unemployment rates experienced in the age groups 20-24, 25-29, 30-34, and 35-39 as in
Equation 2.1. Column 1 of Table 2.2 presents the estimated coeicients from a specification
with cohort- and state-fixed eects. In Column 2 we add a dummy variable indicating whether
a woman has a migratory background. Our preferred specification, Column 3, also includes
indicator variables for level of schooling. None of the estimates is significantly dierent from
zero meaning that the overall unemployment rates, that women experience during their
reproductive years, do not aect completed fertility. However, Becker’s theory predicts two
opposing eects of an increase in the risk of unemployment – a negative income and a positive
substitution eect. If these eects are similar inmagnitude, they quite likely cancel each other
3 Since the number of clusters is quite small, we also make use of a cluster bootstrap procedure proposed by
Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2008). Inference based on the bootstrap procedure is very similar. Therefore, we
present standard errors that are robust to any form of heteroskedasticity and clustered at the state level.
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out. To take a closer look at this issue, we replace the overall unemployment rates with the
gender-specific rates.
Table 2.3 : Long-run eects of average gender-specific unemployment rate on completed fertility
Dependent variable Number of children above age 40
(1) (2) (3)
Eect of average female unemployment rate at
Age 20-24 0.0356** 0.0346** 0.0414**
(0.0144) (0.0141) (0.0135)
Age 25-29 -0.0056 -0.0051 -0.0067
(0.0086) (0.0085) (0.0092)
Age 30-34 0.0045 0.0040 0.0034
(0.0160) (0.0160) (0.0160)
Age 35-39 0.0116 0.0118 0.0171
(0.0117) (0.0112) (0.0112)
Eect of average male unemployment rate at
Age 20-24 -0.0307** -0.0303** -0.0338***
0.0098) (0.0097) (0.0096)
Age 25-29 0.0006 -0.0012 0.0013
(0.0062) (0.0060) (0.0069)
Age 30-34 -0.0288 -0.0281 -0.0276
(0.0170) (0.0168) (0.0167)
Age 35-39 -0.0101 -0.0103 -0.0128
(0.0102) (0.0099) (0.0088)
Migration No Yes Yes
Education No No Yes
Observations 90,756 90,756 90,756
Notes: Marginal eects from OLS regressions of number of children on average unemployment rates in age
groups. Sample consists of women fromWest Germany born between 1954 and 1967. All regressions contain
cohort- and state-fixed eects. Robust standard errors clustered at the state level in parentheses, *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
The estimation results in Table 2.3 show the relationship between completed fertility and
gender-specific unemployment rates thatwomenhave faced in dierent periods of their fertile
lifecycle. The average female unemployment rate between age 20 and 24 has a significant
influence on the number of children. The preferred specification in Column 3 indicates that
a 1 percentage point increase in the average unemployment rate increases the number of
children by more than 0.04. Relative to the average number of children of 1.53 this eect
boosts completed fertility by 2.7 percent. However, the number of children is reduced almost
to the same extent if themale unemployment rate experienced between the ages of 20 and 24
increases by 1 percentage point. In Germany, the minority of births take place with a mother
between the ages of 20 and 24. We thus interpret the significant eects in this age group as
"scarring" eects. If women face periods of increasing unemployment along with its inherent
economic uncertainty in their early career years, they adjust their current as well as their
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future fertility behavior. Based on Becker’s theoretical considerations, we propose a potential
explanation for these results: the positive estimates of the female unemployment rate at age
20 to 24 suggest that the positive substitution eect outweighs the negative income eect for
women. Diiculties with starting a career due to unfavorable labor market conditions entail
diminishing opportunity costs that in turn induce women to have children. In contrast, in
periods of rising male unemployment, women reduce fertility. Since men are still the main
breadwinners, the reduced income has a negative eect on completed fertility. Nevertheless,
we cannot say whether couples with children adjust their optimal family size nor whether
women tend to remain childless when economic conditions worsen.
Table 2.4 : Long-run eects of average gender-specific unemployment rate on intensive and extensive margin
Dependent variable Childlessness Number of children (only mothers)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Eect of average female unemployment rate at
Age 20-24 -0.0130** -0.0128** -0.0161*** 0.0152 0.0142 0.0148
(0.0051) (0.0050) (0.0045) (0.0124) (0.0123) (0.0128)
Age 25-29 0.0004 0.0003 0.0013 -0.0061 -0.0054 -0.0052
(0.0024) (0.0025) (0.0026) (0.0081) (0.0080) (0.0079)
Age 30-34 -0.0027 -0.0027 -0.0025 0.0005 -0.0004 -0.0008
(0.0038) (0.0038) (0.0037) (0.0129) (0.0129) (0.0131)
Age 35-39 0.0002 0.0002 -0.0029 0.0179 0.0180 0.0176
(0.0051) (0.0052) (0.0050) (0.0149) (0.0142) (0.0145)
Eect of average male unemployment rate at
Age 20-24 0.0102* 0.0102* 0.0119** -0.0143 -0.0139 -0.0141
(0.0055) (0.0056) (0.0051) (0.0101) (0.0099) (0.0103)
Age 25-29 0.0007 0.0011 -0.0004 0.0040 0.0021 0.0019
(0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0093) (0.0090) (0.0089)
Age 30-34 0.0104** 0.0103** 0.0103*** -0.0145 -0.0136 -0.0130
(0.0042) (0.0041) (0.0039) (0.0157) (0.0157) (0.0161)
Age 35-39 0.0073** 0.0073** 0.0088*** 0.0049 0.0046 0.0045
(0.0035) (0.0034) (0.0030) (0.0068) (0.0068) (0.0067)
Migration No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Education No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 90,756 90,756 90,756 70,097 70,097 70,097
Notes: Columns 1-3: averagemarginal eects on remaining childless from probit regressions; Columns 4-6:
marginal eects from OLS regressions conditional on having children. Sample consists of women fromWest
Germany born between 1954 and 1967. All regressions contain cohort- and state-fixed eects. Robust standard
errors clustered at the state level in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
To shed more light on this issue, Table 2.4 focuses on the extensive (childlessness; Columns 1-
3) and the intensive margin (number of children conditional on having children; Columns 4-6)
of the fertility decision. The later regressions are based on a reduced sample conditional on
having children. Estimated coeicients of this reduced sample are small in magnitude and
imprecisely estimated. Looking at the incidence of childlessness reveals that experienced
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unemployment rates are associated with substantial changes in the probability of remaining
childless. Higher female unemployment rates in early years of the fertile lifecycle lower the
probability of remaining childless, whereas increasedmale unemployment is positively associ-
atedwith childlessness for almost all age groups. Suppose awoman faces a 1 percentage point
increase in male unemployment rates for all ages from 20 to 39. This would lead to an average
increase ofmore than 3 percentage points in her probability of remaining childless throughout
her fertile life. In contrast, the experienced female unemployment rates significantly influence
the decision to remain childless only between the ages of 20 and 24. A marginal increase
in the average unemployment rate during this age interval lowers childlessness by almost
1.6 percentage points. Again, the significant relationship in the age group 20-24 signals an
experience eect that influences future behavior since the decision to remain childless is
typically not taken so early in life.
Similar to the argument made above, we argue that adverse conditions in the labor market
reduce the male breadwinner’s income, inducing couples to remain childless. At the same
time, the costs of foregone earnings are the lowest at an early stage of a woman’s career.
Thus, if women substitute labor market participation with childrearing activities due to higher
experienced unemployment rates, they are more likely to becomemothers. However, this
explanation is not expected to hold for women with a tertiary degree. These women typi-
cally do not finish their education before age 25, meaning that the labor market conditions
prevailing while they are between the ages of 20 and 24 should not matter for their fertility
behavior. Heterogeneity in the relationship across levels of education is examined in the
following section.
2.5 Heterogeneous Effects by Level of Schooling
When we analyze the eect of unemployment experienced during a woman’s reproductive
years, we run up against a substantial problem. In response to increases in the unemployment
rate (especially the gender-specific unemployment rate), women not only change their fertility
behavior, they also change their education decisions. For instance, if labor market opportuni-
ties are unfavorable, womenmay decide to investmore time in their education until economic
conditions improve. As a consequence, the level of fertility and the level of education are
simultaneously aected by unemployment rates and the estimates are probably biased. Thus,
we run the heterogeneity analysis by level of schooling since school education typically ends
before age 20. More precisely, we estimate the regressions for completed fertility and childless-
ness separately for women with lower secondary education, with upper secondary education,
and for women with a secondary degree that permits university entrance.4
4 Lower and upper secondary education terminate with degrees from Hauptschule and Realschule that basically
allow their recipients to start an apprenticeship or vocational training. A university entrance degree allows to
study either at a regular university or at a university of applied sciences. Three-quarters of the women in our
sample belong to the former two categories, one-quarter to the latter (see Table 2.1).
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Table 2.5 reports the regression results of completed fertility and childlessness for three
dierent educational groups. Columns 1 and 4 show that women with lower secondary
schooling respond to the unemployment rate throughout their reproductive years. Similar to
earlier results, female unemployment at the beginning of the career reduces childlessness
and hence promotes completed fertility. The correlations are almost twice as large as in the
pooled estimations. The female unemployment rates women experience between the ages
of 30 and 34 have an eect on the number of children but leave the probability of remaining
childless unaected. In contrast, higher female unemployment experienced between age 25
and 29, whenwomen are already established in the labormarket, reduces fertility. An increase
in male unemployment in the age groups 20-24 and 30-34 is associated with a significant
reduction in fertility. Contrary to the theoretical predictions,male unemployment at age 25-29
has a positive eect on the number of children – thus a negative eect on remaining childless.
If women hold an upper secondary degree, female unemployment rates are negatively associ-
atedwith remaining childless for all age groups (Columns 2 and 4 of Table 2.5).5 This translates
into an increase in the number of children that is statistically significant only before age 30.
Similarly, higher experienced male unemployment rates before age 30 reduce fertility and
increase the likelihood of remaining childless. The coeicient at age 25-29 is dierently signed
for women with lower and upper secondary schooling. Only for low-educated women is the
experience of increasing male unemployment rates in this age group fertility enhancing. A
potential explanation is a positive substitution eect formen that occurs only in low-educated
couples where the opportunity costs of having children are relatively low.
Women with a university entrance degree do not react to the experienced unemployment
rates (see Columns 3 and 6 of Table 2.5): it seems that increasing unemployment does not
pose a threat to highly educatedwomen. However, whenwomenwith a high level of schooling
are between the ages of 25 and 29 – which may be the same time period during which their
partners are graduating from university – the male unemployment rate has a negative eect
on the number of children. Again, the labor market conditions for men at the start of their
careers aect fertility behavior.
Theheterogeneity analysis shows that the eects of unemployment experienceon fertility vary
strongly with women’s educational attainment. Women without lower and upper secondary
degrees are particularly aected by changing labor market conditions, whereas women with
a university entrance degree are seemingly unaected. Moreover, estimations suggest that a
substantial part of the overall eect on completed fertility can be attributed to changes in the
probability of remaining childless. To shedmore light on the mechanism that explains these
findings, potential channels are discussed in the following paragraphs.
5 Only female unemployment rates experienced between the ages of 30 and 34 are statistically not significant.
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Table 2.5 : Long-run eects of average gender-specific unemployment rate by level of schooling
Dependent variable Childlessness Number of children
Level of schooling Low Upper High Low Upper High
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Eect of average female unemployment rate at
Age 20-24 -0.0148*** -0.0291*** -0.0023 0.0759*** 0.0633** -0.0188
(0.0054) (0.0092) (0.0115) (0.0176) (0.0232) (0.0248)
Age 25-29 0.0101** -0.0075*** -0.0027 -0.0523** 0.0161* 0.0333
(0.0046) (0.0025) (0.0080) (0.0223) (0.0079) (0.0191)
Age 30-34 -0.0033 -0.0100 0.0122 0.0483* 0.0141 -0.0526
(0.0050) (0.0074) (0.0137) (0.0219) (0.0290) (0.0313)
Age 35-39 -0.0055 -0.0199** 0.0181 0.0170 0.0463 -0.0010
(0.0082) (0.0101) (0.0120) (0.0366) (0.0328) (0.0253)
Eect of average male unemployment rate at
Age 20-24 0.0118** 0.0150* 0.0112 -0.0601** -0.0368* 0.0027
(0.0059) (0.0090) (0.0103) (0.0213) (0.0173) (0.0234)
Age 25-29 -0.0160*** 0.0117*** 0.0107 0.0735*** -0.0345*** -0.0462*
(0.0035) (0.0042) (0.0085) (0.0194) (0.0086) (0.0245)
Age 30-34 0.0107* 0.0134 0.0080 -0.0756*** -0.0350 0.0385
(0.0059) (0.0097) (0.0118) (0.0217) (0.0357) (0.0316)
Age 35-39 0.0094 0.0094 0.0083 -0.0016 -0.0063 -0.0191
(0.0076) (0.0091) (0.0115) (0.0291) (0.0347) (0.0187)
Migration Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Education Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 34,199 32,091 24,466 34,199 32,091 24,466
Notes: Columns 1-3: averagemarginal eects on remaining childless from probit regressions; Columns 4-6:
marginal eects fromOLS regressions. Sample consists of women fromWest Germany born between 1954
and 1967. All regressions contain cohort- and state-fixed eects. Robust standard errors clustered at the state
level in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
2.6 Potential Mechanism
In this section we investigate two mechanisms that may be driving our main results. First,
adverse labor market conditions might have an influence on marriage market outcomes,
including the probability of finding a suitable partner or the stability of the partnership. If a
recession raises the threat of unemployment, men and womenmay be more willing to accept
low-quality matches on the partner market. Having a partner ensures financial support in the
event one of the partners becomes unemployed. In the short run, this insurance motive of a
marriage outweighs the potential negative consequences of being in an inferior partnership.
However, in the long run, an increase in the probability of marriage dissolution may also
imply a reduction in fertility. Unfortunately, the GMC does not provide a proper measure for
the quality of a partnership. Thus, we make use of the current marital status to proxy for
the quality and duration of the partnership. More precisely, we construct a dummy variable
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that indicates whether a woman above age 40 has never beenmarried throughout her fertile
lifecycle. Second, income is an important determinant of fertility behavior. Assuming that a
higher threat of unemployment is associated with lower income, we expect that parts of the
eect of unemployment on fertility can be explained by the income channel. Ideally, wewould
like to analyze how cumulative earnings vary with changes in unemployment rates. Since the
GMC reports only contemporary (net) household income, we assume that past unemployment
rates aect the income path and thus the current income. Using the household income rather
than the woman’s own income, accounts for the prevalence of the male breadwinner model
where menmake the larger monetary contribution to the household.
Table 2.6 : Mechanism of the long-run eect of average unemployment rate
Dependent variable Never married (Net) Household income
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Eect of average female unemployment rate at
Age 20-24 -0.0122** -0.0121** -0.0146*** 0.2099*** 0.2126*** 0.1280**
(0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0036) (0.0570) (0.0570) (0.0550)
Age 25-29 -0.0005 -0.0006 0.0003 -0.0882*** -0.0896*** -0.0857***
(0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0022) (0.0186) (0.0183) (0.0255)
Age 30-34 -0.0054 -0.0053 -0.0051 0.0282 0.0296 0.0278
(0.0037) (0.0037) (0.0036) (0.0756) (0.0752) (0.0743)
Age 35-39 0.0004 0.0004 -0.0021 0.2277*** 0.2272*** 0.1678***
(0.0089) (0.0088) (0.0080) (0.0529) (0.0503) (0.0468)
Eect of average male unemployment rate at
Age 20-24 0.0118** 0.0117** 0.0130*** -0.1823*** -0.1834*** -0.1392**
(0.0040) (0.0040) (0.0038) (0.0491) (0.0491) (0.0452)
Age 25-29 -0.0038* -0.0035 -0.0047* 0.0071 0.0122 -0.0092
(0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0022) (0.0367) (0.0362) (0.0375)
Age 30-34 0.0073* 0.0072* 0.0071* -0.1452** -0.1472** -0.1500**
(0.0038) (0.0038) (0.0035) (0.0626) (0.0622) (0.0656)
Age 35-39 0.0044 0.0044 0.0055 -0.1432** -0.1425*** -0.1141**
(0.0072) (0.0072) (0.0063) (0.0443) (0.0435) (0.0433)
Migration No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Education No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 90,756 90,756 90,756 90,756 90,756 90,756
Notes: Columns 1-3: average marginal eects on remaining unmarried from probit regressions; Columns 4-6:
marginal eects from OLS regressions of (net) household income on average unemployment rates in age
groups. Sample consists of women fromWest Germany born between 1954 and 1967. All regressions contain
cohort- and state-fixed eects. Robust standard errors clustered at the state level in parentheses, *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table2.6 reports averagemarginal eects for theprobabilityof remainingunmarried (Columns1
to 3) andmarginal eects on the net household income (Columns 4 to 6).6 Again, the preferred
specifications control for the level of education and themigratory background. The female un-
employment rate at ages 20 to 24 lowers the risk of not marrying until age 40. Hence, if, at the
beginning of their careers, women experience uncertainty in the labor market, they are more
likely to become married (the insurance motive). In contrast, higher male unemployment
rates during early ages reduce men’s attractiveness and women prefer to remain single. Both
findings are in line with the results from Table 2.3: the increasing likelihood of getting married
due to shis in female unemployment rates explains increases in fertility. Positive eects on
remaining unmarried due to changes in male unemployment rates ultimately reduce fertility.
The negative association between never married and the male unemployment rate between
age 25 and 29 implies that unfavorable labor market conditions for men induce women to get
married.
In Columns 4 to 6 of Table 2.6 we present the coeicients on household income. Contrary
to the presumed negative consequences, an increase in the female unemployment rate be-
tween the ages of 20 and 24, as well as between the ages 35 and 39, increases household
income. A possible explanation is that women spendmore time working in the labor market
to compensate for the threat of unemployment. At the same time, a higher labor market
attachment minimizes the probability of actually being aected by unemployment. Since
previous results show that women tend rather to have children than to increase their labor
supply in response to rising (female) unemployment rates, amore realistic explanation implies
an overcompensating of themale partner for the lost income. Household income is negatively
associated with female unemployment rates experienced between the ages of 25 and 29
– a crucial period during which women’s income path seems to be determined. Negative
shocks due to higher labor market uncertainty reduce household income significantly. The
coeicients of experienced male unemployment rates are negative and significant (except for
age 25-29). A higher risk of unemployment for men implies a reduction in household income
and, hence, can explain the negative eect on our fertility measures.
2.7 Robustness Check
To this point, our findings suggest that experienced female unemployment rates at the state
level induce women to increase fertility, whereas rising male unemployment rates reduce
fertility. In this section we check whether migration of women across states is a threat to the
identification of the coeicients. If mobility is high, the unemployment rates measured in
the current state of residence do not reflect the actual labor market conditions women face
during their reproductive years. Moreover, if women with very low or very high preferences
6 Net household income consists of 24 categories with an average bin size of some 300 Euro. Since the size is not
equal for all bins, it is diicult to interpret the coeicients quantitatively. However, the sign and the significance
level retain their intuitive meaning.
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for childrenmove to other states to benefit from better conditions in the labor market, our
estimates are biased. Therefore, we use information in the GMC about state of residence to
illustrate the distribution of women of a certain cohort across federal states. As presented
in Figure 2.8, the distribution of the exemplary cohort 1965 across states is very stable over
time. We find no evidence that womenmove from states where unemployment is very high,
for example, Bremen (HB),7 to states such as Bavaria (BY) or Baden-Württemberg (BW) that
have more favorable labor market conditions.8
Figure 2.8 : Distribution of birth cohort 1965 across states
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Notes: Female birth cohort 1965; West German states are: BW: Baden-
Württemberg; BY: Bavaria; HB: Bremen; HE: Hesse; HH: Hamburg; NI: Lower Sax-
ony; NRW: North Rhine-Westphalia; RP: Rhineland-Palatinate; SH: Schleswig-
Holstein; SL: Saarland.
Source: Microcensus (1985-2005).
Since the GMC is a repeated cross-section, we are not able to follow individuals over time.
Instead, we observe wave by wave which fraction of women from a birth cohort change
residence and also to which federal state they move. The GMC allows us to plot these shares
for thewaves 1985 to 1997 and 2005 to 2012. For the cohort 1965, Figure 2.9 shows the share of
womenwho have changed residencewithin the last 12months, bothwithin and across federal
states. Panel A reveals that youngwomenexhibit thehighestmobility. In their early 20s, almost
20 percent of the cohort 1965 changes residence. This is not surprising, since women typically
start their own household around this age. Some womenmight also change residence due
to education, partnership, or for work-related reasons. At the end of the reproductive age,
7 Even if the graphical analysis shows that some observations from Bremen might be outliers, regressions
without these women provide very similar results.
8 Due to data restrictions we are not able to monitor the mobility of cohorts born before 1965. Since mobility is
an increasing phenomenon over time, we assume that older cohorts are even less likely to change their state of
residence during their reproductive years.
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the share of women changing residence reduces to approximately 7 percent. Nevertheless,
these findings are not problematic for our empirical analysis if womenmove within the same
state or at least do not move systematically across state borders. In Panel B we graphically
assess what share of the cohort born in 1965 moves to another federal state during the fertile
lifecycle. No clear pattern emerges since younger as well as older women both seem to move
across federal state borders. Moreover, the share of movers is vanishingly low: on average,
less than 2 percent of the female population born in 1965 finds a new residence outside their
home state.
Figure 2.9 : Mobility of birth cohort 1965 within and across states
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Notes: Panel A: percentage of women born in 1965 who changes residence by age; Panel B: percentage of women
born in 1965 who changes federal state of residence by age. Values for ages 33 to 39 interpolated due to data
restrictions.
Sources: Microcensus (1985-2005).
Finally, in a regression framework replacing the state-specific unemployment rates with the
national unemployment rates, the threat that our estimates are confounded by systematic
migration is reduced. Table 2.7 presents OLS and probit estimates for the initial regressions
where state-level unemployment is substituted by national unemployment. Note that in this
setting the unemployment rate varies across cohorts, but no longer across regions. Thus, the
remaining variation in the unemployment rates is based on dierences in the labor market
conditions of the 14 birth cohorts in the sample. The estimates reveal that the sign of the
coeicients is in line with previous results; the magnitude is even higher for almost all age
groups, but the standard errors are up to 10 times larger than in Table 2.3 or 2.4. Most likely,
the variation in the national unemployment measures is not suicient to achieve reasonable
standard errors. Hence, we are not able to estimate the coeicients precisely enough to
statistically distinguish them from zero. Nevertheless, we do not interpret the estimates as
contradicting the main results.
The robustness checks aim at providing evidence against selective migration across federal
states. We show graphically, as well as in a regression framework, that our main estimates
are not confounded by the mobility patterns of women of reproductive age. Indeed, using
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national instead of state-specific unemployment rates confirms the main insights from the
previous analysis.
Table 2.7 : Long-run eects of national gender-specific unemployment rate
Dependent variable Childlessness Number of children
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Eect of average female unemployment rate at
Age 20-24 -0.0410 -0.0386 -0.0402 0.0238 0.0118 0.0107
(0.0397) (0.0396) (0.0416) (0.1198) (0.1183) (0.1237)
Age 25-29 -0.0068 -0.0082 -0.0088 0.0706 0.0785 0.0767
(0.0201) (0.0197) (0.0204) (0.0543) (0.0527) (0.0551)
Age 30-34 -0.0211 -0.0223 -0.0237 0.0969 0.1022 0.1053
(0.0325) (0.0327) (0.0363) (0.0930) (0.0945) (0.0974)
Age 35-39 -0.0358** -0.0351** -0.0384** 0.0345 0.0311 0.0331
(0.0165) (0.0169) (0.0158) (0.0559) (0.0562) (0.0548)
Eect of average male unemployment rate at
Age 20-24 0.0446 0.0424 0.0435 -0.0329 -0.0220 -0.0187
(0.0387) (0.0387) (0.0414) (0.1121) (0.1111) (0.1168)
Age 25-29 0.0146* 0.0154* 0.0135 -0.0677*** -0.0720*** -0.0652**
(0.0087) (0.0086) (0.0088) (0.0194) (0.0192) (0.0208)
Age 30-34 0.0049 0.0051 0.0009 -0.0192 -0.0187 -0.0130
(0.0135) (0.0135) (0.0137) (0.0318) (0.0320) (0.0312)
Age 35-39 0.0074 0.0065 0.0054 0.0331 0.0374 0.0415
(0.0162) (0.0162) (0.0171) (0.0402) (0.0399) (0.0436)
Migration No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Education No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 90,756 90,756 90,756 90,756 90,756 90,756
Notes: Columns 1-3: averagemarginal eects on remaining childless from probit regressions; Columns 4-6:
marginal eects fromOLS regressions. Sample consists of women fromWest Germany born between 1954
and 1967. All regressions contain cohort- and state-fixed eects. Robust standard errors clustered at the state
level in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
2.8 Conclusion
The labor market conditions women experience throughout their reproductive years are
expected to influence completed fertility as well as childlessness. Standardmicroeconomic
theory suggests that unemployment spells and thewage reductions that accompany increases
in the unemployment rate have two opposing eects on fertility: a negative income eect and
a positive substitution eect. Which of the two dominates remains, ultimately, an empirical
question. In addition, short-run studies that analyze the contemporaneous relationship
between unemployment and birth rates are not able to distinguish a mere tempo eect from
a quantum eect.
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Thus, we intend to answer in this chapter how the labormarket conditions women face during
their reproductive years aect the fertility behavior. To this end, wemake use of the German
Microcensus from 2008 and 2012, focusing on the incidence of childlessness and the number
of children born to each woman from the birth cohorts 1954 to 1967. Applying standard OLS
and probit regressionmethods, the results suggest that increases in the five-year averages
of state-specific unemployment rates have a significant impact on fertility decisions. More
precisely, experiencing higher female unemployment rates during early career years increases
fertility, whereas risingmale unemployment rates have the opposite eect. This relationship is
mainly driven by changes in the probability of remaining childless. For instance, if the average
female unemployment rate at age 20 to 24 increases by 1 percentage point, the likelihood
that a woman remains childless decreases by 1.6 percentage points. However, if the male
unemployment rate rises in the same period, childlessness increases by 1.2 percentage points.
Given the baseline of 23 percent childlessness in our sample, the estimates correspond to a
7 percent decline or a 5.3 percent growth in childlessness. The changes in the probability of
remaining childless translate into lower completed fertility. The number of children is reduced
by 2.2 percent and raised by 2.7 percent if male, respectively, female unemployment increases
in the age group 20-24. Since most fertility decisions are taken aer age 25, we argue that our
results represent a "scarring" eect of unemployment that influences future fertility behavior.
In addition, the heterogeneity analysis reveals that women with lower and upper secondary
degrees respondmost strongly to changes in unemployment rates. Twomechanismsmay
explain the findings: first and foremost, experienced unemployment rates have a substantial
influence onmarriage market outcomes and, second, they also impact household income.
We argue that the results are robust to potential distortions caused by womenmigrating to
states with more favorable labor market conditions.
From a policy perspective, our research opens a new way of thinking about labor market and
fertility policy. Since labormarket experience significantly aects fertility behavior – especially
during the early years of a career – policymeasures regardingmale and female unemployment
need to be evaluated for the extent to which they may interfere with family policies. A narrow
perspective focused solely on the labor market may have severe consequences for the fertility
decisions of couples.
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3 Fixed-Term Employment and Fertility: Evidence from
GermanMicro Data1
3.1 Introduction
One of the most striking facts about labor market development in many European countries
over the last decades is the tremendous increase in fixed-term employment. By 2012, the
average share of temporary2 employees among all 25- to 54-year-old employees was, on
average, 12 percent in all European OECD countries (OECD, 2014). Germany has witnessed a
particularly strong rise in fixed-term employment in recent years. By 2012, almost 50 percent
of new employment contracts were of limited duration. Fixed-term employment is particularly
concentrated among young adults in their early careers – a period in life that is crucial both for
career progression and family formation. Recent evidence shows that adverse labor market
conditions at the beginning of the career can lead to severe and persistent earning losses (e.g.,
Oreopoulos, von Wachter, and Heisz, 2012). Temporary employment might cause a similarly
negative labor market path dependence via repeated episodes of temporary employment,
decelerated wage progression, and higher likelihood of future unemployment (Hagen, 2002;
Bruno, Caroleo, and Dessy, 2012; Booth, Francesconi, and Frank, 2002; Pavlopoulos, 2009).
Previous studiesmainly link contemporaneous temporary employment and fertility responses
at dierent stages of the lifecycle and producemixed evidence. Their approach neglects the
potential endogeneity of fixed-term contracts as well as any path dependence. The empirical
literature on whether and, if so, how increased levels of economic uncertainty due to unstable
working contracts at the beginning of a career have spill-over eects on other domains of life
is rare.
The main objective and contribution of this chapter is to fill this gap by empirically assessing
the implications for subsequent fertility of entering the labormarketwith a fixed-termcontract.
To this end, we focus on several cohorts of graduates from vocational training or tertiary
education and follow them for their first 10 years in the labor market. We analyze the timing
of first birth (tempo eect) as well as the number of children (quantum eect) in the short to
medium run. We also contribute to the literature by discussing and addressing the potential
selection of individuals into dierent types of contracts. To reduce possible omitted variable
bias, we exploit our rich and unique data set and include a large set of novel control variables.
1 Joint with Natalia Danzer, published as "Fixed-Term Employment and Fertility: Evidence from German Micro
Data" in CESifo Economic Studies 62 (4), 2016. This and the last chapter were part of a project funded by IBS
(Warsaw) by grant number 3_SG/IBS/2014
2 Throughout the third and fourth chapter of this dissertation, the terms "fixed-term contract" and "temporary
contract" are used interchangeably.
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Based on the survey years 1995 to 2012 of the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), we
apply probit and poisson estimationmethods on a pooled sample of womenwho are childless
when they finish their education and enter the labor market. Our results for natives confirm
that starting a career with a fixed-term contract is negatively associated with subsequent
fertility: we find an increased postponement of first birth and a reduction in the number
of children in the first 10 years aer graduation. These results also hold when we expand
the sample and include migrants in the analysis; however, the eects in the full sample
are slightly less pronounced. Furthermore, we show that fixed-term employment seems to
particularly aect the fertility decisions of women with secondary education. We find no
significant correlations between job uncertainty and fertility for the subsample of men. As
fertility decisions, as well as holding a fixed-term contract, may be driven by unobserved
heterogeneity, we address potential endogeneity concerns on two fronts: first, by including
many important and previously neglected control variables and, second, by showing that
entering the labor market with a fixed-term contract is related neither to family nor to career
preferences. Against this background, we reckon that our results actually reflect a robust,
negative relationship between job uncertainty in the early career and the timing and number
of children. Even though we are not able to examine the eect on completed fertility in this
empirical setup, our results suggest that completed fertility might be negatively aected as
well.
Our research contributes to the growing literature on the relationship between economic
uncertainty and fertility. Several empirical studies suggest that fertility reacts pro-cyclically
to macroeconomic conditions: higher unemployment rates are generally associated with
reduced fertility rates and vice versa (e.g., Adsera, 2005; Adsera and Menendez, 2011; Gold-
stein, Kreyenfeld, Jasilioniene, and Örsal, 2013). Analyses of how individual unemployment
aects fertility yield mixed evidence (e.g., Del Bono et al., 2012; Kreyenfeld, 2010). Focusing
on perceived economic uncertainty using German data, Bhaumik and Nugent (2011) and
Hofmann and Hohmeyer (2013)3 find a reduction in fertility and a study by Kreyenfeld (2010)
confirms this result for a subsample of highly educated women.
Temporary employment is considered to be one form of economic uncertainty. Unfortunately,
evidence on the relationship between fixed-term employment and fertility is scarce and incon-
clusive. For Germany, Gebel and Giesecke (2009) find no evidence that fixed-term contracts
influence the fertility decisions of young couples, whereas the results by Schmitt (2012) sug-
gest a negative impact. Tölke and Diewald (2003) find evidence for a postponement of first
birth due to economic uncertainty for youngmen. Kind and Kleibrink (2013) disagree, conclud-
ing that time-limited contracts postpone childbearing only for women, not for men. Studies
from other European countries report less ambiguous results. For Spain, studies by Ahn and
Mira (2001) and De la Rica and Iza (2005) conclude that fixed-term employment has a negative
eect on the decision to marry and delays childbearing. Similarly, Sutela (2012) reports that
3 The study by Hofmann and Hohmeyer (2013) stands out from the other studies in its attempt to correct for the
potential endogeneity of subjective economic uncertainty.
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in Finland, fixed-term employment is negatively associated with entering parenthood. All
these studies have in common that they focus mostly on empirical associations between
holding a fixed-term contract and fertility. They neither consider the potential endogeneity
problems of fixed-term contracts (whichmight be increasing in labor market experience as
well as previous number of children) nor the potential path dependence of entering the labor
market with a contract of limited duration.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. The following section discusses the
theoretical background. Section 3.3motivates our empirical analysis by descriptively showing
the relationship between fixed-term employment, economic uncertainty, and the fertility
decisions of young couples. Section 3.4 introduces our data and our empirical approach. The
main results, as well as several sensitivity and subgroup analyses, are presented in Section 3.5.
Section 3.6 concludes and discusses potential policy implications.
3.2 Theoretical Background
The main microeconomic theory of fertility dates back to Becker (1960, 1965, 1991). In his
work, children are modeled as normal consumption goods and fertility decisions are based
on the relative costs and benefits of having children. These models are also referred to as
opportunity cost models or price-of-time models since wage increases not only induce a
positive income eect (raising the demand for children), but also a negative opportunity cost
eect (substitution eect). Direct opportunity costs arise due to foregone earnings during the
time that parents take o fromwork or reduce their working hours to care for their children.
Additionally, childrearing incurs indirect opportunity costs or future career costs through
humancapital depreciationduring employment interruptions, which in turnnegatively impact
the future earnings profile. The overall eect of changes in the wage on fertility depends on
the relative size of these opposing income and opportunity costs of time eects. However, as
women in many countries traditionally devote more time to childrearing than domen, the
opportunity costs argument is mainly applied to women. In contrast, wage increases of men
are expected to have a positive income eect.4
Based on this theoretical framework, fixed-term employment could aect fertility in several
ways. First, demand for children should be reduced as the wages of fixed-term employees are,
on average, lower than those of their colleagues with permanent contracts (income eect).
Second, lower wages also imply smaller direct opportunity costs of childbearing, thus fos-
tering the demand for children. Third, it is likely that fixed-term contracts further exacerbate
the future career costs of children through increased economic uncertainty: temporary em-
ployment is generally associated with a higher risk of future unemployment Hagen (2002).
In addition, unemployed women with children might be disadvantaged in the labor market
4 Becker and Lewis (1973) extend this framework by incorporating the possibility that parents trade o the
quantity and quality of children. In their model, a rise in income does not necessarily increase the number of
children, but can instead raise the quality per child (e.g., through additional investments in education).
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and might find it more diicult to find a job than childless women (Del Bono et al., 2012).
Taken together, having children while in a temporary job is likely to put women in an even
more unfavourable situation. Moreover, fixed-term employment might hamper the success of
future job search as human capital accumulation in temporary jobs is generally decelerated
due to smaller investments in firm- or task-specific skills (Albert, García-Serrano, and Hernanz,
2005). Hence, these additional future career costs of children exclusively related to fixed-term
contracts and their associated economic uncertainty should reduce the demand for children
andmight deter women from entering motherhood while on a fixed-term contract.
Overall though, the standard economic theory of fertility does not predict an unambiguous
eect of fixed-term employment on fertility. Moreover, this static framework neither allows
drawing any conclusions about the optimal timing of childbearing, nor does it explicitly
account for the potential role of economic uncertainty.5 These twoaspects are jointly captured
in the economic models of fertility proposed by Ranjan (1999) and Iyer and Velu (2006):6 in
both models, childbirth decisions are considered irreversible and parents have the option
to postpone childbearing to future periods. The intuitive implication in both cases is that in
light of future uncertainties (about own income or the net benefit of children), it might be
worthwhile for parents to postpone their childbearing decision to the (next) period when the
uncertainty is resolved. This way parents can avoid entering parenthood and incurring its
associated irreversible costs in a bad state of the world when having children is not optimal.
Against this background, fixed-term contracts should increase the option value of postponing
the childbearing decision and thus cause a delay in parenthood. Themain driver will be the
economic uncertainty associated with fixed-term contracts due to a more unstable future
employment and income path.
3.3 Descriptive Evidence
This section descriptivelymotivates economic uncertainty as themain channel throughwhich
starting a career with a fixed-term contract aects fertility decisions. We employ two large-
scale and nationally representative Germanmicro-data sources – the German Socio-Economic
5 The timing of fertility is addressed in so-called lifecycle or dynamic models of fertility. However, these models
do not yield clear predictions and are also diicult to test econometrically (Hotz, Klerman, andWillis, 1997). Hotz
et al. (1997) and Gustafsson (2001) provide comprehensive reviews of the theoretical and empirical literature on
the postponement of maternity, but do not address the potential role of economic uncertainty.
6 Iyer and Velu (2006) incorporate a real options approach in their theoretical framework. Their model aims
at explaining demographic processes in developing countries in which economic uncertainty increases the
insurance motive for children (positive fertility eect) and at the same time the option to wait (negative fertility
eect). However, as the insurance motive should be of little, if any, relevance in developed countries, the model
predicts an unambiguous delay of childbearing due to economic uncertainty in the German context (Bhaumik
and Nugent, 2011).
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Panel (SOEP)7 and thePanel Analysis of IntimateRelationships andFamilyDynamics (pairfam)8
– to shed light on (a) the degree of economic uncertainty and the path dependence associated
with a career start in a fixed-term employment and (b) the role played by economic security in
the decision to have children.
3.3.1 Fixed-Term Contract and Economic Uncertainty
We employ several subjective as well as objective measures to capture economic uncertainty.
Controlling for various covariates, Table 3.1 shows predicted probabilities for individual per-
ception of job security and own economic situation by type of contract. Over 48 percent of
women and almost 47 percent of men with a regular, permanent contract report that they are
not concerned at all about job security, whereas only 22 percent of the temporary employed
women and 28 percent of men do not worry about job security. Moreover, almost one-third of
female workers with a fixed-term contract are very concerned about job security, whereas
this is true of only 13 percent of workers on permanent contracts. A similar picture emerges
if we look at assessments of the general economic situation. While only 20 (16) percent of
all female (male) permanent employees report that they are very concerned about the gen-
eral economic situation, almost 29 (23) percent of their temporary colleagues are worried.
Thus, self-reported job and economic uncertainty is indeedmuchmore pronounced among
temporary than among permanent employees.
Table 3.1 : Worries about job security and economic situation (in percent)
Men Women
Very concerned Not concerned at
all
Very concerned Not concerned at
all
A. Are you concerned about job security?
Permanent contract 11.3 46.9 12.8 48.1
Fixed-term contract 23.7 27.5 33.2 22.1
B. Are you concerned about your own economic situation?
Permanent contract 15.7 28.0 20.1 24.3
Fixed-term contract 23.0 19.5 28.8 16.7
Notes: SOEP 1995-2012, employedmen and women, 18-49 years, predicted probabilities controlling for age,
education, migratory background, net wage, occupation, industry, year, and federal state; residual category
"somewhat concerned".
We find a similar pattern when using several objective measures of economic uncertainty,
namely, income volatility, future unemployment risk, and wage progression. Our first mea-
sure, income volatility, reflects the degree of uncertainty in wages attached to fixed-term
7 For more information regarding the SOEP, see Section 3.4.
8 The pairfam study (Huinink, Brüderl, Nauck, Walper, Castiglioni, and Feldhaus, 2011) covers the complex
processes of partnership development, family formation, and childrearing, as well as intergenerational relations.
It was first conducted in 2008/2009, and consists of three birth cohorts. The first wave of the birth cohort
1981-1983, which is used in this section, comprises 1,238 childless women and 1,659 childless men.
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employment. Following Bonin, Dohmen, Falk, Human, and Sunde (2007), we analyze the
variance of the residual part of a Mincer wage regression using individual net and gross labor
income. If the variance of the unexplained part for temporary employees exceeds that for
permanent workers, uncertainty is higher for the former.
Table 3.2 : Variance ratio test for unexplained part of wages by type of contract
Men Women
Net wages Gross wages Net wages Gross wages
A. Mean values
Permanent contract 1748.2 2743.1 1223.4 1905.4
Fixed-term contract 1453.5 2252.0 985.3 1554.8
B. Variance of unexplained part
Permanent contract 0.258 0.281 0.223 0.268
Fixed-term contract 0.391 0.430 0.312 0.354
C. Variance ratio test
F-statistic 0.660 0.654 0.714 0.757
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes: SOEP 1995-2012, employed men and women, 18-49 years, controlling for gender, age, education,
migratory background, experience, tenure, net wage, occupation, industry, year, and federal state.
Table 3.2 shows variances, test statistics, and p-values for the variance ratio test by gender.
On average, wages of temporary employed men and women are lower than those of their col-
leagues with permanent contracts. Furthermore, the earnings are more volatile and therefore
more uncertain for temporary workers. The formal test confirms this result since the F-statistic
leads to a rejection of the null hypothesis of equal variances (p-value< 0.001). Individuals
with a fixed-term contract experience significantly higher earnings uncertainty compared to
individuals in permanent jobs.
Descriptive evidence regarding future unemployment risk and future wages related to fixed-
term employment is provided in Table 3.3. We present future labor market outcomes for
men and women whose first job is on a temporary or on a permanent basis. The picture that
emerges supports the notion of a negative path dependence of starting a career with a fixed-
term contract. The risk of subsequent unemployment is substantially higher if the first job has
a limited duration. During the first 10 years aer labormarket entry, these individuals aremore
likely to have had at least one unemployment spell than their colleagues who started with a
permanent contract. On average, they have also experiencedmore periods of unemployment.
This finding holds for men as well as for women (Panel A and B). In contrast, conditional on
employment, the net wages of both groups are only slightly dierent at the beginning of the
career and converge over time (Panel C).
However, when including unemployed individuals in the wage calculations, the earnings gap
widens for men but turns around for women (Table 3.3, Panel D).9 Hence, while we do not find
9 We included unemployed and inactive individuals in these earnings calculations by assigning them a zero
labor market income.
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Table 3.3 : Path dependence of type of the first contract
Men Women
Years aer graduation
Starting a career with 3 5 10 3 5 10
A. Incidence of at least one unemployment spell (in percent)
Permanent contract 9.6 14.3 18.9 11.3 20.3 34.4
Fixed-term contract 23.2 26.5 29.3 15.9 26.2 39.7
B. Number of unemployment spells
Permanent contract 0.111 0.212 0.447 0.137 0.313 0.834
Fixed-term contract 0.293 0.518 1.061 0.182 0.392 0.944
C. Net wages
Permanent contract 1548.9 1716.9 2154.0 1198.3 1227.9 1349.2
Fixed-term contract 1530.2 1612.0 2200.5 1123.2 1274.1 1419.4
D. Net wage (UE = 0)
Permanent contract 1462.6 1620.7 2061.0 1020.6 929.2 998.2
Fixed-term contract 1284.6 1417.8 1905.3 884.9 989.9 1104.0
Notes: SOEP 1995-2012, men and women, 18-49 years.
consistent evidence for dierences in actual wage profiles (see Booth et al., 2002; Pavlopoulos,
2009), earning stability is much lower among those employees who entered the labor market
with a fixed-term contract.
To sumup, descriptive statistics suggest that holding a fixed-termcontract is indeedassociated
with a high degree of uncertainty and negative future career consequences. This holds for
subjective as well as objective measures of economic uncertainty.
3.3.2 Job Security and First Birth
Table 3.4 : Conditions for having children (in percent)
Men Women
A. Financial aordability must be satisfied before first birth
Permanent contract 76.9 77.8
Fixed-term contract 77.9 78.8
B. Compatibility with work life must be satisfied before first birth
Permanent contract 63.1 68.3
Fixed-term contract 64.0 69.2
Notes: pairfam 2009, childless men and women, 24-29 years, predicted probabilities controlling for gender,
age, education, migratory background, parental education, importance of career and family, and federal state.
How does the economic situation aect the fertility decisions of young couples? Table 3.4 lists
predicted probabilities by gender for the two most oen mentioned conditions for having
children (pairfam data). Both conditions are related to work life: parenthood has to be finan-
cially aordable and has to be compatible with the work situation.10 The numbers dier only
10 Other, less important, conditions are the availability of childcare or leisure-time pursuits.
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marginally by type of contract: for instance, 77 (78) percent of the male (female) respondents
in permanent employment report that financial aordability must be satisfied before having
a first child, while 78 (79) percent with fixed-term contracts do so. Hence, the groups are
not dierent in their desire for economic security and stability before having children. This
suggests that young people do not self-select into fixed-term contracts with respect to these
observable family- and work-related attitudes.
The answers as to whether these conditions are satisfied are in striking contrast to this simi-
larity in desires (Table 3.5). The dierences between individuals with fixed-term and those
with permanent contracts are substantial. Male respondents with a fixed-term contract are 15
(13) percentage points less likely to rate the financial (job-related) situation as good enough
to become parents. Women with a fixed-term contract assess their financial preconditions for
entering motherhood even worse than domen: only 48 percent report that financial condi-
tions allow them to have a baby. This is almost 15 percentage points less than women with
a regular contract. This descriptive evidence indicates that job-related factors play a major
role in young couples’ decisions to have children. Independent of the type of employment
contract, individuals prefer to be economically secure before having children. However, this
condition is significantly less oen satisfied for temporary than for permanent employees.
Table 3.5 : Satisfaction of conditions for having children (in percent)
Men Women
A. Financial aordability is satisfied
Permanent contract 60.0 62.3
Fixed-term contract 45.5 47.9
B. Compatibility with work life is satisfied
Permanent contract 59.7 59.5
Fixed-term contract 46.6 46.4
Notes: pairfam 2009, childless men and women, 24-29 years, predicted probabilities controlling for gender,
age, education, migratory background, parental education, importance of career and family, and federal state.
The descriptive analysis in this section suggests that (a) fixed-term contracts are indeed
associated with increased economic uncertainty and (b) economic uncertainty seems to
deter young couples from entering parenthood. The resulting hypothesis that temporary
employment induces a postponement of first birth (or even a negative fertility eect) will be
empirically assessed in a regression framework in the next section.
3.4 Data and Empirical Strategy
3.4.1 Data, Sample Restrictions, and Variables
We employ the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), which has provided annual and na-
tionally representative panel data since 1984 (Wagner, Frick, and Schupp, 2007). In 2012, the
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SOEP coveredmore than 20,000 individuals living in over 12,000 households. SOEP contains
detailed information on a variety of individual as well as household-specific socioeconomic
characteristics. Moreover, the respondents provide information about their labor market
history as well as their current labor force status. Most importantly, we knowwhether their
employment contract was permanent or temporary.
We focus on the waves 1995 to 2012 since consistent information on the type of employment
contract for all working individuals was collected only from 1995 onward.11 Our main sample
consists of nativewomenwhoare childless, 18 to 30 years old at the timeof graduation, and for
whom information on subsequent fertility for at least 10 years aer graduation is available.12
Furthermore, we restrict the main analysis to women who have obtained at least a vocational
degree (i.e., ISCED codes 3 to 6).13 The restriction concerning age at graduation is imposed
because we want to ensure that the biological preconditions for becoming pregnant and
giving birth are not too dierent in the 10 years following graduation. Women who finish their
education aer their 31st birthday have a comparatively narrower biological time interval in
which to postpone the birth of their first child. Furthermore, for these older women it seems
more likely that fertility and education choices are made simultaneously. We end up with a
balanced sample of 267 women from the graduation cohort 1995 to 2003 whomwe observe
at the start of their career and at least once more 10 years aer graduation.
The outcome variables are the following. First, to measure the timing of first birth, we create
a set of dummy variables taking the value 1 if a woman has had a first child in year z aer
graduation or labor market entry14 (with z = 4, ..., 10) and remains 1 from this point onward.
The dummy variable is 0 if the woman is still childless in that particular year z. For instance,
for a woman who has remained childless until her fih year on the labor market and has a
child from year 5 on, we code the outcome variable as 0 for years 1 to 4 and as 1 for years 5
to 10. Second, to analyze the quantum eect, that is, whether a postponement of first birth
also translates into a decline in the total number of children, we generate a set of variables
indicating the number of children, again in each of years 4 to 10 aer career start.15 The
11 Respondents who did not report a job change were excluded from this question. Thus, switching from
temporary to permanent employment at the same employer was not part of the questionnaire up to 1995.
12 To be precise, these women are childless and not pregnant when they enter the labor market. For those
individuals who did not participate in each wave of the survey, we filled in the missing fertility information
retrospectively using the birth history reported in year 10 aer graduation.
13 We employ these restrictions to increase the homogeneity of our small sample and to drop outliers (e.g., there
are only nine observations with less than secondary education). However, our main results hold when we relax
all sample restrictions.
14 We use the expressions “year of graduation” and “year of labor market entry” interchangeably even though,
technically speaking, wemeasure the information on the first job in the calendar year aer graduation. Themain
reason for doing so is that we do not have information on the exact date of graduation. Our approach ensures
that the job information is indeedmeasured aer graduation.
15 Due to the low number of first births two and three years aer graduation (for the number of children esti-
mations, also four years aer graduation), there is not enough variation to estimate the regression until this
point.
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dependent variables thus reflect the proportion of women who have had their first child aer
a certain amount of time aer graduation, as well as the average number of children.
The main explanatory variable is a binary variable indicating whether the first job aer grad-
uation had a fixed-term employment contract or a permanent contract (we also control for
whether the respondent is unemployed aer graduation). A great advantage of the SOEP
data is the variety of unique information provided about the respondent. The data allow us
to include a large set of controls for individual, background, personality, and first job char-
acteristics, as well as for partnership status at labor market entry. All control variables are
either predetermined (i.e., determined before labor market entry) or measured in the year
of career start. Individual control variables are age at graduation, years of education, and
being born in East Germany.16 As a proxy for the respondent’s predetermined family- and
career-related background we include variables indicating whether her mother has tertiary
education, whether the respondent’s mother was employed when the respondent was 15
years old, whether the respondent has siblings, andmother’s age at the respondent’s birth.
Personality traits and self-reported attitudes are captured by the "Big 5", locus of control,
and Kluckhohn’s importance of life area measures. More specifically, five variables on a scale
from 1 (low) to 7 (high) reflect the respondent’s openness to new experience, agreeableness,
conscientiousness, extraversion, and neuroticism. The locus of control variable takes on high
values if the respondent is convinced that her own actions determine her success in life. Four
binary variables indicate individual career- and family-related attitudes and values. The latter
take the value 1 if awomanclaims that having children, being in a happypartnership/marriage,
being able to aord something, or having a career is important or very important in her life.17
In addition, a dummy variable indicates whether a woman is risk averse, that is, reports a
(very) low subjective willingness to take risks. As regards the characteristics of the first job, we
include only very rough indicators, namely, dummy variables for blue- versus white-collar
occupations and five industry dummies for the main economic sectors.18 The prevalence of
fixed-term employment diers across industries and occupational groups. Similarly, women
with particular fertility preferences might self-select into particular industries and occupa-
tional groups. We control for these job characteristics to ensure that our results do not reflect
spurious correlations between temporary jobs and fertility.19 Finally, we include a dummy
variable indicating whether the person is in a partnership at career start.
16 In the robustness checks we includemigrants in the sample and add a control variable for migration back-
ground.
17 Questions on personality traits and attitudes are not included in every wave of the survey. To exclude possible
feedback eects of labor market or partnership experiences on personality traits and family and career attitudes,
we use only the first available observation. According to the psychological literature, personality traits are stable
in adulthood. The majority of women answered this question at around the age of 21.
18 The five main industries are generated according to the classification of the Federal Statistical Oice (destatis).
Thesearemanufacturing, construction, tradeand transportation, financial services, andpublic andother services.
We dropped the only respondent working in the agricultural sector.
19 However, our main results are robust to excluding these industry and occupational dummy variables.
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Table 3.6 : Descriptive statistics by employment status
First job First job Unemployed
permanent contract fixed-term contract aer graduation
Mean SD N Mean SD N Mean SD N
A. Outcome variables
First birth aer 3 years 0.136 0.379 177 0.171 0.343 76 – – 14
First birth aer 5 years 0.322 0.469 177 0.263 0.443 76 0.071 0.267 14
First birth aer 7 years 0.446 0.499 177 0.421 0.497 76 0.286 0.469 14
First birth aer 10 years 0.605 0.490 177 0.553 0.501 76 0.643 0.497 14
Number of children aer 5 years 0.379 0.592 177 0.329 0.598 76 0.071 0.267 14
Number of children aer 7 years 0.588 0.726 177 0.579 0.753 76 0.286 0.469 14
Number of children aer 10 years 0.927 0.892 177 0.868 0.929 76 0.714 0.611 14
B. Control variables
Age at graduation 23.48 2.682 177 24.71 3.382 76 23.43 3.368 14
Years of education 13.11 2.483 177 13.97 2.940 76 12.21 2.463 14
Born in East Germany 0.367 0.483 177 0.434 0.499 76 0.571 0.514 14
In partnership aer graduation 0.684 0.466 177 0.737 0.443 76 0.786 0.426 14
Married aer graduation 0.056 0.232 177 0.092 0.291 76 0.286 0.469 14
Cohabiting aer graduation 0.395 0.490 177 0.408 0.495 76 0.357 0.497 14
Openness 4.529 1.183 177 4.553 1.199 76 4.357 1.017 14
Agreeableness 5.471 0.842 177 5.360 0.955 76 5.500 0.894 14
Conscientiousness 5.914 0.778 177 5.893 0.811 76 6.333 0.692 14
Extraversion 5.053 1.143 177 4.989 1.075 76 5.238 1.505 14
Neuroticism 4.339 0.775 177 4.364 0.820 76 4.643 0.891 14
Risk aversion 0.079 0.271 177 0.039 0.196 76 0.071 0.267 14
Locus of control 4.141 0.614 177 4.107 0.626 76 4.357 0.924 14
Importance of having children 0.650 0.478 177 0.750 0.436 76 0.714 0.469 14
Importance of career 0.910 0.288 177 0.895 0.309 76 1.000 0.000 14
Notes: Main sample, including native women with at least secondary education, younger than 31 years, and
childless at graduation. Note that except for age at graduation and years of education, all dierences between
temporary and permanent workers are not significant at the 10 percent level.
Table 3.6 contains summary statistics of the fertility measures as well as the covariates by
type of first job contract and employment status aer graduation. The share of women in
regular jobs who enter parenthood increases from almost 14 percent within the first three
years aer graduation to more than 60 percent aer 10 years. As soon as four years aer
graduation there is a greater likelihood that women starting work with a permanent contract
(vs. a temporary contract) have becomemothers. The gap remains constant at between 2 and
6 percentage points. A similar, albeit much weaker, pattern emerges when we consider the
total number of children. The lower panel of Table 3.6 shows dierences in characteristics of
temporary and permanent employed women. Women who start their career with a contract
with limited duration are significantly older at labor market entry and have more education.
The personality traits are highly similar across groups but the proxy for child preferences
(self-rated importance of having children) is substantially higher and almost significant at
the 10 percent level for women in fixed-term jobs. Women with dierent types of contracts
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do not seem too dierent, yet controlling for observable characteristics should improve the
precision of our estimates.
3.4.2 Empirical Strategy
We more thoroughly examine the eects on fertility of starting a career with a fixed-term
contract in a regression framework. Ourbasic empirical strategy is to comparewomenentering
the labor market with a fixed-term contract with their counterparts on permanent contracts
in terms of their short- to medium-run fertility. The empirical setup is comparable to that
employed inpapers studying future eects of adverse labormarket conditions at thebeginning
of the career (see, e.g., Kahn, 2010; Liu, Salvanes, and Sørensen, 2012; Stevens, 2008). We
take advantage of the fact that even though fixed-term employment increased tremendously
over the last 15 years, not all regions or industries were equally aected. Thus, a substantial
part of the variation in starting a career with a fixed-term contract is caused by this exogenous,
labor-demand driven increase in temporary employment. The underlying empirical model
can be described in a very simple linear regression form as follows:
(3.1) Yit0+z = βFTit0 + γUEit0 + δ
′Xit0 + ϕst0 + µt0 + εit0
Yit0+z denotes the outcome of interest for woman i in period t0 + z, where z indicates the
year aer graduation or end of vocational training. FTit0 is an indicator variable for starting a
career with a fixed-term contract andUEit0 indicates whether an individual experiences an
unemployment spell aer graduation. Therefore, the base category in our regressions will
be starting a career with a permanent contract. Further,Xit0 are observed predetermined
individual and job characteristics measured in t0, ϕst0 is the federal state of the first job, µt0 is
year of graduation, and εit0 is the unobserved error term.
It is crucial to include variables that influence the probability of holding a fixed-term contract
andmight also and simultaneously correlate with the fertility decision. Not controlling for
these variables may leave them in the error term as confounding factors, which may cause
spurious correlations between fertility and holding a fixed-term contract at labor market
entry. If workers with particular characteristics or preferences for children self-select into
particular types of contracts, our estimates would be biased. This aspect is usually ignored
in previous studies analyzing the role of fixed-term employment on fertility outcomes. For
example, one might think of an individual who is strongly risk averse and therefore will be
most reluctant to work with a fixed-term contract. Most likely, this person will keep looking
for a job until she finds a permanent position. At the same time, her risk aversion might make
her less likely to have a child since entering parenthood obviously involves a great deal of
uncertainty. The presence of such individuals in our sample would cause a positive bias and
our results would underestimate the true eect. In contrast, we can expect a negative bias
if, say, a freedom-loving, flexible woman is more likely to accept a fixed-term contract and
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also less likely to have a strong preference for children. Fortunately, the SOEP data allow
us to control for a variety of individual characteristics and preference indicators. Thus, all
regressions include controls for the degree of risk aversion as well as for personality traits
and general attitudes. For instance, family preferences are controlled for by Kluckhohn’s
importance of life areameasures. Furthermore, we test whether any of the predetermined
observable characteristics significantly aects the likelihood of starting a career with a fixed-
term contract (Table B.1 in the Appendix): Almost none of the coeicients are significantly
dierent from zero; the exception being risk aversion (significantly negative coeicient). This
result is reassuring and important as it provides further evidence against the possibility of
fertility-related self-selection into fixed-term contracts at labor market entry. Summing up,
we cannot claim to estimate the causal eect of fixed-term employment on fertility as we
lack truly exogenous variation in temporary contracts. However, controlling for a large set of
personality traits and attitudes and given the insignificance of predetermined characteristics
to type of first job contract, we believe that our results are robustly estimated associations.
We run separate regressions for all outcome variables using a standard probit model to esti-
mate the association between starting a career with a fixed-term contract and the probability
of entering parenthood. Sincewomen canonly have a nonnegative integer number of children,
we employ a maximum likelihood procedure with an underlying poisson distribution for the
estimations of number of children. We use robust standard errors to account for potential
heteroskedasticity.20
3.5 Main Results
3.5.1 Probability of Entering Motherhood
In this section we present the results of the regression analysis. Table 3.7 shows the main
results of separate probit regressions. Each cell reports the average marginal eect of starting
a career with a fixed-term contract on the probability of having a first birth during the first z
years aer graduation.21 The first column reports the results from the specification including
individual, background, and jobcharacteristics. In the secondcolumnweaddpersonality traits
and attitudes. Finally, in the last column we add a control for partnership status. Column III is
our preferred specification since it contains all relevant control variables.
The first finding is that the estimates are quite stable across the dierent specifications, sug-
gesting that the results are not purely driven by selection based on observable characteristics,
personality traits, and attitudes. We proceed further in time when going from the top of the
20 Basically, we use the same sample of 267 women in all estimations. In practice, the number of observations
varies slightly between the estimations in themain table since themaximum likelihood procedure cannot use all
observations if the outcome is predicted perfectly.
21 Strictly speaking, we estimate the correlation between starting a career with a fixed-term contract and the
probability of having had a first child within z years aer graduation.
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table to the bottom: that is, the first row reports the average marginal eects on first birth
probability four years aer graduation; the last row reports the average marginal eects aer
10 years. The association between the first birth probability and starting a career with a fixed-
term contract is zero up to three years aer graduation since in these years the vast majority
of women are still childless and are working in their first job. But four years aer graduation,
the size of themarginal eect increases considerably and becomes significantly dierent from
zero. For women entering the labor market with a fixed-term contract, the probability of hav-
ing entered motherhood within five years aer graduation is smaller by 20 percentage points
than it is for those starting work with a permanent contract. This dierence 10 years aer
graduation is still notable at 15 percentage points. Hence, aer a period in which all women
work and none have children, women who started their career with a fixed-term contract are
significantly less likely to have becomemothers compared to women on permanent first job
contracts. We interpret this finding as a postponement eect due to temporary jobs.
Table 3.7 : Probability of first birth 4 to 10 years aer graduation
(I) (II) (III)
Aer 4 years -0.102* -0.127*** -0.147***
(0.052) (0.045) (0.043)
Aer 5 years -0.152*** -0.182*** -0.195***
(0.052) (0.044) (0.043)
Aer 6 years -0.123** -0.148*** -0.160***
(0.059) (0.051) (0.050)
Aer 7 years -0.117* -0.138** -0.156***
(0.064) (0.059) (0.055)
Aer 8 years -0.147** -0.159** -0.172***
(0.066) (0.062) (0.059)
Aer 9 years -0.116* -0.124* -0.137**
(0.067) (0.064) (0.061)
Aer 10 years -0.127* -0.139** -0.152**
(0.068) (0.064) (0.061)
First job characteristics YES YES YES
Personality traits & attitudes NO YES YES
Partnership status NO NO YES
Observations 267 267 267
Notes: Average marginal eects from probit regressions for starting the career with a fixed-term contract;
female sample, nomigrants; all regressions contain controls for individual characteristics and background
characteristics, and federal state of first job and year of graduation dummies; robust standard errors in
parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
All coeicients of the other explanatory variables not reported in Table 3.7 show the expected
sign (see Table B.2 in the Appendix).22 For instance, all else equal, older graduates are more
22 Table B.2 in the Appendix provides an example of a complete regression table on first birth probability five
years aer graduation.
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likely, and the better educated less likely, to enter parenthood within five years. Family
background seems to play no role in the decision to have a child, but personality does: open-
minded and conscientiouswomen are less likely to have a child five years aer they finish their
education. Furthermore, attitudes and values seem tomatter. Women for whom the family is
very important are significantly more likely to have entered motherhood during the five-year
period, whereas women for whom a career is very important are significantly less likely to
do so. Finally, having a partner at the time of labor market entry increases the probability of
becoming a mother in the first five years aer graduation. According to economic theories of
fertility, temporary jobs could aect fertility decisions via reduced first job income. In themain
regressionwe do not explicitly control for an individual’s income since itmight be endogenous.
However, we include themost important predictors of average income, such as education,
age, occupation, industry, personality traits, and attitudes. Hence, we implicitly control for
an individual’s earning potential, but omit all remaining idiosyncratic variation in earnings,
which is probably highly endogenous. For completeness, we later present results controlling
for net labor income (wages) at labor market entry.
3.5.2 Number of Children
Does a delay in enteringmotherhood result in having fewer children? The evidence presented
in Table 3.8 reveals significantly negative eects of entering the labor market with a fixed-
term contract on number of children up to 10 years aer graduation. Compared to previous
estimates, however, these results are slightly weaker and less significant for all specifications.
Again, the eect does not kick in before year 4 aer graduation. In the full specification
(Column III), the estimated coeicient remains significantly dierent from zero and increases
continuously. For instance, starting a career in a fixed-term job reduces fertility five years
aer graduation on average by almost 0.22 of a child and aer 10 years by more than 0.28
of a child. This indicates that the observed postponement does indeed translate into lower
fertility and cumulates over time. Since we do not observe women all the way until the end of
their reproductive age, our analysis does not allowmaking any statements about total fertility.
However, the significant reduction in the number of children 10 years aer graduation points
to a potential reduction in total fertility as well.
67
3 Fixed-Term Employment and Fertility
Table 3.8 : Number of children 4 to 10 years aer graduation
(I) (II) (III)
Aer 4 years -0.082 -0.121** -0.155**
(-)† (0.061) (0.075)
Aer 5 years -0.134 -0.190** -0.215**
(0.089) (0.090) (0.092)
Aer 6 years -0.069 -0.125 -0.150**
(0.091) (-)† (0.074)
Aer 7 years -0.127 -0.176* -0.208**
(0.099) (0.097) (0.088)
Aer 8 years -0.202** -0.240** -0.247***
(0.103) (0.101) (0.095)
Aer 9 years -0.187* -0.237** -0.251**
(0.114) (0.112) (0.107)
Aer 10 years -0.224* -0.278** -0.286**
(0.123) (0.119) (0.115)
First job characteristics YES YES YES
Personality traits & attitudes NO YES YES
Partnership status NO NO YES
Observations 267 267 267
Notes: Average marginal eects from poisson regressions for starting the career with a fixed-term contract; all
regressions contain controls for individual characteristics and background characteristics, and federal state of
first job and year of graduation dummies; † standard error cannot be estimated consistently; interpretation of
coeicient with caution; female sample, nomigrants; robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
3.5.3 Robustness Checks
In this section we test the sensitivity of our main results in several ways. First, we test whether
our main results, which were based on a homogenous population subsample (natives with at
least secondary education), are aected when we include individuals with migratory back-
ground andwithout secondary education (full sample). Second, we relax the age at graduation
limitation to see whether our main results are robust to including women who finish their
education or training aer age 30. The results for both tests are shown in Table 3.9. The
first column reveals that the negative association between starting a career with a fixed-term
contract and enteringmotherhood also holds for the full sample. The results seemparticularly
robust for years 5 to 8 and even for year 10. Overall, the estimated coeicients are slightly
smaller than those in Table 3.7 and the significance levels for the early and late years are
somewhat reduced. For instance, the average marginal eects on having had a first birth
aer four and five years aer graduation decline by around 5 percentage points but remain
statistically significant.
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Table 3.9 : Sensitivity analysis: full sample and dierent age-at-graduation cut-os
Dependent variable First birth Number of children
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
Sample Full sample Age at grad.
< 35
Age at grad.
< 40
Full sample Age at grad.
< 35
Age at grad.
< 40
Aer 4 years -0.083** -0.125*** -0.113** -0.072 -0.131* -0.101
(0.041) (0.046) (0.047) (0.058) (0.068) (0.071)
Aer 5 years -0.143*** -0.172*** -0.162*** -0.153** -0.206*** -0.185**
(0.043) (0.044) (0.045) (0.066) (0.066) (0.086)
Aer 6 years -0.130*** -0.138*** -0.121** -0.114 -0.126* -0.087
(0.045) (0.049) (0.050) (0.081) (0.075) (0.078)
Aer 7 years -0.147*** -0.139** -0.128** -0.172* -0.189** -0.157*
(0.049) (0.055) (0.055) (0.088) (0.088) (0.088)
Aer 8 years -0.135*** -0.160*** -0.138** -0.166* -0.241*** -0.198**
(0.052) (0.058) (0.058) (0.095) (0.091) (0.093)
Aer 9 years -0.103* -0.106* -0.087 -0.156 -0.208** -0.168
(0.054) (0.060) (0.061) (0.104) (0.105) (0.105)
Aer 10 years -0.123** -0.117* -0.096 -0.208* -0.244** -0.199*
(0.053) (0.060) (0.061) (0.108) (0.111) (0.113)
Observations 363 287 294 363 287 294
Notes: Averagemarginal eects from probit (Columns I-III) and poisson (Columns IV-VI) regressions for starting
the career with a fixed-term contract; female sample; all regressions contain controls for individual character-
istics and background characteristics, and federal state of first job and year of graduation dummies; robust
standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p< 0.1.
It appears that fixed-term employment does not influence the fertility decisions of migrants to
the same degree as it does the decisions of non-migrants, possible due to cultural dierence
in fertility behavior (Fernández and Fogli, 2006). Turning our attention to the eects on the
number of children (Table 3.9, Column IV), we see that the estimated marginal eects are
smaller than in our main specification and are less precisely estimated; the only significant
coeicient at the 5 percent level is on the number of children in year 5 aer graduation. Hence,
in the full sample that includes migrants and women with less than secondary education,
the significant postponement eect of fertility continues to have an impact on the number of
children 10 years aer graduation, but is a weaker eect than found in the sample previously
investigated.23
Our main results are also generally robust to relaxing the age at graduation restriction. The
averagemarginal eects for the main sample including childless women graduating up to age
23 However, even though the estimates for the later years are about half the size of our main results, they are
not very close to zero. We cannot rule out the possibility that the estimates become insignificant as we lack
precision due to our small sample size.
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34 and 39 are reported in Table 3.9, Columns II and V respectively Columns III and VI.24 Ten
years aer labor market entry these women are 44 and 49 years old and have probably com-
pleted their fertility plans. Furthermore, compared to younger women, these older graduates
might have a lower fecundity and might find it increasingly diicult to realize their fertility
intentions.25 Nevertheless, for both samples having a fixed-term contract in the first job is
associated with a lower probability of first birth up to the eighth year aer graduation. The
results for year 9 and 10 aer graduation are not significantly dierent from zero when we
include women who are relatively old (age 35+) at labor market entry. This could indicate that
older graduates are not able to postpone childbearing too long as they are closer to the end
of their reproductive age. Overall, the postponement eects are slightly smaller than those in
ourmain regressions but remain qualitatively almost equal. The results on number of children
are also quite robust for the sample including women graduating up to age 34, but are smaller
and less oen significantly dierent from zero when including women graduating up to age
39. This could also be related to the reduced time window during which older graduates can
realize their fertility intentions.
In a third robustness test we analyze whether our results are biased by sample attrition. Recall
that ourmain analysis is based on a (generated) balanced sample ofwomenwhomweobserve
for at least 10 subsequent years aer they finish their education. If dropping out of the survey
is correlated with starting a career with a particular type of contract, our results may be
confounded. Therefore, we construct a balanced sample including all women who stay in
the survey for at least five years aer graduation. This sample condition is less strict and
substantially increases the size of the sample. If our main results are driven by a confounding
change in sample composition, the marginal eects in Table 3.10 should diverge from those
in Table 3.7 and 3.8.
However, as the results in Columns I and II of Table 3.10 show, the estimated negative relation-
ship between labormarket entry with a fixed-term contract and our fertility outcomes remains
very robust. In fact, the larger sample size increases the precision of the estimates. Three
years aer graduation, the likelihood of entering motherhood is around 6 to 7 percentage
points lower amongwomenwho started with a fixed-term contract, compared to those whose
first job was permanent. This dierence increases to more than 14 percentage points in year
5 aer graduation. We observe a similar pattern for the results on the number of children:
the marginal eects remain very similar to our main results, but the standard errors become
smaller. Hence, these results reveal a significant reduction in the number of children due to
fixed-term employment at labor market entry.
24 In our sample, about 4 percent and 2 percent of women who are childless at graduation finish their education
when they are older than 34 and 39, respectively.
25 For example, in our sample, none of the childless women graduating at age 39 or older give birth aer entering
the labor market.
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Table 3.10 : Sensitivity analysis: five years balanced sample
Dependent variable First birth Number of children
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
Aer 3 years -0.056* -0.066** -0.056* -0.072**
(0.030) (0.028) (0.034) (0.033)
Aer 4 years -0.084** -0.091*** -0.087** -0.097**
(0.034) (0.033) (0.043) (0.043)
Aer 5 years -0.140*** -0.146*** -0.145*** -0.156***
(0.036) (0.034) (0.049) (0.048)
Personality traits & attitudes YES YES YES YES
Partnership status NO YES NO YES
Observations 490 490 490 490
Notes: Average marginal eects from probit (Columns I-II) and poisson (Columns III-IV) regressions for starting
the careerwith a fixed-termcontract; female sample, nomigrants; all regressions contain controls for individual
characteristics and background characteristics, and federal state of first job and year of graduation dummies;
robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
In Table 3.11 we run three more robustness checks. First, partner’s labor market status might
be important in the decision to have children. Even if the own contract is only fixed-term, a
permanent job arrangement for the partner could enable a couple to have children. Second,
we argue that economic uncertainty is themain explanation for the negative estimates. Hence,
specifying uncertainty explicitly in the regression equation should have an eect on the
coeicients. As an objective measure of economic uncertainty we include local labor market
conditions in the regressions (see Columns II and V). Finally, Columns III and VI directly control
for the perceived level of job security at labor market entry.
Male partner controls are measured at the career start of the women and contain a dummy
variable for not working and one for fixed-term employment. The unemployment rate is
measured at the level of "Raumordnungsregionen", an aggregation level between federal
states and counties. Assuming that the initial type of contract has no influence on future
unemployment rates, we include the unemployment rate lagged by one year (which means in
our notation t = z − 1). Finally, perceived job security takes the value 1 if the individual is
very concerned about job security; 0 otherwise. Note that the number of observations drops
slightly since SOEP does not provide regional identifiers for the first year (1995) of our sample.
Similarly, sample size is reduced in Columns I and IV since partner information is available
only for cohabiting couples and job uncertainty is reported solely by working individuals
(Columns III and VI).
Without any formal test the estimated coeicients in Table 3.11 seem similar in sign and
size to the estimates in Table 3.7 and 3.8. On average, the associations between starting a
careerwith a fixed-term contract and the fertility outcomes are even strongerwhen controlling
for partner’s labor market status when entering the labor market and including the lagged
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Table 3.11 : Sensitivity analysis: additional measures of economic uncertainty
Dependent variable First birth Number of children
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
Additional Controls Partner’s
LM status
Lagged
unemploy-
ment
rate
Perceived
job
uncertainty
at LME
Partner’s
LM status
Lagged
unemploy-
ment
rate
Perceived
job
uncertainty
at LME
Aer 5 years -0.215*** -0.241*** -0.214*** -0.200** -0.260*** -0.227***
(0.067) (0.045) (0.060) (0.098) (0.081) (0.077)
Aer 6 years -0.154** -0.163*** -0.158*** -0.143 -0.136 -0.161*
(0.063) (0.056) (0.060) (0.105) (0.083) (0.088)
Aer 7 years -0.194*** -0.204*** -0.139** -0.237** -0.283*** -0.177*
(0.059) (0.057) (0.065) (0.101) (0.097) (0.102)
Aer 8 years -0.225*** -0.213*** -0.153** -0.209* -0.317*** -0.242**
(0.064) (0.061) (0.065) (0.112) (0.106) (0.108)
Aer 9 years -0.196*** -0.159** -0.119* -0.272** -0.279** -0.238*
(0.069) (0.063) (0.068) (0.124) (0.111) (0.123)
Aer 10 years -0.228*** -0.186*** -0.146** -0.317** -0.324*** -0.305**
(0.064) (0.063) (0.067) (0.125) (0.125) (0.133)
Observations 181 237 248 181 237 248
Notes: Averagemarginal eects from probit (Columns I-III) and poisson (Columns IV-VI) regressions for starting
the career with a fixed-term contract; female sample; all regressions contain controls for individual character-
istics and background characteristics, and federal state of first job and year of graduation dummies; robust
standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p< 0.1.
regional unemployment rate. Possibly, uncertainty lessens when the partner has a permanent
contract, or that opportunity costs shrink when labor market conditions are unfavourable.
Even more similar to the main specifications are the estimates in Columns III and VI, implying
that the uncertainty is not directly due to the type of first contract. Otherwise, including job
uncertainty should have alleviated the correlation significantly. We argue that themechanism
depends more on the uncertainty due to the path dependence of starting a career with a
fixed-term contract. Repeated spells in temporary employment and the associated economic
uncertainty induces women to postpone childbearing.
3.5.4 Mechanism
We now test whether the negative association of fixed-term employment at career start and
fertility is driven by the lower wage of temporary jobs and a lower attractiveness on the
marriage market. From descriptive evidence we know that starting a career with a fixed-term
contract is associatedwith lowerwages,which in turnmaycause reduced fertility. To this point,
we have controlled for many wage predictors. Now, we re-estimate our main specification
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controlling explicitly for monthly net wages of the first job (Columns I and IV of Table 3.12).26
If wages and their profile over time are the main channel through which fixed-term jobs aect
fertility, the coeicient of fixed-term employment should become much smaller and even
insignificant.
Table 3.12 : Mechanism: income andmarriage market eects
Dependent variable First birth Number of children
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
Additional Controls Wage of
first job
Married at
labor
market
entry
Cohabiting
at labor
market
entry
Wage of
first job
Married at
labor
market
entry
Cohabiting
at labor
market
entry
Aer 4 years -0.116** -0.120*** -0.137*** -0.119 – –
(0.047) (0.045) (0.044) (0.144) – –
Aer 5 years -0.168*** -0.178*** -0.183*** -0.178** -0.183** -0.205**
(0.047) (0.045) (0.043) (0.071) (0.086) (0.104)
Aer 6 years -0.130** -0.142*** -0.142*** -0.091 -0.111 -0.124
(0.054) (0.051) (0.051) (0.087) (0.085) (0.158)
Aer 7 years -0.143** -0.137** -0.141** -0.141 -0.160* -0.166*
(0.058) (0.058) (0.058) (0.095) (0.096) (0.090)
Aer 8 years -0.147** -0.136** -0.136** -0.187* -0.191* -0.175*
(0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.102) (0.102) (0.096)
Aer 9 years -0.122* -0.110* -0.115* -0.212* -0.213* -0.208*
(0.063) (0.064) (0.062) (0.112) (0.111) (0.109)
Aer 10 years -0.129** -0.122* -0.124** -0.245** -0.261** -0.243**
(0.063) (0.064) (0.062) (0.119) (0.117) (0.116)
Observations 267 267 267 267 267 267
Notes: Averagemarginal eects from probit (Columns I-III) and poisson (Columns IV-VI) regressions for starting
the careerwith a fixed-termcontract; female sample, nomigrants; all regressions contain controls for individual
characteristics and background characteristics, and federal state of first job and year of graduation dummies;
robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
However, the results in Table 3.12 are very similar to our main estimates in Table 3.7 and 3.8,
thus indicating that it is not the lower income of the first job per se that induces women to
postpone childbearing, but more likely the economic uncertainty associated with temporary
contracts.
Another potential channel is lower attractiveness on the marriage or partner market. Women
in fixed-term employment are supposed to be less attractive to men and therefore less likely
to have a suitable partner with whom to form a family. In the standard specifications (last
columns of Table 3.7 and 3.8), we control for partnership status at labor market entry to
account for this channel. Replacing having a partner by beingmarried or living together at
labor market entry appears to have no substantial eect on the correlation between starting
26 Unemployed individuals are assigned a zero wage.
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a career with a fixed-term contract and fertility outcomes. Columns II, III, V, and VI show that
the coeicients are only slightly dierent from the ones estimated previously. In particular,
Column II of Table 3.7 is very similar to the results here, meaning that cohabitation ormarriage
does not alleviate the uncertainty caused by temporary employment. If anything, having a
partner seems to matter for the way economic uncertainty influences fertility decisions.
We propose that neither lower income nor lower attractiveness on the partner market are
the driving mechanisms for the negative association but that, instead, it is the economic
uncertainty attached to the path dependence of starting a career with a fixed-term contract.
Figure 3.1 shows the stability of an initial fixed-term contract over the first 10 years in the labor
market. In the second year in the labor market, almost 50 percent of women, who started in a
temporary job, have a contract of limited duration, but this number declines steadily over
time. Nevertheless, in the first five years, repeated spells in fixed-term employment seem to
be common. Women who start their careers with a regular contract have for the whole period
a much lower probability of working with a fixed-term contract.
Figure 3.1 : Stability of initial employment by contract type
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Table 3.13 reports marginal eects of the type of initial contract on the type of contract in year
z aer graduation. The inclusion of first job characteristics in Column II has no substantial
eect on the size of the estimates. The development indicates a strong persistence in tempo-
rary employment for at least the first five years in the labor market. Controlling for first job
characteristics, we estimate a 20 percentage point higher probability of holding a fixed-term
contract even five years aer the first job.
We argue that this path dependence is the main force that creates economic uncertainty for
the aected women and induces them to postpone entering motherhood and, as a result,
to have on average fewer children than women with a permanent first job. Since the large
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Table 3.13 : Path dependence of starting the career with a fixed-term contract
Dependent variable Future fixed-term contract
(I) (II)
Aer 2 years 0.464*** 0.448***
(0.036) (0.037)
Aer 3 years 0.329*** 0.299***
(0.068) (0.071)
Aer 4 years 0.196*** 0.221***
(0.058) (0.056)
Aer 5 years 0.184*** 0.242***
(0.064) (0.069)
First job characteristics NO YES
Notes: Average marginal eects from probit regressions for starting the career with a fixed-term contract;
female sample, nomigrants; all regressions contain controls for individual characteristics and background
characteristics, and federal state of first job and year of graduation dummies; robust standard errors in
parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
majority of women have found a permanent job aer five years, estimations are not possible
beyond this point.
3.5.5 Further Heterogeneity Analysis and Results for Men
Results by Education
In this section we investigate whether starting a career with a fixed-term contract aects
fertility outcomes of women dierently depending on their level of education. Specifically,
we compare women with secondary education to those with tertiary education. Therefore,
we split our main sample into two groups: (a) all women who attained middle vocational
training or vocational training and "Abitur" (ISCED codes 3 and 4) and (b) all women with
higher vocational training or a university degree (ISCED codes 5 and 6).27 Themain rationale
for doing this is that women with high educational attainment, such as a university degree,
enter the labormarket relatively late but face the same "biological age restrictions" as women
who finish their education at younger ages. Hence, the scope for postponing having a child
is much more restricted for more highly educated women. Furthermore, for older women
it becomes comparatively more risky, both for health and biological reasons, to postpone
childbearing. Thus, conditional on a particular intended number of children, we would expect
a smaller postponement eect of fixed-term employment for women with higher education.
Table 3.14 reports the averagemarginal eects by educational subgroup for selected years. As
hypothesized, the postponement eects are stronger for women with secondary education:
27 In the residual group, that is also not part of the main sample, are women who dropped out of school or do
not have any vocational training at all.
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the coeicients are more negative and the estimates are highly significant. For instance, five
years aer graduation, the first birth probability is reduced by almost 24 percentage points if
the first contract was of limited duration. The magnitude of the eect declines over time but
remains statistically significant, even 10 years aer graduation. In contrast, thepoint estimates
for women with tertiary education are smaller and only weakly significant. Regarding the
number of children, we find a similar picture: starting the career with a fixed-term contract
significantly reduces the realized number of children for women with secondary education.
For women with a university degree, the economic uncertainty associated with starting a
career with a fixed-term contract does not seem to play such a crucial role in the timing of
the first child or for the number of children in the first 10 years aer their graduation. The
estimates are sizeable, but much smaller, and we are not able to estimate the coeicients
precisely enough to distinguish them from a zero eect. Even though a formal test is not easily
applicable in this setting, the confidence intervals suggest that the coeicients are statistically
dierent between the two groups, at least in the earlier years aer labor market entry. These
findings are in line with our expectations that relatively old university graduates are not able
to postpone parenthood to the same extent as can younger women.
Table 3.14 : Heterogeneity analysis: eects by education
Dependent variable First birth Number of children
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
Sample Secondary
education
Tertiary education Secondary
education
Tertiary education
Aer 5 years -0.236*** -0.095* -0.277* -0.147
(0.050) (0.053) (0.148) (0.152)
Aer 7 years -0.335*** -0.014 -0.308*** -0.110
(0.091) (0.031) (0.107) (0.203)
Aer 10 years -0.279** -0.112 -0.348** -0.092
(0.112) (0.115) (0.145) (0.168)
Observations 204 141 204 141
Notes: Average marginal eects from probit (Columns I-II) and poisson (Columns III-IV) regressions for starting
the career with a fixed-term contract; note that due to sample size problems, the MLmethod cannot find a
maximum in the standard specification; therefore, partnership status is removed from the specification; female
sample; all regressions contain controls for individual characteristics and background characteristics, and
federal state of first job and year of graduation dummies; robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Results for Men
It is possible that entering the labor market with a fixed-term contract aects the fertility
outcomes of men, too. The corresponding results are reported in Table 3.15. In the male
sample, the age at graduation cut-o is two years later than in the female sample since men,
on average, graduate two years later and are not exposed to biological constraints regarding
fertility. The male sample consists of 225 observations. The estimated association between
temporary jobs and subsequent fertility is close to zero and never statistically distinguishable
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from zero. Hence, the results indicate that men do not react as sensitively as women to
economic uncertainty. One possible explanation is that men do not suer from fixed-term
contracts in the long run since they can quite easily find a permanent job even if they already
have a child. In contrast, women, who are responsible for the majority of childrearing, first
want to gain a foothold in the labor market before deciding to enter motherhood.
Table 3.15 : Heterogeneity analysis: eects onmen
Dependent variable First birth Number of children
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
Aer 5 years 0.077 0.070 0.178 0.116
(0.070) (0.064) (0.155) (0.122)
Aer 7 years -0.012 -0.038 0.158 0.103
(0.079) (0.072) (0.165) (0.140)
Aer 10 years -0.023 -0.052 0.078 -0.003
(0.080) (0.068) (0.171) (0.136)
Personality traits & attitudes YES YES YES YES
Partnership status NO YES NO YES
Observations 225 225 225 225
Notes: Average marginal eects from probit (Columns I-II) and poisson (Columns III-IV) regressions for starting
the career with a fixed-term contract; male sample, no migrants; all regressions contain controls for individual
characteristics and background characteristics, and federal state of first job and year of graduation dummies;
robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
3.6 Conclusion
In countries with strong employment protection legislation, fixed-term contracts are intended
to increase the flexibility of the recruitment process and are thought to foster employment in
general. However, existing evidence suggests that fixed-term contracts lead to a dual labor
market and casts doubt on the notion that temporary contracts foster employment and reduce
aggregate unemployment in the long run (Cahuc and Postel-Vinay, 2002; Bentolila andDolado,
1994; Boeri and Garibaldi, 2007).
Our analysis sheds light on potential spill-over eects of fixed-term employment on fertility.
Using German data on young female graduates, we find a significant postponement of first
birth and a reduction in the number of children in the first ten years aer graduation. These
results are robust to several sensitivity tests. A possible explanation is the economic uncer-
tainty associated with a career start in fixed-term employment. The likelihood of repeated
spells in precarious jobs is significantly higher when entering the labormarket on a temporary
contract. Thus, wemeasure an indirect eect of the initial contract on fertility, which works
via recurrent contemporaneous economic instabilities. Furthermore, we show that fixed-term
employment appears to particularly aect the fertility decisions of women with secondary
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education. In contrast, our results reveal no significant correlations between job uncertainty
at the beginning of a career and fertility for youngmen. We address potential endogeneity
threats by including a large set of controls and by showing evidence against fertility-related
self-selection into temporary contracts at the beginning of a career. Hence, we believe that
the results suggest a negative relationship between fixed-term employment and fertility that
is robust to a variety of sensitivity checks.
Our study has important implications for policymakers in low-fertility countries as our findings
highlight negative spill-over eects of temporary employment on demographic outcomes.
Fixed-term contracts might facilitate the labor market entry of older persons and the long-
term unemployed (stepping-stone hypothesis), but they seem to impede the integration
of young graduates into the labor market and to negatively aect fertility outcomes. As
such, this labor market policy imposes a disproportionate burden on the young generation.
Against this background, policymakers should possibly reconsider the costs and benefits of
this policy instrument and strive for a more equal distribution of the costs associated with
employment protection across population subgroups. A possible approach is broader reform
of the employment protection legislation, that is, a reduction in dismissal costs for all workers
(Blanchard and Landier, 2002).
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Appendix B.1 Supplementary Tables
Table B.1 : Probability of starting a career with a fixed-term contract
(I) (II)
Sample Native women All women
Age at graduation 0.023 0.018
(0.015) (0.012)
Years of education 0.012 0.002
(0.016) (0.014)
Born in East Germany 0.082 0.029
(0.111) (0.106)
High education mother -0.107 0.033
(0.085) (0.093)
Employment mother -0.119 -0.135
(0.118) (0.092)
Age at birth mother 0.006 0.001
(0.007) (0.005)
Number of siblings 0.067 0.034
(0.080) (0.077)
Openness 0.016 0.030
(0.032) (0.026)
Agreeableness -0.042 -0.032
(0.036) (0.030)
Conscientiousness -0.013 -0.029
(0.044) (0.033)
Extraversion -0.029 -0.015
(0.030) (0.025)
Neuroticism 0.006 0.007
(0.041) (0.035)
Risk aversion -0.173** -0.165**
(0.084) (0.072)
Locus of control 0.000 -0.035
(0.054) (0.045)
Importance of having children 0.090 0.022
(0.077) (0.068)
Importance of partnership 0.121 0.156
(0.146) (0.100)
Importance of career 0.002 0.008
(0.110) (0.081)
Importance of aording something 0.003 -0.032
(0.099) (0.092)
In partnership aer graduation 0.078 0.148*
(0.123) (0.090)
Observations 267 363
Notes: Average marginal eects from probit regressions; female working sample, all regressions contain
federal-state-of-first-job and year-of-graduation dummies; robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table B.2 : Probability of first birth 5 years aer graduation
(I) (II) (III)
First job fixed-term contract -0.152*** -0.182*** -0.195***
(0.052) (0.044) (0.043)
Unemployment aer graduation 0.649*** 0.645*** 0.623***
(0.027) (0.028) (0.045)
Age at graduation 0.034*** 0.038*** 0.037***
(0.012) (0.011) (0.011)
Years of education -0.036*** -0.041*** -0.040***
(0.013) (0.012) (0.012)
Born in East Germany 0.071 0.083 0.065
(0.100) (0.093) (0.094)
High education mother -0.007 -0.002 -0.026
(0.092) (0.082) (0.078)
Employment mother 0.112 0.064 0.069
(0.127) (0.119) (0.115)
Age at birth (mother) -0.004 -0.007 -0.007
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
Number of siblings 0.035 0.066 0.064
(0.077) (0.075) (0.072)
Openness -0.018 -0.007
(0.022) (0.021)
Agreeableness -0.017 -0.031
(0.029) (0.028)
Conscientiousness -0.039 -0.035
(0.032) (0.031)
Extraversion 0.027 0.014
(0.024) (0.023)
Neuroticism -0.019 -0.033
(0.031) (0.030)
Risk aversion 0.117 0.108
(0.087) (0.081)
Locus of control -0.031 -0.025
(0.040) (0.038)
Importance of having children 0.215*** 0.225***
(0.060) (0.060)
Importance of partnership 0.143 0.053
(0.166) (0.171)
Importance of career -0.157* -0.151*
(0.083) (0.080)
Importance of aording something -0.019 0.001
(0.086) (0.083)
First job blue collar 0.121 0.116 0.125
(0.104) (0.098) (0.096)
In partnership aer graduation 0.190***
(0.051)
Observations 267 267 267
Notes: Average marginal eects from probit regressions; female sample, nomigrants; all regressions contain
federal-state-of-first-job and year-of-graduation dummies; robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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4.1 Introduction
Oicial health insurance statistics provide evidence that mental health issues are a major
concern in Germany. The 2014 report of the company health insurance fund (BKK) contains
statistics suggesting that absenteeism due to mental illness has increased rapidly – since
the 1970s, absence days per insured person have quintupled and currently account for more
than 15 percent of all absenteeism. In addition, mental illness causes the longest periods of
absence with, on average, 38 days (Knieps and Pfa, 2014).
Previous studies mainly aim at finding the contemporaneous link between health conditions
and fixed-term employment at dierent stages of the lifecycle and have produced mixed
evidence. Their approach neglects the potential endogeneity of fixed-term contracts due
to path dependence of starting the career in a temporary job. The empirical literature on
whether and, if so, how increased levels of economic uncertainty due to unstable working
contracts at the beginning of the career have spill-over eects on other domains of life is rare.
The main objective and contribution of this chapter is to fill this gap by empirically assessing
the implications for subsequent physical andmental health outcomes of entering the labor
market with a fixed-term contract.
From a theoretical perspective, the eect of fixed-term employment on health is not clear a
priori. First, lower opportunity costs might allow individuals to devote more time to healthy
behavior and therefore induce better health outcomes (Grossman, 1972). On the other hand,
higher levels of stress, uncertainty, and financial instability might negatively aect mental
health and health investments. Empirically, we focus on several cohorts of graduates from vo-
cational training or tertiary education and follow them up to five years aer entering the labor
market. We analyze the eects of starting a career with a fixed-term contract on subsequent
health outcomes in the short run. Another contribution of this chapter is to carefully discuss
and address the potential endogeneity due to path dependence of starting a career with a
fixed-term contract. To reduce possible omitted variable bias, we exploit a rich and unique
data set and include a large set of new control variables (e.g., personality traits, attitudes,
family background, and ex-ante health status). In addition, we check to what extent men and
women select into fixed-term employment based on observable characteristics and employ
an approach to assess the resulting bias.
Based on the survey years 1995 to 2012 of the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), the
results suggest strong gender dierence in response to economic uncertainty at the beginning
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of the career. For women, starting a career with a fixed-term contract is associated with
negative subsequent health outcomes in the short run. However, men respond with a higher
status of mental health as of their third year on the labor market. In contrast, neither men’s
nor women’s physical health outcomes are aected by the type of the contract held at the
beginning of the career. These findings are robust to a variety of sensitivity checks and can
be explained, at least for women, by a negative path dependence of starting a career with a
fixed-term contract. As health status, as well as holding a fixed-term contract, may be driven
by unobserved heterogeneity, we address potential endogeneity concerns on two fronts: first,
by including pre-graduation health status as well as a set of previously neglected control
variables and, second, by showing that entering the labor market with a fixed-term contract is
related neither to family nor to career preferences.
In general, this research contributes to the growing literature on the relationship between
economic uncertainty and health. Several empirical studies focus on aggregate unemploy-
ment and how it aects mortality rates (see, e.g., Ruhm, 2000, 2003, 2005). Mortality rates
seem to follow a pro-cyclical pattern at the state level, which is surprising since it suggests an
adverse health eect of reduced unemployment rates. On the individual level, the relationship
seems to be reversed. For instance, Sullivan and von Wachter (2009) show a particularly pro-
nounced increase in the annual probability of dying immediately aer job loss. Theodossiou
and Vasileiou (2007) find that the eect of perceived risk of job loss on job satisfaction is
significantly negative and large.
Temporary employment is considered to be one particular form of economic uncertainty.
Unfortunately, evidence on the relationship between fixed-term employment and health is
scarce and inconclusive. Several studies find negative eects of fixed-term employment on job
satisfaction (e.g., Booth et al., 2002; Chadi and Hetschko, 2013; Dawson, Veliziotis, Pacheco,
and Webber, 2015), but show that this does not translate into lower well-being (Dawson
and Veliziotis, 2013) or worse health status (Bardasi and Francesconi, 2004). In the study
most similar to our research, Rodriguez (2002) analyzes British and Germanmicro data and
finds that German workers with fixed-term contracts have a significantly higher probability of
reporting worse health than their permanently employed colleagues. In contrast, the eect
of fixed-term employment is not significant among British workers, a finding in line with the
results of Bardasi and Francesconi (2004) for the United Kingdom. All these studies have
in common that they focus mostly on empirical associations between holding a fixed-term
contract and health outcomes. They neither consider the potential endogeneity problems
nor the potential path dependence of entering the labor market with a contract with limited
duration.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 introduces the data and
Section 4.3 the empirical approach. The main results and mechanisms as well as several
sensitivity and subgroup analyses are presented in Section 4.4. Section 4.5 concludes.
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4.2 Data and Sample Restrictions
We employ the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), which has provided annual and na-
tionally representative panel data since 1984 (Wagner et al., 2007). In 2012, the SOEP covered
more than 20,000 individuals living in over 12,000 households. SOEP contains detailed infor-
mation on a variety of individual as well as household-specific socioeconomic characteristics.
Moreover, the respondents provide information about their labor market history as well as
their current labor force status. Most importantly, we observe when the individuals finish
their education and enter the labor market and whether their first employment contract is
permanent or temporary. We focus on the waves 1995 to 2012 since consistent information
on the type of employment contract for all working individuals was collected only from 1995
onward. Respondents who do not report a job change are excluded from this question before
1995. Thus, switching from temporary to permanent employment at the same employer is
not part of the questionnaire up to 1995. The questions regarding life and health satisfaction
are available for the whole observation period. Since the health questions have been part of
the questionnaire since 2002, but only every second year, we are not able to look at the same
sample period as for the satisfaction analysis. To make the sample more homogenous, we
restrict the sample towomen andmenwho entered the labormarketwith their highest degree
before their 36th birthday and have at least a secondary school degree. In the robustness
checks we show that the results are not sensitive to the choice of the age-at-graduation cut-o.
By restricting the sample tomen andwomenwho answer the questionnaire in five subsequent
years aer their labor market entry, we obtain a balanced sample. The sample for the health
analysis comprises 1442 observations of 297 women and 1180 observations of 245 men from
the graduation cohorts 2002 to 2007.
Tomeasure the health status of the individuals in the sample, we use various outcome vari-
ables. First, the SOEP data provide an overall index of mental and physical health that are
standardized for the survey year 2004 to a mean of 50 and a standard deviation of 10.1 Since
both summary scales are not available annually, we fill up the gaps in the main analysis:
assuming a linear development of health status over time, we use the average value of the
healthmeasures between two observations. On the one hand, we obtain an increased number
of observations and thusmore precise estimates. On the other hand, the linearity assumption
might be too restrictive and in some cases inappropriate andmisleading. For instance, in years
when we do not observe the health status of a respondent the linearity assumption causes a
change by construction. In this casewe are not able to ensure that the type of the first contract
and not the computation is the main reason for the change in the health status. Since this
would cause an overestimation of the true relationship we address this issue in the sensitivity
analyses. Second, the data also contain information on each of the subcategories of the health
indices, which we use in a refinement of the analysis. Third, we use self-rated information
about satisfaction with life and health status. Although these variables are measured on a
1 For more detail on how the cardinal measures for mental and physical health are constructed from the survey
items, see Nübling, Andersen, Mühlbacher, Schupp, and Wagner (2007).
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scale from 0 (worst outcome) to 10 (best outcome), we assume continuity and do not further
manipulate the scales. In the analysis of life and health satisfaction we are able to look at the
graduation cohorts 1995 to 2007. Thus, the number of women in the sample increases to 672
and the number of men to 607.
Table 4.1 : Development of outcome variables by employment status
First job First job Unemployed
permanent contract fixed-term contract aer graduation
Mean SD N Mean SD N Mean SD N
A. Women
Mental health 1st year 48.62 8.71 148 47.52 8.46 85 49.06 8.75 64
Mental health aer 2 years 49.25 8.34 152 47.45 7.54 84 49.59 8.55 59
Mental health aer 3 years 49.88 7.76 143 47.28 7.46 82 49.29 9.61 59
Mental health aer 4 years 49.58 8.10 144 47.66 8.33 81 49.24 9.20 61
Mental health aer 5 years 48.54 8.93 142 46.68 9.09 81 49.48 9.20 57
Physical health 1st year 56.44 5.67 148 55.54 5.53 85 55.53 5.78 64
Physical health aer 2 years 55.94 6.00 152 56.01 5.76 84 55.59 5.90 59
Physical health aer 3 years 55.76 6.65 143 55.93 6.47 82 55.34 6.82 59
Physical health aer 4 years 55.21 7.32 144 55.53 5.66 81 54.94 6.82 61
Physical health aer 5 years 55.09 7.25 142 55.26 5.36 81 54.55 6.04 57
B. Men
Mental health 1st year 51.45 7.89 150 50.18 7.76 48 50.85 7.47 47
Mental health aer 2 years 51.63 7.70 146 51.00 8.39 53 50.41 8.03 41
Mental health aer 3 years 50.49 7.75 139 52.41 7.09 51 48.86 10.01 42
Mental health aer 4 years 50.11 8.20 142 51.72 6.78 52 48.97 8.90 39
Mental health aer 5 years 50.02 8.43 145 51.08 6.65 46 48.75 10.54 39
Physical health 1st year 56.26 5.46 150 57.25 4.97 48 56.21 5.42 47
Physical health aer 2 years 55.86 6.01 146 56.51 4.73 53 55.82 5.96 41
Physical health aer 3 years 56.27 4.88 139 56.21 4.61 51 56.18 6.44 42
Physical health aer 4 years 56.32 4.83 142 56.44 4.78 52 55.56 7.13 39
Physical health aer 5 years 55.98 5.44 145 56.01 5.10 46 54.33 6.90 39
Notes: Summary statistics of the main sample including women/men with at least secondary education,
younger than 36 years at labor market entry and at least for 5 years in the sample.
Table 4.1 contains summary statistics of the twomain healthmeasures by type of first contract
andemployment statusaer graduation, respectively. Three facts areworthnoting: First, fixed-
termcontracts aremoreprevalent amongyoungwomen thanamongyoungmen: 29percentof
thewomen in the sample start their career with a fixed-term contract, whereas only 20 percent
of men are aected. Second, if men start their career with a fixed-term contract, their mental
health appears to be slightly higher – at least aer three years. However, if women’s first
contract is of limitedduration, they tend to report a lowermental health status. Thedierences
are statistically significant only for women three years aer their labor market entry. Third,
physical health conditions in the male and the female sample seem to be very similar across
employment status.
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The main explanatory variable is a binary variable indicating whether the first job aer grad-
uation has a fixed-term or a permanent employment contract. Since we also control for
whether the respondent is unemployed aer graduation, the reference group is entering the
labor market with a permanent contract. A great advantage of the SOEP data is the variety of
unique information about the respondents. The data allow us to include a large set of controls
for individual, background, personality, and job characteristics, as well as health-related
information.
Individual control variables are age, years of education, a dummy variable for migratory back-
ground and being born in East Germany as well as the partnership status. As a proxy for
the respondent’s predetermined family background we include variables indicating whether
his or her mother has tertiary education, whether the mother was employed when she was
15 years old, whether the respondent has siblings and his or her mother’s age at the respon-
dent’s birth. Personality traits and self-reported attitudes are captured by the "Big 5" and
Kluckhohn’s importance of life areas. More precisely, five variables reflect the respondent’s
openness to new experience, agreeableness, conscientiousness, extraversion, and neuroticism.
Four binary variables indicate individual career and family-related attitudes. They take the
value 1 if a woman claims that having children, being in a happy relationship, the ability to
aord something or having a career is important or very important in her life. Questions on
personality traits and attitudes are not included in every wave of the survey. However, in order
to exclude possible feedback eects of personal labor market or partnership experience on
personality traits and family and career attitudes, we only use the first available observation.
The majority of women answer this question around the age of 21 or younger. In addition, a
dummy variable indicates whether an individual is risk averse, that is, reports a (very) low
subjective willingness to take risks. Our last measure of personality is locus of control, where
higher values imply a higher level of internal locus of control.
As regards the characteristics of the job,we includeonly very rough indicators, namely, dummy
variables for blue- versus white-collar occupations and for part-time and self-employment.
Moreover, the weekly working hours are supposed to capture the labor market attachment.
Six industry dummies are generated according to the classification of the Federal Statistical
Oice (destatis). These are agriculture,manufacturing, construction, trade and transportation,
financial services, and public and other services. The prevalence of fixed-term employment
diers across industries and occupational groups. Similarly, women andmen with particular
health conditions might self-select into particular industries and occupational groups. By
controlling for these job characteristics we want to make sure that the results do not reflect
spurious correlations between temporary jobs and the health status. To allow for dierent
health conditions before entering the labor market, we add indicators for baseline health
conditions (pre-graduation), such as the number of doctor visits and days in the hospital
before labor market entry. Tables C.1 and C.2 in the Appendix presents summary statistics by
gender for the majority of control variables.
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4.3 Empirical Strategy
Weexamine thehealth eects of starting a careerwith a fixed-termcontractmore thoroughly in
a regression framework. The basic empirical strategy is to compare women andmen entering
the labor market on fixed-term contracts with their counterparts on permanent contracts in
terms of short- to medium-run health outcomes. The empirical setup is comparable to that
used in papers studying future eects of adverse labor market conditions at the beginning
of the career (see, e.g., Kahn, 2010; Liu et al., 2012; Stevens, 2008). The underlying empirical
model can be described in a very simple linear regression form as follows:
(4.1) Yi,t = αYi,t=0 + βtFTi,t=1 + γUEi,t=1 + δ′Xi,t + ϕs + µt + εi,t
Yi,t denotes the health outcome of individual i in period t. We add Yi,t=0, that is, the health
status in the year before labor market entry. In so doing, we intend to equalize the baseline
health status and control for ex-ante health conditions. Moreover, changes in health due to
a fixed-term contract becomemore comparable across the individuals in the sample. Since
the original data provide bi-yearly information only, we use health status either one or two
years before labor market entry. This allows us to avoid biased estimates due to the linearity
assumption. FTi,t=1 is an indicator variable for starting a career with a fixed-term contract and
UEi,t=1 indicates whether an individual experienced an unemployment spell aer graduation.
Therefore, the reference category in the regressions is starting a career with a permanent
contract. βt measures the relationship we are interested in: How does starting a career with
a fixed-term contract aect the health status in each of the first t years on the labor market.
Furthermore,Xi,t are observed individual and job characteristics, ϕs represents dummies for
the federal state of residence, µt are year fixed eects, and εi,t is the unobserved error term.
We run OLS regressions with standard errors robust to any form of heteroskedasticity and
clustered at the individual level.
In the regressions, it is crucial to include variables that influence the probability of holding a
fixed-term contract andmight simultaneously correlate with ex-ante health conditions. Not
controlling for these variables, may leave them in the error term as confounding factors, which
may cause spurious correlations between health and holding a fixed-term contract at labor
market entry. If workers with particular characteristics self-select into particular types of
contracts, the estimates would be biased. This aspect has beenmainly ignored in previous
studies analyzing the role of fixed-term employment on health outcomes. We discuss this
issue in detail later on. Controlling for a large set of covariates, we believe that the estimates
express robust associations. However, in Section 4.4.5 we assess the potential bias due to
selection into fixed-term employment.
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4.4 Results
4.4.1 Main Results for Health Outcomes by Gender
The estimated gender-specific coeicients of starting a career with a fixed-term contract are
reported in Table 4.2. For themain indices ofmental and physical health, the first rowpresents
the contemporaneous relationship followed by the short- tomedium-run eects up to the fih
year on the labor market. Similar to the summary statistics, the regression results confirm
that physical health is not aected by the type of the first contract. However, women’s mental
health appears to respond to spells of temporary employment at the beginning of the career.
While in the first job or during the first years of their careers, economic uncertainty reduces
the mental well-being of women. Starting a career with a fixed-term contract is associated
with a decline in women’s mental health status by about 1.7 to 2.2 index points in the second
and third year aer labor market entry. Compared to the average pre-graduation health of
47.5 index points and a standard deviation of 10.4, female mental health is reduced by more
than 4 percent or 20 percent of a standard deviation. However, as soon as four years aer
labor market entry, the association becomes smaller and insignificant. According to these
findings, the economic uncertainty associated with fixed-term contracts is detrimental for
women’s mental condition. For the male sample, we find a dierent pattern. Right at the
start of the career, the coeicient is basically zero and remains small in the second year. Thus,
men do not respond to uncertainties on the labor market in the short run. Probably, men see
the fixed-term contract as an extended probation period and do not worry much about the
security of the job. However, in the third year men’s mental well-being even increases if they
started a career with a fixed-term contract. Thus, the way men and women handle economic
uncertainty at an early career stage is very dierent. The following analyses aim at finding a
proper explanation for these results.
Theway SOEP provides health information allows us to have a closer look at the subcategories
of the mental health index to analyze in particular what causes the reduction or the rise in
the mental health index. The four categories are: 1. Mental health that measures whether
respondents have experienced time pressure or have felt depressed in the last four weeks. 2.
Vitality takes on high values if respondents have felt calm and peaceful.2 3. Social functioning
is high if respondents have not experienced limitations of social contacts due tomental health
problems. 4. Role emotional is a variable that attains a high value if the respondent does
not feel limited in work or other activities due to mental and emotional problems. Table 4.3
reports the coeicients from regressions of the subcategories of mental health on starting
a career with a fixed-term contract for the female subsample. As regardsMental health and
Vitality, a similar pattern as for the overall index emerges. The subcategoryMental health does
not show a significant correlationwith themental health status except for the third year on the
labor market. The pattern for the measure Vitality is more conclusive: all coeicients suggest
2 To simplify the interpretation of the regression coeicients we invert the category vitality such that high values
imply good health conditions.
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Table 4.2 : Starting a career with a fixed-term contract and subsequent mental and physical health
Dependent variable Mental health Physical health
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
Women Men Women Men
At labor market entry (1st year) -1.071 -0.257 -0.146 0.704
(1.027) (0.980) (0.728) (0.809)
2nd year on the labor market -1.716* 0.386 0.615 0.602
(0.950) (1.151) (0.810) (0.820)
3rd year on the labor market -2.185** 3.106*** 0.714 -0.136
(0.968) (1.015) (0.943) (0.780)
4th year on the labor market -1.144 2.769** 0.735 0.388
(1.073) (1.068) (0.901) (0.803)
5th year on the labor market -1.191 2.757** 0.559 0.496
(1.126) (1.161) (0.849) (0.895)
Observations 1,442 1,180 1,442 1,180
Notes: Marginal eects of starting a career with a fixed-term contract from OLS regressions with robust
standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses; dependent variables interpolated assuming a
linear trend; all regressions contain controls for individual characteristics, background characteristics, job
characteristics, personality traits and attitudes, partnership status, ex-ante health status, federal-state and
year dummies; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
a significant association that is strongest in the third year on the labormarket. Women appear
to suer from economic uncertainty by reporting less time for rest and recreation. In contrast,
women do not feel that they are restricted in social contacts or in their work capacity due to
economic uncertainty at the start of their career (see Columns III and IV). Thus, a first channel
of poorer mental conditions for women with a temporary first contract is that they feel more
oen depressed and under (time) pressure and less oen calm and peaceful.
Looking atmen, we find evidence for gender dierences in the health consequences of starting
a career with a fixed-term contract. Table 4.4 provides two notable insights: First, the coei-
cients for feeling under pressure show the opposite sign compared to the female sample, the
correlations with Vitality completely disappear. Men with a temporary job at the beginning of
the career seem to be less stressed or depressed than their counterparts with permanent first
contracts. Second, parts of the positive association with the overall mental health measure
can be attributed to changes in Social functioning and Role emotional. Unlike women, starting
a career with a fixed-term contract motivatesmen such that they feel more productive at work
and canmaintain their social contacts. Again, this finding arises not before the third year on
the labor market.
Next, we turn our attention to slightly dierent measures of well-being: Life and health sat-
isfaction are the dependent variables in Table 4.5. Estimation results show that women are
less satisfied with their lives when they enter the labor market with a temporary instead of
a permanent job. However, this negative relationship holds only contemporaneously and
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Table 4.3 : Eects on subcategories of women’s mental health
Dependent Variable Mental health Vitality Social
functioning
Role emotional
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
At labor market entry (1st year) -1.101 -1.774* -0.532 0.034
(0.966) (0.991) (1.034) (1.025)
2nd year on the labor market -1.478 -2.836*** -0.863 0.329
(0.945) (1.006) (0.965) (0.997)
3rd year on the labor market -1.860** -3.627*** -0.974 -0.259
(0.943) (1.079) (1.030) (1.079)
4th year on the labor market -1.384 -3.103*** 0.665 0.067
(0.999) (1.167) (1.165) (1.042)
5th year on the labor market -1.389 -2.332* 0.282 -0.208
(1.072) (1.194) (1.167) (1.130)
Observations 1,442 1,442 1,442 1,442
Notes: Marginal eects of starting a career with a fixed-term contract from OLS regressions with robust
standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses; dependent variables interpolated assuming a
linear trend; all regressions contain controls for individual characteristics, background characteristics, job
characteristics, personality traits and attitudes, partnership status, ex-ante health status, federal-state and
year dummies; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 4.4 : Eects on subcategories of men’s mental health
Dependent Variable Mental health Vitality Social
functioning
Role emotional
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
At labor market entry (1st year) -0.312 -1.348 0.945 0.186
(1.038) (1.105) (0.979) (1.040)
2nd year on the labor market 1.114 -0.010 0.143 0.109
(1.141) (1.132) (1.227) (1.115)
3rd year on the labor market 3.479*** 1.642 1.664 1.731*
(1.086) (1.271) (1.050) (0.958)
4th year on the labor market 2.783** 1.543 2.229** 1.316
(1.100) (1.336) (0.962) (1.027)
5th year on the labor market 1.336 1.667 2.698** 2.576**
(1.298) (1.351) (1.070) (1.094)
Observations 1,180 1,180 1,180 1,180
Notes: Marginal eects of starting a career with a fixed-term contract from OLS regressions with robust
standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses; dependent variables interpolated assuming a
linear trend; all regressions contain controls for individual characteristics, background characteristics, job
characteristics, personality traits and attitudes, partnership status, ex-ante health status, federal-state and
year dummies; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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becomes negligible and insignificant one year later. Turning to the second subjectivemeasure
of well-being, our results suggest no significant dierences in reported health satisfaction
between individuals starting their career with a fixed-term versus a permanent contract. All
in all, our estimations suggest that life and health satisfaction are not the channels trough
which mental health is aected.
Table 4.5 : Eects on life and health satisfaction
Dependent variable Life satisfaction Health satisfaction
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
Women Men Women Men
At labor market entry (1st year) -0.249* -0.171 -0.177 -0.197
(0.133) (0.140) (0.173) (0.143)
2nd year on the labor market 0.011 -0.068 0.065 -0.012
(0.131) (0.156) (0.153) (0.161)
3rd year on the labor market -0.050 0.113 0.071 -0.034
(0.125) (0.128) (0.151) (0.157)
4th year on the labor market -0.113 -0.093 0.016 0.039
(0.140) (0.137) (0.163) (0.166)
5th year on the labor market -0.032 -0.055 0.307* -0.047
(0.139) (0.139) (0.167) (0.167)
Observations 3,315 2,972 3,315 2,972
Notes: Marginal eects of starting a career with a fixed-term contract from OLS regressions with robust
standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses; all regressions contain controls for individual
characteristics, background characteristics, job characteristics, personality traits and attitudes, partnership
status, ex-ante health status, federal-state and year dummies; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
The subcategories have already shed some light on the question of channels driving the
relationship between economic uncertainty and men’s or women’s health conditions. To
analyze the underlying mechanisms more deeply, we now test whether the associations
of fixed-term employment at the start of a career and subsequent health outcomes can be
explained by 1) lower wages or 2) changes in the fertility behavior. To this point, we have
controlled for many wage predictors. Now, we re-estimate our main specification controlling
explicitly for monthly net income assigning a zero wage to unemployed individuals. If the
income and its profile over time are themain channel through which fixed-term jobs aect
health, the coeicient of fixed-term employment should become much smaller and even
insignificant. Similarly, if changes in the fertility behavior account for the negative (positive)
correlation, including a control variable for the number of children should at least capture
parts of the initial eect. In fact, women with a temporary first job are less likely to have
children within the first five years in the labor market. If this translates into lower mental
conditions, not the uncertainty but the fertility accounts for the negative estimates. However,
Table 4.6 assures that neither income nor fertility is able to explain why starting a career with
a fixed-term contract lowers women’s mental health in the short run and rises men’s health
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in the short to medium run. The estimated correlations are very similar to our main results,
indicating that we still lack a comprehensive explanation for the mechanism.
Table 4.6 : Eects onmental health controlling for income and fertility
Dependent variable Mental health
Women Men
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
At labor market entry (1st year) -1.068 -1.042 -0.289 -0.256
(1.029) (1.025) (0.980) (0.981)
2nd year on the labor market -1.750* -1.750* 0.415 0.375
(0.954) (0.943) (1.151) (1.150)
3rd year on the labor market -2.211** -2.278** 3.137*** 3.093***
(0.969) (0.961) (1.015) (1.019)
4th year on the labor market -1.236 -1.242 2.799*** 2.771***
(1.075) (1.061) (1.069) (1.068)
5th year on the labor market -1.185 -1.351 2.778** 2.742**
(1.123) (1.130) (1.164) (1.165)
Net income Yes No Yes No
Number of children No Yes No Yes
Observations 1,442 1,442 1,180 1,180
Notes:Marginal eects of starting a careerwith a fixed-term contract fromOLS regressionswith robust standard
errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses; dependent variable interpolated assuming a linear trend;
all regressions contain controls for individual characteristics, background characteristics, job characteristics,
personality traits and attitudes, partnership status, ex-ante health status, federal-state and year dummies; ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
4.4.2 Path Dependence as Potential Mechanism
The transmission channel we propose, is the incarceration eect of starting a career with a
fixed-term contract. We call this phenomenon path dependence since the type of the initial
employment contract prescribes the future career path. Table 4.7 shows the path dependence
of starting a career with a fixed-term contract. The probability of repeated spells in fixed-
term employment is positive and significant. We argue that the underlying mechanism for
the negative eects on women’s mental health is this path dependence and the associated
economic uncertainty due to the risk of becoming unemployed when the contract ends.
However, even if fixed-term employment seems to be little more persistent, men respond
dierently to economic uncertainty. A potential explanation is that men adjust their behavior
to the long-lasting uncertain employment situation and are able to handle the uncertainty in
a better way. Instead of increased levels of stress and anxiety about the future, they adapt to
the situation and thus improve themental conditions in the short to medium run. Another
possible explanation is that men with a temporary first contract experience better mental
health conditions, if they soon find a permanent position. Thus, switching to a permanent job
can account for the positive eects onmen’s mental health.
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Table 4.7 : Eects on future fixed-term contract
Dependent variable Future fixed-term contract
(I) (II)
Women Men
2nd year on the labor market 0.421*** 0.440***
(0.050) (0.061)
3rd year on the labor market 0.247*** 0.371***
(0.045) (0.061)
4th year on the labor market 0.151*** 0.284***
(0.038) (0.058)
5th year on the labor market 0.195*** 0.091**
(0.042) (0.039)
Observations 1,442 1,180
Notes: Marginal eects from OLS regressions of holding a fixed-term contract (conditional on first contract
was fixed-term) on starting a career with a fixed-term contract with robust standard errors clustered at the
individual level in parentheses; all regressions contain controls for individual characteristics, background
characteristics, job characteristics, personality traits and attitudes, partnership status, ex-ante health status,
federal-state and year dummies; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
How does the path dependence influence the relationship betweenmental health and start-
ing a career with a fixed-term contract? To answer this question, we go back to the initial
estimation equation replacing our main explanatory variable with two slightly dierent vari-
ables. The first indicator variable signals that a person changes from a fixed-term contract
to a permanent contract already aer the first year on the labor market. In this case, the
uncertainty aects the individual only for a very short period. The second variable is a binary
variable indicating that a person remains in fixed-term employment for at least one more
year. Thus, we actually split the main measure of starting a career with a fixed-term contract
into two variables: the first measures fixed-term employment in the short run and the second
a long-lasting uncertainty due to repeated fixed-term contracts. To confirm the hypothesis
of path dependence, we expect that the eect on mental health of starting a career with a
fixed-term contract is stronger if the individual is exposed to fixed-term employment for more
than one period. Table 4.8 reports gender-specific correlations between the type of the first
contract and the summary measure of mental health conditional on the duration of the initial
fixed-term contract. The estimates in Column I are based on a pooled regression of women’s
mental health on both explanatory variables and the full set of controls, the ones in Column II
make use of the male sample.
We find a large and negative coeicient in the second year on the labor market if a woman
who started with a fixed-term contract still holds a fixed-term contract. The coeicient is
statistically dierent from the point estimate for holding a fixed-term contract only in the first
year. The same applies to the estimate in the third year even if the dierence is marginally not
significant any more. This strongly supports our hypothesis of the negative path dependence.
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However, the pattern changes in the male sample. The positive relationship seems to be
mainly driven by men finding a permanent job during the first year aer labor market entry.
Thus, we conclude that the path dependence can explain the negative relationship only for
women since the positive eect in the male sample is due to the majority of men quickly
finding a permanent job.
Table 4.8 : Path dependence: eects onmental health
Dependent Variable Mental health
(I) (II)
Women Men
Duration of fixed-term contract Only 1st year More than 1 year Only 1st year More than 1 year
2nd year on the labor market 1.983 -2.844** 2.792 -1.137
(1.693) (1.417) (2.120) (1.783)
3rd year on the labor market 1.013 -2.730** 3.121* 1.628
(1.734) (1.355) (1.731) (1.502)
4th year on the labor market 1.192 -1.752 2.816 1.656
(1.914) (1.643) (1.892) (1.343)
5th year on the labor market -0.829 -0.840 2.638 1.832
(2.077) (1.420) (1.971) (1.396)
Observations 1,442 1,180
Notes:Marginal eects of starting a careerwith a fixed-term contract fromOLS regressionswith robust standard
errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses; dependent variable interpolated assuming a linear trend;
all regressions contain controls for individual characteristics, background characteristics, job characteristics,
personality traits and attitudes, partnership status, ex-ante health status, federal-state and year dummies; ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
To sum up, in the short run, we find a negative association between starting a career with a
fixed-term contract andmental health, but only for women. The path dependence of starting
a career with a fixed-term contract can explain these findings. At least in the short to medium
run, aected womenmight have a higher likelihood of remaining in precarious employment.
The prolonged uncertaintymight weaken themental health of these women. The fact that the
gap in mental health closes aer a few years is related to these women adapting to uncertain
circumstances or finding permanent jobs. In contrast, men seem to adapt much faster to the
economic uncertainty associated with a temporary first employment contract. Already in the
third year aer the labor market entry, men who started with a temporary contract report a
significantly higher mental health status. Although the persistence of fixed-term employment
is even stronger amongmen than among women, switching to a permanent job, potentially
explains the positive eects onmen’s mental health.
4.4.3 Sensitivity Analysis
In this section we investigate to what extent the previous results for the mental health status
are driven by the sample restrictions and the linearity assumption. First, we run the same
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regressions as in the previous analyses, but omit the linearity assumption. Therefore, wemake
use of the original data, which contain health information only bi-yearly (Table 4.9, Columns I
and II). Second, we add controls describing the characteristics of the first job (Table 4.9,
Columns III and IV). Third, we relax the sample restrictions by changing the age-at-graduation
cut-o (Table 4.10) aswell as by includingmenandwomenwith less than secondary education
(Table 4.11).
At first, Columns I and II of Table 4.9 discuss the sensitivity of the results by making use of
the original summary scale of female mental health, that is available only biannual. The
association for women between starting a career with a fixed-term contract andmental health
does not change qualitatively but quantitatively. The signs remain unchanged but the size
and the precision of the coeicients vary slightly: The associations are strong in Year 1, 3 and 5,
whereas coeicients are small and insignificant in Year 2 and 4. Since the gaps in the data
potentially account for this profile in the coeicients, we prefer the specification with the
assumption of a linear trend in the health status. Using averages gives a smoother pattern in
the coeicients but does not change the qualitative interpretation of the results.
Table 4.9 : Sensitivity analysis: original mental health measure
Dependent variable Original mental health index Mental health
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
Women Men Women Men
At labor market entry (1st year) -2.338 -0.364 -1.162 -0.261
(1.785) (1.736) (1.038) (1.049)
2nd year on the labor market -1.049 -1.078 -2.005** 0.400
(1.390) (2.098) (0.961) (1.200)
3rd year on the labor market -3.617** 4.398** -2.228** 3.182***
(1.534) (1.775) (0.996) (1.044)
4th year on the labor market -0.925 1.827 -1.326 2.792**
(1.767) (1.671) (1.100) (1.133)
5th year on the labor market -3.427* 4.411*** -1.285 2.851**
(1.750) (1.703) (1.172) (1.231)
First-job characteristics No No Yes Yes
Observations 729 588 1,442 1,180
Notes:Marginal eects of starting a careerwith a fixed-term contract fromOLS regressionswith robust standard
errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses; Columns I and II: original biannual mental health index;
Columns III and IV: interpolated annual measure of mental health; regressions contain controls for individual
characteristics, background characteristics, job characteristics, personality traits and attitudes, partnership
status, ex-ante health status, federal-state and year dummies; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
The second robustness check adds time-invariant first-job characteristics to the main regres-
sion equation. These fixed eects revoke all variation in the mental health status due to the
characteristics of the first job. The set of additional controls comprises the working hours,
self-employment as well as occupation and industry dummies of the first job. Columns III
and IV of Table 4.9 report the coeicients of starting a career with a fixed-term contract from
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the enlarged specification. The coeicients are very similar to the main results. Women’s
mental health is reduced in the second and third year on the labor market, whereas men
whose first contract is of limited duration exhibit higher health conditions from the third year
onward. Thus, we are convinced that selection based on the first-job characteristics cannot
explain the significant associations from themain tables.
Next, we provide evidence that the choice of the age-at-graduation cut-os does not alter
the findings. In the main sample, we restrict the age at graduation to a maximum of 35 years.
Table 4.10 shows the coeicients from regressions with a lower and higher age cut-o. The
results confirm the previous findings: women tend to indicate a lower mental health status in
the years aer career start if the first contract is limited in duration. The size of the estimates in
the sample with the oldest women being 30 at graduation is somewhat larger compared with
the numbers in the main regressions. Extending the sample up to age 40 dampens the eect
slightly. However, statistically, the coeicients are not dierent from the ones in Table 4.2.
Table 4.10 : Sensitivity analysis: dierent age-at-graduation cut-os
Dependent variable Mental health
Women Men
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
Sample Age at grad.
≤30
Age at grad.
≤40
Age at grad.
≤30
Age at grad.
≤40
At labor market entry (1st year) -1.297 -1.405 -0.169 -0.605
(1.102) (0.975) (1.143) (1.024)
2nd year on the labor market -1.851* -1.769* 0.355 0.345
(0.984) (0.910) (1.325) (1.160)
3rd year on the labor market -2.539** -1.981** 3.099*** 2.686**
(1.002) (0.948) (1.157) (1.047)
4th year on the labor market -1.943* -1.234 2.939** 2.502**
(1.089) (1.044) (1.208) (1.098)
5th year on the labor market -1.731 -1.211 3.749*** 1.925*
(1.171) (1.104) (1.259) (1.142)
Observations 1,225 1,577 964 1,366
Notes:Marginal eects of starting a careerwith a fixed-term contract fromOLS regressionswith robust standard
errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses; dependent variable interpolated assuming a linear trend;
all regressions contain controls for individual characteristics, background characteristics, job characteristics,
personality traits and attitudes, partnership status, ex-ante health status, federal-state and year dummies; ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
The results for men approve that fixed-term employment at the beginning of the career posi-
tively aects men’s mental health. Again, the estimates are smaller for the sample including
older men but the basic insights remain unchanged. Thus, the negative relationship in the
female and the positive in the male sample seem to be driven by younger individuals. Never-
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theless, we can conclude that the choice of the age-at-graduation cut-o does not significantly
influence our results.
Finally, we relax the education restriction and include men and women who have no sec-
ondary school degree. As Table 4.11 shows, these individuals do not substantially change the
estimates. Themain pattern from the previous regressions remains the same. In the very short
run, women react to temporary employment at the beginning of their careers with reduced
mental health. This eect becomes weaker over time but the negative sign does not vanish.
The size of the association in the second and third year is slightly smaller but statistically not
distinguishable from the former results. In the male sample, previous findings are confirmed
as well.
Table 4.11 : Sensitivity analysis: including individuals without secondary degree
Dependent variable Mental health
(I) (II)
Women Men
At labor market entry (1st year) -1.197 0.039
(1.006) (0.996)
2nd year on the labor market -1.555 0.703
(0.957) (1.058)
3rd year on the labor market -1.982** 2.376**
(0.940) (1.004)
4th year on the labor market -1.034 2.076**
(1.028) (1.054)
5th year on the labor market -1.046 2.208*
(1.098) (1.143)
Observations 1,562 1,320
Notes:Marginal eects of starting a careerwith a fixed-term contract fromOLS regressionswith robust standard
errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses; dependent variable interpolated assuming a linear trend;
all regressions contain controls for individual characteristics, background characteristics, job characteristics,
personality traits and attitudes, partnership status, ex-ante health status, federal-state and year dummies; ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
4.4.4 Heterogeneous Health Eects by Education
Motivated by the previous section, we analyze the eects of starting a career with a fixed-
term contract for educational subgroups. Table 4.12 shows that women as well as men who
have less than a university degree are responsible for the eects of starting a career with
a fixed-term contract. The associations are very similar to the overall eects even if the
pattern for women with secondary education diers slightly. The coeicient remains large
and significant also aer 5 years on the labor market. These women probably have diiculties
to find a permanent job and remain in fixed-term employment. In contrast, among women
with university education, estimation results suggest no significant association between the
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type of the first contract andmental health. An potential explanation is that highly educated
women are able to change to a permanent positionmore quickly. For men with secondary
education, we observe the opposite eects. Three years aer they started a career with a
temporary job, they report a significantly higher mental health status. In contrast, the mental
health of men with tertiary education seems to be unaected by the type of contract held in
their first job.
Table 4.12 : Eects onmental health by education
Dependent variable Mental health
Women Men
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
Secondary
education
Tertiary
education
Secondary
education
Tertiary
education
At labor market entry (1st year) -0.467 -0.396 -0.120 -2.361
(1.485) (1.508) (1.357) (1.569)
2nd year on the labor market -1.513 -0.372 0.994 -1.784
(1.340) (1.516) (1.909) (1.505)
3rd year on the labor market -2.371* -0.405 4.886*** -0.099
(1.385) (1.682) (1.142) (1.655)
4th year on the labor market -1.862 0.515 4.055*** 0.837
(1.573) (1.722) (1.340) (1.640)
5th year on the labor market -2.348 0.768 3.772** 1.041
(1.638) (1.903) (1.488) (1.956)
Observations 867 542 721 433
Notes:Marginal eects of starting a careerwith a fixed-term contract fromOLS regressionswith robust standard
errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses; dependent variable interpolated assuming a linear trend;
all regressions contain controls for individual characteristics, background characteristics, job characteristics,
personality traits and attitudes, partnership status, ex-ante health status, federal-state and year dummies; ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
4.4.5 Selection into Fixed-term Employment
In this section,wepresentevidence that theeectof startingacareerwitha fixed-termcontract
is not purely due to selection. To this point, we are able to estimate a consistent average
treatment eect on the treated (ATT), that is, the mean eect for those men and women
who started their career with a fixed-term contract (FT = 1) conditional on all observable
factors,X : ATT = E(Y1 − Yo|X,FT = 1). If we are willing to belief that, conditional on all
observable characteristics, holding a fixed-term contract at the start of the career is randomly
assigned, then we are able to estimate a consistent average treatment eect (ATE). This is
the expected eect on a randomly drawn person from the population of men and women
entering the labor market not later than age 35 (see Wooldridge, 2010, Chapter 21).
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However, the underlying problem is that starting a career with a fixed-term contract is not
randomly assigned. For instance, an individual with very high ability will bemore likely to find
a permanent contract – at least it is more likely that her employer will oer her a permanent
contract aer a short probation period with a fixed-term contract. At the same time, she
might have fewer mental problems due to economic uncertainty since she is convinced that
her ability will be an advantage in finding an appropriate and permanent position. Such a
situation would cause a positive bias and the results would underestimate the true eect.
Fortunately, the SOEP data allow us to control for a variety of individual characteristics that
are typically unobserved in other survey data and proxy well for unobserved ability. Thus, all
regressions include controls for the degree of risk aversion, the locus of control as well as a
set of personality traits and general attitudes.
Nevertheless, we further investigate the selection issue by testing whether any of the prede-
termined observable characteristics significantly aects the likelihood of starting the career
with a fixed-term contract (Table C.3 in the Appendix). Almost none of the coeicients are
significantly dierent from zero, the only exception in the female sample is age, meaning
that older women are less likely to start a career with a fixed-term contract. In the male
sample none of the explanatory variables helps predicting the type of the first contract. It
is important to note that all variables related to the health status before labor market entry
have no explanatory power for the type of first contract. Even if we include ex-ante life and
health satisfaction, as in Columns II and IV, the coeicients remain insignificant. This result is
reassuring and important as it provides further supporting evidence against the possibility of
health-related self-selection into fixed-term contracts at labor market entry.
Finally, we investigate the robustness of our results to omitted variable bias. In so doing, we
follow Oster (2013) who recently developed a novel method to assess the bias that arises
from unobserved factors. Oster’s method relies on the choice of the degree of proportionality
between the selection based on observable and unobservable factors (δ˜). We assume equal
importanceof observable andunobservable factors, that is δ˜ = 1. Weare thenable to compute
a bias-adjusted coeicient (β∗) of starting a career with a fixed-term contract equal to
(4.2) β∗
(
R2max, δ˜
)
= β˜ − δ˜
[
β˙ − β˜
] R2max − R˜2
R˜2 − R˙2 .
R˙2 and β˙ come from a regression of the health outcome on starting a career with a fixed-term
contract without further controls. R˜2 and β˜ arise from a controlled regression as in Table 4.2.3
The adjustment of β˜ accounts for changes in the estimated coeicients due to the observable
controls weighted by relative changes in the explained variation in mental health. R2max is
the hypothetical value ofR2 controlling for all observable and unobservable characteristics.
3 If we include control variables in the male sample, the coeicients rise. Only under the assumption δ˜ < 0,
that is, the selection based on observable and based on unobservable characteristics go in dierent directions,
the bias adjustment would make sense. Since the derivation of the bias-adjusted coeicient in this case is not
straight forward, we refrain from showing bias-adjusted estimates for men.
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Following Oster (2013), we chooseR2max = min{2.2R˜2, 1}. In the end, we obtain an identified
set of the treatment eect of starting a career with a fixed-term contract
[
β˜, β∗
(
R2max, δ˜
)]
. If
this set excludes 0, the controlled coeicients can be considered robust to omitted variable
bias.
Table 4.13 : Robustness to omitted variable bias of the results for women
Dependent variable Mental Health
(I) (II) (III)
Baseline eect β˙ Controlled eect β˜ Identified set [β˜, β∗]
At labor market entry (1st year) -1.231 -1.071 [-1.071, -0.870]
(1.095) (1.027)
2nd year on the labor market -1.894* -1.716* [-1.716, -1.493]
(1.005) (0.95)
3rd year on the labor market -2.430** -2.185** [-2.185, -1.878]
(1.011) (0.968)
4th year on the labor market -1.820* -1.144 [-1.144, -0.295]
(1.096) (1.073)
5th year on the labor market -2.127* -1.191 [-1.191, -0.018]
(1.194) (1.126)
R2 R˙2 : 0.012 R˜2 : 0.277 R2max: 0.610
Observations 1,442 1,442
Notes:Marginal eects of starting a careerwith a fixed-term contract fromOLS regressionswith robust standard
errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses; Column I: baseline regression contains no controls;
Column II: controlled regression contains controls for individual characteristics, background characteristics,
job characteristics, personality traits and attitudes, partnership status, ex-ante health status, federal-state
and year dummies; Column III: identified set gives a lower bound for the coeicients from the controlled
specification assuming equal selection based on observable and unobservable characteristics, δ˜ = 1; ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 4.13 shows in Column I the coeicients from the baseline model without controls,
whereas Column II displays the controlled coeicients. For each year aer labor market entry,
the estimates become slightly smaller if we include the full set of controls. In addition, theR2
increases from 0.012 to 0.277 meaning that the controlled model is able to explain a much
larger part of the variance in mental health. In the last column, we present the identified set
with the controlled coeicient as upper bound and the bias-adjusted coeicient as lower
bound. Since all sets exclude 0, we can conclude that under the assumption of equal selection
based on observable and unobservable characteristics our controlled estimates are robust to
omitted variable bias.
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4.5 Conclusion
The analysis sheds light on potential spill-over eects of fixed-term employment on health
outcomes. Using German data on youngmale and female graduates, we find a substantial
reduction in female mental well-being due to fixed-term employment at the beginning of the
career. This association is significant only in the short run, and has no eect aer the third
year on the labor market. In contrast, young male graduates are not aected in the short
run but starting with the third year aer labor market entry they report an improvedmental
health status. Detailed analyses of the subcategories of the summary measure of mental
health reveal that women with a limited first employment contract experience more (time)
pressure and feel more oen depressed. For men, however, limitations in social interactions
and job productivity are alleviated. The main results are robust to several sensitivity tests.
A possible explanation is the path dependence of starting a career with a fixed-term contract.
The likelihood of repeated spells in precarious jobs is significantly higher when entering the
labor market with a temporary contract. Thus, we measure an indirect eect of the initial
contract on health, that works through recurrent contemporaneous economic instabilities.
The heterogeneity analysis shows that women with secondary education are particularly
aected. We address potential endogeneity threats by including a large set of controls and
by showing evidence against health-related self-selection into temporary contracts at the
beginning of a career. Among men and women, ex-ante baseline health indicators are not
related to the type of contract in the first job. Hence, the results suggest a robust, negative
association between fixed-term employment and women’s mental health in the short run and
a positive relationship with men’s mental health in the short to medium run.
Subject of this study are graduates and newcomers on the labor market from the generations
below age 35. As a result of their youth, they suer less from physical problems but are
rather aected bymental illness. If economic uncertainty due to fixed-term employment at
the beginning of the career facilitates poor mental conditions for women, this implies costs
that are probably not indented by the policymakers. Given the importance of mental health
problems for absenteeism fromwork, further research should also take into account potential
consequences of fixed-term employment for employers and health insurance companies.
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Appendix C.1 Supplementary Tables
Table C.1 : Summary statistics of control variables for female sample
N Mean SD Min Max
Age 1442 28.08 4.12 18 39
Migratory background 1442 0.21 0.41 0 1
Years of education 1442 13.96 2.68 7 18
Born in East Germany 1442 0.36 0.48 0 1
Mother tertiary education 1442 0.15 0.36 0 1
Mother employed 1442 0.39 0.49 0 1
Mother’s age at birth 1442 26.38 5.21 16 43
Siblings 1442 0.90 0.29 0 1
Openness 1442 4.80 1.13 1.33 7
Agreeableness 1442 5.58 0.89 2.33 7
Conscientiousness 1442 5.77 0.88 2.67 7
Extraversion 1442 5.12 1.21 1.67 7
Neuroticism 1442 4.35 0.81 2.33 6.33
Risk aversion 1442 0.05 0.23 0 1
Internal locus of control 1442 4.11 0.67 2.56 6.22
Importance of having children 1442 0.71 0.46 0 1
Importance of partnership 1442 0.92 0.27 0 1
Importance of career 1442 0.92 0.27 0 1
Importance of aording sth. 1442 0.88 0.32 0 1
Unemployed 1442 0.22 0.42 0 1
Weekly working hours 1442 30.06 18.89 0 75
Part-time work 1442 0.14 0.34 0 1
Self-employed 1442 0.04 0.20 0 1
Blue collar job 1442 0.07 0.26 0 1
White collar job 1442 0.60 0.49 0 1
Doctor visits 1442 9.12 11.38 0 80
Hospital stays 1442 0.11 0.44 0 4
Partnership 1442 0.78 0.42 0 1
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Table C.2 : Summary statistics of control variables for male sample
N Mean SD Min Max
Age 1180 28.75 4.29 19 39
Migratory background 1180 0.15 0.36 0 1
Years of education 1180 13.82 2.89 7 18
Born in East Germany 1180 0.36 0.48 0 1
Mother tertiary education 1180 0.13 0.34 0 1
Mother employed 1180 0.41 0.49 0 1
Mother’s age at birth 1180 26.29 4.76 16 46
Siblings 1180 0.83 0.38 0 1
Openness 1180 4.61 1.12 1.67 7
Agreeableness 1180 5.44 0.92 2.67 7
Conscientiousness 1180 5.64 0.93 2 7
Extraversion 1180 4.84 1.19 1.67 7
Neuroticism 1180 4.05 0.82 2 6.67
Risk aversion 1180 0.02 0.15 0 1
Internal locus of control 1180 4.07 0.66 2.67 6.33
Importance of having children 1180 0.51 0.50 0 1
Importance of partnership 1180 0.88 0.33 0 1
Importance of career 1180 0.95 0.23 0 1
Importance of aording sth. 1180 0.93 0.26 0 1
Unemployed 1180 0.12 0.33 0 1
Weekly working hours 1180 39.04 17.12 0 80
Part-time work 1180 0.03 0.17 0 1
Self-employed 1180 0.08 0.27 0 1
Blue collar job 1180 0.26 0.44 0 1
White collar job 1180 0.46 0.50 0 1
Doctor visits 1180 4.54 7.75 0 60
Hospital stays 1180 0.06 0.25 0 2
Partnership 1180 0.64 0.48 0 1
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Table C.3 : Selection into fixed-term contract at the beginning of the career
Dependent Variable Starting the career with a fixed-term contract
Women Men
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
Ex-ante mental health 0.000 0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Ex-ante health satisfaction -0.005 0.001
(0.018) (0.018)
Ex-ante life satisfaction -0.017 -0.008
(0.019) (0.017)
Number of annual doctor visits -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Number of nights in hospital 0.054 0.057 -0.010 -0.010
(0.047) (0.047) (0.084) (0.085)
Age -0.013* -0.013 0.002 0.002
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008)
Migratory Background -0.027 -0.031 -0.030 -0.032
(0.070) (0.069) (0.072) (0.074)
Years of education 0.015 0.016 0.003 0.004
(0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014)
Born in East Germany -0.034 -0.035 -0.140 -0.144
(0.097) (0.095) (0.090) (0.093)
Mother tertiary education -0.118 -0.121 -0.026 -0.024
(0.077) (0.078) (0.082) (0.083)
Mother employed -0.071 -0.067 -0.024 -0.023
(0.085) (0.084) (0.087) (0.088)
Mother’s age at birth 0.006 0.006 -0.003 -0.003
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Siblings 0.013 0.013 -0.042 -0.041
(0.088) (0.088) (0.072) (0.074)
Openness -0.005 -0.002 0.021 0.022
(0.027) (0.027) (0.025) (0.025)
Agreeableness 0.004 0.002 -0.009 -0.009
(0.031) (0.031) (0.029) (0.029)
Conscientiousness -0.046 -0.046 -0.016 -0.016
(0.037) (0.037) (0.027) (0.028)
Extraversion -0.021 -0.018 -0.033 -0.033
(0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.025)
Neuroticism 0.054 0.056 -0.010 -0.011
(0.036) (0.036) (0.034) (0.034)
Risk aversion -0.055 -0.048 0.088 0.079
(0.114) (0.118) (0.105) (0.109)
Internal locus of control 0.009 0.004 -0.046 -0.051
(0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.045)
Weekly working Hours -0.004 -0.004 0.003 0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Part-time employed -0.016 -0.023 0.245 0.238
(0.089) (0.088) (0.174) (0.177)
Self-employed -0.240 -0.241 -0.243 -0.238
(0.157) (0.158) (0.159) (0.161)
Blue collar job 0.181 0.176 0.249 0.253
(0.164) (0.163) (0.163) (0.164)
White collar job 0.102 0.103 0.108 0.112
(0.117) (0.117) (0.150) (0.151)
Partnership 0.021 0.020 -0.087 -0.083
(0.061) (0.062) (0.055) (0.056)
Observations 297 297 245 245
R2 0.325 0.328 0.365 0.365
Notes: Marginal eects from OLS regressions with robust standard errors clustered at the individual level
in parentheses; dependent variables interpolated assuming a linear trend; all regressions contain industry,
federal-state, and year dummies; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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